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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY 
 
1.   The effectiveness of public service delivery depends in large part on the capability, 
resources and inputs, and the motivation of frontline service providers at the local level. In Nepal 
a combination of de-concentrated line agencies and local bodies at the district, municipal, and village 
level provides inputs which are translated into delivery of service outputs and outcomes. Yet the 
relationships between line agencies and local bodies in service delivery are not well understood. This 
study seeks to map out the dynamics of service delivery at the local level through analysis of the 
institutional framework and actual practices in service delivery in 14 jurisdictions in the two districts 
of Dhankuta and Dhanusa. The study includes a detailed review of the provision of local roads 
networks and primary and lower secondary education. 
 
Institutional Framework for Local Bodies 
 
2.   Nepal’s approach to local government has historically emphasized local participation 
and empowerment rather than creating institutions for service delivery. Over 50 years of sub-
national governance reforms have yielded an administrative framework of local bodies (LBs) 
consisting of 75 District Development Committees (DDCs), 58 Municipalities and 3,915 Village 
Development Committees (VDCs). As the LBs’ names indicate, their primary role is ‘development’, 
understood as carrying out small capital works, rather than local governments ensuring a mix of inputs 
for effective delivery of public services. 
 
3.   LBs presently are run by centrally appointed civil servants. Elected local body councils 
ceased to operate in 2002, at the height of Nepal’s internal conflict. For the past 12 years seconded 
civil servants have been responsible for the day-to-day management of LBs, working with unelected 
councils consisting of representatives from line departments and other local stakeholders. For a short 
period LBs were required to consult with local representatives of political parties, but this practice was 
halted after allegations of corruption. Senior LB officers are seconded by the Ministry of Federal 
Affairs and Local Development (MoFALD), the central agency responsible for decentralization and 
local development issues. 
 
4.   LBs’ revenues have increased six-fold over the past six years without a corresponding 
overhaul of their institutional framework. In contrast to other South Asian countries, Nepal’s LBs 
account for a significant proportion of total public expenditure. Central government grants and 
transfers to them have accounted for 9 to 12% of total central government expenditures from FY 
2009/10 to FY 2012/13. 
 
5.   Coherence in legislation regarding functional assignments could be strengthened. The 
1999 Local Self Government Act (LSGA) assigns a wide range of functions including broad 
responsibilities in the education, roads, water, health, agriculture and other sectors. There is overlap 
between district and primary level VDC and municipality functions. Most important, the LSGA is not 
aligned with other Government legislation, particularly the Government of Nepal (Allocation of 
Business) Rules (2008, amended in 2009). The list of functions is thus a permitted list, rather than 
mandated responsibilities. LBs’ functional responsibilities effectively follow a principle of 
‘supplementarity’ to those of line agencies, rather than subsidiarity whereby responsibilities are 
assigned to the lowest level with sufficient capability. 
 
6.   Local spending patterns in Dhankuta and Dhanusa show LB involvement in a wide 
range of sectors. LBs in practice fulfil functions where there is no other entity involved – essentially 
vital events registration – or for which they receive earmarked grants, such as disbursements of social 
benefits. In addition to spending on core administration and projects dictated by earmarked grants, 
LBs fund small projects in a wide range of functional areas, including those which are not indicated in 
the LSGA, such as the police. 
 
7.   LB revenues are dominated by intergovernmental transfers. Own source revenues (OSR) 
account for a small and diminishing share of total LB revenues, dropping from 17.5% in FY 2006/07 
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to 13% in FY 2012/13. LB taxes are mostly nuisance taxes with limitations on setting rates and the tax 
base. At the same time there has been a six-fold increase in the size of intergovernmental fiscal 
transfers from FY 2006/7 to 2012/13, driven in part by an even larger eight-fold increase in transfers 
for social payments for the same period. Overall, the share of transfers in LBs’ budgets has increased 
from 60% to 83% in the same period. Transfers range from mostly discretionary block grants to 
strictly earmarked transfers for social security and capital projects. VDCs and municipalities enjoy 
substantial discretion over roughly 50% of their total revenues; DDCs, on the other hand, are much 
more dependent on conditional grants, over which they have limited discretion. 
 
8.   Planning for the use of LB resources is empowering to local communities but the process 
does not facilitate cohesive planning for service delivery. LBs prepare five-year periodic plans 
which are to inform annual plans and budgets. Annual LB planning involves a bottom-up, fourteen-
step process which is often not fully observed. The process has yielded significant involvement at the 
grassroots level, with 40% of LB financed projects originating via local Ward Citizen Forums, though 
there is indication of substantial influence on decision-making by local elites. Most importantly, 
decision-making is rarely informed by technical assessments or a holistic analysis of service needs. 
The LB planning cycle is not aligned with the national and deconcentrated line agency planning cycle; 
linkages between the two processes are ad hoc. 
 
9.   The LB planning process and method of executing projects reflects a priority on widely 
spreading resources. In Dhanusa and Dhankuta VDCs and municipalities annually fund dozens of 
small projects averaging as little as NPR 100,000 (US$ 1,000). DDCs have the same spending 
patterns, only for an even greater number of projects of somewhat higher value. Execution of projects 
overwhelmingly occurs via User Committees (UCs) which are to be formed among beneficiaries of the 
proposed project and may receive funding directly for projects up to NPR 6 million. 
 
10.   LB financial management practices could be reviewed to improve the coherence of 
spending on sectors and accountability. Although there are required formats, there is wide variance 
among actual LB financial reports. Reporting on expenditure is organized according to revenue source 
devoted to that expenditure; this leads to unusual expenditure items appearing in financial reports, 
such as ‘land registration fees’. The breakdown by revenue source indicates that multiple revenue 
sources are not used for the same expenditure item. There is no breakdown of expenditures by function 
or sector, with the partial exception of showing expenditures on target beneficiary groups, such as 
women or children, for block grant spending. Consolidated financial reports are not aggregated at any 
level. The Auditor General’s Office audits DDCs while private auditors are used for municipalities and 
VDCs; there appears to be limited follow up on audit findings. 
 
Frontline Service Delivery in the Roads Sector 
 
11.   LBs are broadly responsible for the local roads network. The local roads network is 
defined as roads which are not part of the national Strategic Road Network (SRN). Although the 
Department of Roads is in some instances involved with the local roads sector, most construction, 
upgrading and maintenance of the Local Road Network (LRN) is undertaken by LBs. However, the 
central Department of Local Infrastructure Development and Agricultural Roads in MoFALD 
exercises substantial guidance through the provision of conditional grants and supervision of local 
District Technical Offices. 
 
12.   LBs work on local roads is funded out of their discretionary resources and conditional 
grants. Only DDCs and municipalities receive conditional grants. The extent to which LBs spend their 
discretionary resources in the local roads sector varies: municipalities spend the highest proportion, 
followed by DDCs and then VDCs. 
 
13.   Annual roads sector planning at the district level is guided by District Transport Master 
Plans (DTMPs). DTMPs only provide a framework for the District Road Core Network (DRCN), for 
which DDCs are responsible. However, they do not govern planning of village or municipal roads 
which can account for up to 50% of the length of all registered local roads. Moreover, DDCs when 
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using their discretionary revenues follow the annual LB planning process with little reference to their 
DTMPs. This results in diffuse spending on a large number of relatively small projects, most of which 
are implemented by so called User Committees rather than contractors. 
 
14.   The flow of funds from conditional grants can complicate integrated planning for the 
roads network. There are a large number of conditional grants for items involving the local roads 
network, including separate grants for local roads, agricultural roads, suspension bridges, and bridges. 
Frequent end-of-year budget reallocations by the central government and ad hoc funding make 
planning difficult. Delays in fund release are common and result in impromptu adjustments to local 
roads sector plans. 
 
15.   Technical capacity at the local level is limited. VDCs almost never have full-time technical 
staff and the District Technical Offices (DTOs) lack the resources to service all local needs. There are 
about 1,150 total staff in all DTOs which handle all local infrastructure projects, including local roads, 
while there are annually in excess of 100,000 small local projects in all LBs. Providing engineering 
oversight for the over 100 annual works projects in DDCs alone stretches capacity. 
 
Frontline Service Delivery in the Basic (Primary and Lower Secondary) Education Sector 
 
16.   Planning, supervision of delivery, and quality control in the basic education sector 
(grades 1-8) is the responsibility of the Ministry of Education (MoE) and its Department of 
Education (DoE). Sub-nationally, District Education Offices (DEOs) supervise, monitor and channel 
funds to schools. At the local level, School Management Committees (SMCs, elected by parents) 
ensure day-to-day management functions, including expenditure. 
 
17.   The sector has decentralized most operational issues to the School Management 
Committees. SMCs are expected to provide regular financial and progress reports to their respective 
DOEs. These financial reports presently are limited to grants received from the central government 
and currently do not include other sources of income, such as from rents or grants from LBs which are 
referred to as ‘off-budget’ income. In principle, school financial accounts are audited every year by 
private sector auditors; in practice, 40% of schools do not undergo regular annual audits though they 
continue to receive grants. 
 
18.   LBs have a formal but unrealized role in education through Education Committees. Each 
VEC, MEC, and DEC is to be chaired by the head of the corresponding LB. They have a mandate to 
engage in planning, resource mobilization, and monitoring. However, these bodies rarely meet. 
Planning and execution of school budgets occurs via SMCs and the offices of the Ministry of 
Education. 
 
19.   Primary and lower secondary schools receive most of their funding through grants from 
the central government. Well over 90% of schools budgets are from central government grants. The 
per student amounts provided to districts and then passed on to schools vary considerably between 
districts, with Dhankuta district receiving twice as much as Dhanusa. 
 
20.   LB contributions to schools’ financing are a small and declining proportion of total 
school income. While reports from 2008 and 2009 indicated as much as 13% of total school 
expenditures being financed by LBs, data from schools in Dhankuta and Dhanusa showed LBs 
contributing less than 2% of total revenues in the three years from 2009/10 to 2012/13. These figures 
are consistent with the larger schools public expenditure tracking survey completed in 2013. In 
addition to providing schools with operating grants, LBs spend directly on the construction of school 
buildings and facilities, the purchase of books and equipment, and on a range of other items or 
activities. Regulations prohibit LBs from directly contracting with teachers, though grants once 
received by schools can be utilized by SMCs for any type of expenditure. LB direct spending on 
school education is dispersed among numerous small items. 
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21.   The decline in LB spending in the basic education sector is due to a perception of 
relatively lower needs of schools, though not to perceptions of lower importance of education. 
Many schools are currently carrying over significant unspent balances from one year to the next.  This 
implies that schools do not need (or are not seen to need) supplementary funding from LBs. In the case 
of Dhankuta, this has been compounded by an overall 25% drop in enrolment between 2009/10 and 
2012/13.  At the same time, survey results show that education is rated among the most important 
public services by local citizens. 
 
22.   There are aspects of education outside of operating schools where the Education 
Committees should, but do not presently play a role. These include issues of getting out-of-school 
children into schools, reconfiguring local schools as a response to declining enrolment rates, and 
addressing the factors underlying drop-out rates. LBs do not appear to address such education issues in 
their own planning processes or through their leadership of local Education Committees. 
 
Recommendations 
 
23.   The findings of this study point to two sets of potential measures to improve frontline 
service delivery: long term changes in the institutional framework and short and medium term 
actionable steps within the existing framework. Improvements can be made both in LBs’ general 
performance and capacity to contribute to service delivery, as well as actions that directly concern the 
local roads and basic education sectors. 
 
Long Term Institutional Considerations 
 
24.   Long term fundamental changes must be considered within the context of broader 
deliberations on federalism in Nepal as well as ongoing efforts to strengthen LBs. While 
deliberations to date on changing the government structure have focused on defining federal units, the 
role of LBs and the lower links in the service delivery chain will also be critical elements. Local 
governments are likely to have a place in a new federal system, albeit not necessarily the existing 
units. Changes could also build on local governance reforms undertaken under MoFALD’s Local 
Governance and Community Development Program. 
 
25.   Changes to the institutional framework could seek to build stronger lines of 
accountability for service delivery, addressing the classic ‘building blocks’ of decentralized 
government: functions, finance, and functionaries. This could include: 
 Clarifying functional assignments by: introducing the concept of ‘own exclusive’ assignments 
for LBs; allow for asymmetric assignment, recognizing geographic and demographic 
variations among local government units; delineating tasks for shared functions; retaining 
substantial local discretion to take on functions voluntarily since LBs are best positioned to 
respond to local needs and priorities; ensuring harmonization with other (sectoral) legislation, 
particularly the Government Rules of Business; 
 Strengthening the intergovernmental financial system to provide more predictability and 
stimulate local revenue collection effort. Reforms in revenue assignments could focus on 
boosting own source revenues, while fiscal transfers could be consolidated, made more 
predictable and equitable, and designed so as to incentivize own source revenue collection at 
the sub-national level; 
 Developing personnel systems that support local bodies’ administrative authority, creating a 
local government cadre; and 
 Conducting elections to LBs in order to constitute them in a manner that makes them 
accountable to citizens. Though elections are far from the only means of building downward 
accountability, they would play an overall framework that would incentivize performance in 
serving citizens in localities. 
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Potential Actionable Steps in the Short and Medium Term 
 
For the Government of Nepal, initiated by MoFALD in the Short Term: 
 
26.   Address LB human resource constraints. LBs, especially VDCs, would benefit from 
additional capacity in accounting and in basic engineering. Two options may be considered: 
 Provide for accountant and overseer positions among VDC staff, and augment positions in 
DDCs and municipalities. 
 Facilitate the hiring of accountants and overseers which could be shared by several VDCs and 
perhaps municipalities and DDCs. 
Such a change could involve establishing links with professional associations (such as the Institute of 
Chartered Accountants of Nepal) that have members who can provide these technical and managerial 
inputs. Additional personnel are likely to require additional financing, though this could be justified by 
the fact that LBs are receiving six times more funds than before. Any increase in funding for personnel 
could be matched with more rigorous monitoring of standards for financial management and technical 
inputs. 
 
27.   Adjust planning processes. Although much of the planning process is mandated by law and 
hence not easily changed, there may be adjustments that could lead to more strategic and service-
focused plans which incorporate principles of good public investment management. These are: 
 Introducing needs assessments into the planning process. This could involve having 
mandatory planning formats that LBs could use to estimate the baseline levels of service, 
constraints and problems in key local service sectors, e.g. roads, water & sanitation, education, 
and health. These assessments could encourage more strategic investments as well as 
consideration of how LB activities can contribute towards improving the quality and/or 
quantity of those services. 
 Harmonizing the LB and sector planning calendar. This could allow for more synergy at the 
local level. 
 Orienting local planning processes towards a medium-term or ‘pipeline’ perspective. This 
would address short-termism and the danger of ‘participation fatigue’ of annual planning 
exercises. 
 
28.   Strengthen LBs financial management framework. The increase in resources makes 
improving the framework whereby LBs manage their funds a priority. There are several actions that 
might be considered: 
 Unifying, harmonizing and simplifying reporting formats and making their use mandatory. 
Reports could consolidate various revenues and expenditures, regardless of source into one 
document that is exactly the same for all LBs of the same type. 
 Strengthening MoFALD capacity to ensure reporting and interpret LBs’ spending patterns. 
MoFALD could become able to collate and use LB reports for purposes of monitoring and 
broader strategic planning. 
 Incrementally introducing functional expenditure reporting. This could start with reporting on 
capital or developmental expenditures, for which LBs would be expected to provide a simple 
but clear breakdown in terms of sectors, regardless. 
 Consolidating bank accounts held by LBs. This could reduce fiduciary risk as well as 
encourage LBs to report on expenditures and revenues in a more comprehensive and less 
piecemeal way. 
 Removing a local bottleneck in the disbursement of transfers. While delays in 
intergovernmental transfers are beyond MoFALD’s control, at the local level LDOs’ authority 
to release funds to VDCs creates unwarranted delays. Rather than having LDOs wait to group 
requests from VDCs before approving disbursements, VDCs could submit their financial 
reports directly to the DTCO with a copy to their DDC. The DDC would have a set time 
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period (for instance two weeks) to raise any concerns; in the absence of written concerns, the 
DTCO would be authorized to release funds directly to the VDC’s account. 
 
For the Government of Nepal, initiated by MoFALD in the Medium Term: 
 
29.   Delineate service responsibilities to the extent possible within existing legislation. 
Delineation should occur between DDCs and primary tier VDCs and municipalities, as well as in 
relation to central government agencies. For services which presently are essentially overseen by the 
central government through deconcentrated departments, such as education, guidance on what LBs are 
responsible for could be developed in conjunction with sector agencies. 
 
30.   A delineation of service responsibilities might first be modelled and tested for a few 
functions. There are many types of inputs and activities that are carried out to deliver services, with 
much differentiation among services. The GoN might consider modelling a detailed description of 
what LBs (with differentiation among VDCs, municipalities, and DDCs) and what line agencies would 
be responsible for in two or three functions. One would be a case where there is clearly a large role 
played by LBs (e.g. local roads, water supply) and the other might be a case where central agencies 
will play a major role (e.g. social services such as health or education). The delineation would 
distinguish between operational authority to make decisions on quantity and quality of services 
delivered; long term planning, including capital investment; service standards; oversight and 
monitoring functions; and incentives for performance. 
 
31.   Simplify the system of intergovernmental fiscal transfers. Conditional grants that target the 
same sector, such as local roads or water & sanitation, could to the extent possible be provided at the 
same time and have harmonized reporting requirements. Consolidation could help central management 
of fund flows and, more importantly, could provide an enabling framework for a more strategic 
approach to service delivery in these functional areas. 
 
32.   Improve the predictability of intergovernmental fiscal transfers. This could include 
avoiding ad hoc and mid/end year allocations, providing LBs with future transfer ceilings prior to the 
annual local planning/budgeting cycle, and considering more formula-driven allocations which 
recognize objective disparities among LB jurisdictions, particularly for conditional grants. 
 
For DoLIDAR/MoFALD: 
 
33.   More fully integrate the District Technical Offices into the DDC structure, rather than 
preserving the at times competitive structure in place. While there are valid reasons to insulate 
DTOs from local influence (including political), if LBs are to be made accountable for service areas 
they could benefit from an integrated management structure to deliver. 
 
For the Ministry of Education and the Education Sector: 
 
34.   Carry through with plans to consolidate school reporting of all revenue and 
expenditures, including from LBs, NGOs and OSR in FY 2014/15. This could help SMCs make 
more strategic use of available resources. It would also allow for better overall planning and 
deployment of resources for basic education at the national level. 
 
35.   Clarify the roles and responsibilities of Education Committees at local levels to address 
issues of providing education beyond the operation of schools. The VECs/MECs/DECs should be 
promoted as fora within which education sector activities are coordinated at the local level without 
getting into issues of individual school management that are handled by SMCs and supervised by 
DEOs. Local level Education Committees can play a role in addressing questions of attendance, 
enrolment, and, given demographic trends, rationalization. This would require amending the Education 
Regulations and cooperation between the MoE and MoFALD to provide local Education Committees 
with active guidance and support. Such work could be undertaken irrespective of whether a more 
profound delineation of functions is undertaken in the sector. 
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I. INTRODUCTION 
 
36.   The effectiveness of public service delivery depends in large part on the capability, 
resources and inputs, and the motivation of frontline service providers. Higher level inputs, such 
as curriculum development for education, are critical for the quality of and access to services, but the 
provision of services occurs at the local level – at the ‘last mile’ of the chain of service delivery – 
where services are actually received by citizens.1 In theory, inputs are converted to service outputs 
which in turn contribute to better public service outcomes for the population at the local level. 
Therefore, the factors influencing the provision of services at the local level are integral to overall 
service delivery. As has been observed in many contexts2, one of the key factors is the institutional 
framework for frontline service provision, because this framework in turn establishes chains of 
accountability for results which spur performance. 
 
37.   Public services are provided by a combination of deconcentrated line agencies and local 
bodies3 in Nepal, but the respective roles and relationships among these entities in providing 
services could be more clearly defined. There 
appears to be overlap in responsibility in legislation 
which has underpinned parallel reform efforts for 
local governance and in service sectors. In particular, 
the institutional framework for local government 
remains incomplete. The legislated mandate for 
devolution of key public services is limited in practice 
by a lack of implementing regulations and the 
issuance of government rules of business which make 
line agencies responsible for most aspects of service 
delivery. The role of local bodies (LBs) has been 
weakened due the absence of elected councils since 
2002. 
 
38.   Despite the uncertainties around their role, local bodies play an increasingly important 
part in service provision at the local level. The size of transfers from the central government to local 
bodies has increased six-fold between 2006 and 2012. The local bodies’ share in total public 
expenditures has been around 10% for the past three years, a proportion that is considerably higher 
than in other South Asian countries. Even accounting for the conditional grants over which LBs 
exercise limited discretion and which make up over half of LB budgets, the proportion of local 
expenditures is relatively high. 
 
39.   There is limited understanding of what local bodies are doing to deliver services. It is 
difficult to assess how much is being spent, how activities and allocations are prioritized, and what 
types of outputs and outcomes are achieved in service areas at the local level. Reporting mechanisms 
are limited in their regularity, enforcement and transparency. There are currently no requirements to 
report by sector, which means that it is impossible to know how much is being spent on education, 
roads or any other sector by a particular LB or the aggregate of all LBs. Instead, LBs report on 
‘development’ spending, which can be a mix of recurrent and capital costs. There is also self-reporting 
on the types of beneficiaries, or target groups, in the use of some grants. Thus, LBs may report that 
primary beneficiaries are certain types of disadvantaged groups, but the service area involved is often 
not known. 
                                                     
1 See for instance, Kim, Farmer, and Porter, Redefining Global Health-Care Delivery, The Lancet, published 
online May 20, 2013. 
2 Notably in the 2004 World Development Report. 
3 Local bodies are Village Development Committees, Municipalities, and District Development Committees as 
per the 1999 Local Self Governance Act. As their names suggest, the entities were initially conceived of as 
development agents, rather than local government per se. The term local bodies (LBs) is the common general 
term for these entities. 
Box 1: Public Service – A Definition 
A public service is a service benefiting the 
public that is provided for by the government 
because it is underprovided by the market. The 
public benefits from outputs and outcomes of 
the given service, not merely inputs. For 
instance, buildings, textbooks, teachers, 
assurance of pedagogical training and quality 
instruction, are all inputs for delivery of 
education service, but the public service is to 
yield an output of students with skills. 
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Box 2: The Police Station in Pakhribas Village 
Pakhribas VDC in Dhankuta District spent 300,000 NPR – around 15% of its discretionary budget – to 
purchase land for a police station in FY 2009/10. The decision emerged from the VDC’s grassroots planning 
for use of funds. Funding for the land purchase was the second largest of 31 allocations for a mix of 
livelihoods schemes for women, local roads, small infrastructure for schools, and other projects. Pakhribas is 
not alone in having this spending pattern: all local bodies fund a large number of small projects across a range 
of sectors. Other VDCs and DDCs also spend on the police. Yet public security is not a function for VDCs or 
DDCs. 
This spending pattern raises questions about frontline service delivery and the role of local bodies in their 
delivery. Why did the VDC use limited resources for a service over which it had no responsibility or 
authority? Is the VDC simply responsively using its funds to address local needs across a range of public 
services? Is it a case of local capture of resources? Is the VDC then accountable for the quality of police 
services or for service delivery in other areas where it provides albeit modest funding? Does the allocation 
give the VDC a say in how the funds are used? Does it give the VDC a role in how the police perform? 
 
40.   There is also limited understanding of how deconcentrated line agencies interact with 
LBs to deliver services. Nepal’s governmental system treats LBs and local development as a ‘sector’ 
unto itself, rather than a contributor to the delivery of services in a sector such as education. The 
system does not allow for understanding how LBs are contributing to service outcomes. LBs are 
viewed as contributing to development in general rather than to any particular outcome in the 
provision of specific public services, such as water or the rural road network. There are mechanisms in 
place for local level coordination between line agencies and local bodies, but the extent to which this 
coordination is effective is not clear. 
 
Figure 1: Service delivery chain 
 
 
41.   This study seeks to map out the dynamics of frontline service delivery in Nepal. It is 
based on a rapid review conducted over four months of service delivery in two sectors – local roads 
and primary and lower secondary education – in 14 LB jurisdictions in two districts.4 The study 
                                                     
4 The districts of Dhankuta and Dhanusa were chosen to reflect the situation in a relatively well performing and 
resourced hill district and a more populous, less well performing and resourced district in the country’s southern 
Terai region. The jurisdictions in Dhankuta were: Dhankuta DDC, Dhankuta municipality, and Bhedetar, 
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analyzes the formal framework for local bodies’ operations and service delivery in the basic education 
and local roads sectors.  It compares de jure arrangements with data on what actually occurred over a 
three year period from 2009 to 2012 in the reviewed jurisdictions. Information about budgets, staffing, 
and planning was gathered by two field-based consultant teams. It proved difficult to obtain 
comprehensive budget and planning data at the local level for analysis, but nonetheless there is 
sufficient information on service delivery in this small number of jurisdictions to serve as case studies 
in the context of existing knowledge about the formal institutional framework. In addition, the study 
included a field survey of individual citizens and local officials in the same LB jurisdictions. The 
survey covered 3,200 local citizens and local officials in DDCs, VDCs and municipalities sampled in 
Dhankuta and Dhanusa. The survey was intended to assess perceptions about local governance and 
service delivery responsibilities, as well as the quality of services. Citizens’ perceptions thus provide 
an important, if not all-encompassing, measure of outputs and outcomes from service delivery. A 
detailed description of the districts and the methodology for the study and its two field surveys is 
provided in Annexes 1 and 5. 
 
42.   The limited service delivery orientation and coordination challenges among increasingly 
well-resourced local bodies suggest that there is an opportunity to improve the organization of 
frontline service delivery. This would involve both providing incentives for more orientation of local 
bodies towards their role in the delivery of services and for ensuring greater synergies and 
responsiveness among local bodies and deconcentrated line departments. The purpose of this report is 
to examine in detail the current dynamics of frontline service delivery to identify institutional 
limitations and propose approaches to addressing them. 
                                                                                                                                                                      
Bhirgoun, Hattikharka, Pakhribas, and Rajarani VDCs. The jurisdictions in Dhanusa were: Dhanusa DDC, 
Janakpur municipality, and Basbitti, Labtoli, Lohana Sapahi, Umaprempur VDCs. 
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II. INSTITUTIONAL FRAMEWORK FOR LOCAL SERVICE DELIVERY 
 
43.   The institutional framework for service delivery is defined by functional assignments (or 
the placement of responsibility for provision of public services with respective public entities), fiscal 
assignments (the system for financing of public entities to perform their responsibilities), and 
administrative assignments (the powers given respective public entities to carry out their 
responsibilities, such as control over staffing or planning and execution of the quantity of services 
provided). Assignments are typically among levels of government, which assumes some degree of 
autonomy of sub-national units. Nepal’s intergovernmental system is quite complex de jure. This is 
further compounded by how LBs have developed and adapted since their introduction decades ago. 
This section reviews the governance arrangements of local bodies, functional assignments, and the 
intergovernmental fiscal framework. 
 
A. Brief History of Sub-National Government in Nepal 
 
44.   Nepal has had sub-national government institutions for 50 years. The current structure of 
sub-national administration and governance – based on districts and villages – was established in the 
1960s in the Panchayat era. Districts and villages have been a part of Nepal’s sub-national 
institutional landscape for as long as most Nepalese can remember. A watershed in their development 
was the 1982 Decentralization Act, which provided for elected district and village panchayats, albeit 
on a non-party basis and with nominated and elected members. The functions and responsibilities of 
these early panchayats were largely limited to the maintenance of public goods and social order. They 
had few own source revenues and fiscal transfers were limited. 
 
45.   Following the establishment of multi-party democracy and promulgation of a new 
constitution in 1990, District Development Committees (DDCs), Village Development 
Committees (VDCs), and municipalities were established under separate DDC, VDC and 
municipality Acts adopted in 1991. Full multi-party local elections were held in 1992. The first 
block grants for LBs were put into place in 1995. New local elections were held in 1998 for five year 
terms. The three local body acts were subsequently combined in the Local Self Governance Act 
(LSGA) of 1999, which remains the over-arching legal framework for sub-national government. In 
2002, as part of a policy of sector devolution, the government officially devolved three key sectors 
(primary education, primary health and agricultural & livestock services) to LBs, giving further 
impetus to decentralization reforms. Later ‘local infrastructure’ was normatively devolved. 
 
46.   Local government reforms were undermined by the armed conflict between the 
Government and Maoist insurgents in the 2000s. The elected local bodies lapsed in 2002 when 
elections could not be held and the government decided not to extend the mandate of the LBs elected 
in 1998. Since then, despite the re-establishment of a broad democratic process at the national level in 
2006, sub-national government has been managed without elected leaders or councils. Instead, 
centrally appointed civil servants (LDOs, VDC Secretaries, and EOs, respectively), have been 
responsible for the day-to-day management of LBs, with the assistance of other line department 
officials in DDCs and municipalities. In 2009, the government established the ‘All-Party Mechanism’ 
(APM), seen as a way of widening accountability by bringing political parties at the sub-national level 
into the local body decision-making process. The APM was repealed in 2012 following reports of 
corruption, but political parties continue to play a role in local-level decision-making.5 The absence of 
locally elected councils since 2002 has diminished downward accountability, as well as the political 
status of local bodies.  At the same time it has increased the perception that they are ‘branches’ of the 
Ministry of Federal Affairs and Local Development (MoFALD). 
 
                                                     
5 Cf. Carter Center (2014), The Asia Foundation (2013). The Carter Center report stresses that political parties 
are involved in many organizational structures at local level, including schools, which by regulation are 
supposed to be free from such interference. 
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47.   Decentralization policies and reforms in Nepal have reflected an approach that 
emphasizes LBs as conduits for local participation and carrying out small works as development 
rather than government responsible for delivering public services. The usage of the term 
‘development committee’ and as opposed to council or government denotes this vision. One major 
attempt to devolve sectoral responsibility to local bodies was made in 2002, but this was never 
implemented due to armed conflict, the dissolution of elected councils, the reservations of line 
ministries to devolve authority and implementation of government regulations which kept powers 
within the line agencies. In the recent post-conflict period, the same local development vision of sub-
national government has remained unchanged. In recent years, increasingly large intergovernmental 
fiscal transfers (see section D on the intergovernmental fiscal framework below) have been central 
government’s principal mechanism for strengthening sub-national government – but with little 
concomitant effort made to make local bodies increasingly responsible for service delivery. 
 
B.  Sub-National Governance Arrangements 
 
48.   The legal framework for sub-national governance is the Local Self Governance Act 
(1999) and the Government of Nepal (Allocation of Business) Rules (2008, amended in 2009). 
While the LSGA provides the legal basis for LBs, government rules allocate public sector 
responsibilities, including issues of frontline service delivery, in detail among national ministries. 
Nepal has an interim constitution which provides for a federal system of government and local self-
governance and has committed to having a new constitution as soon as possible. Questions of how to 
structure a federal state and sub-national governance are the most contentious issue in this drafting 
process. 
 
49.   Nepal has two tiers of sub-national institutions. At the lowest level, there are 3,915 Village 
Development Committees (VDCs) and 58 Municipalities. At a higher level, there are 75 District 
Development Committees (DDCs), the territory of which overlaps with the VDCs and municipalities. 
 
Table 1: Characteristics of LBs in Nepal 
Characteristics DDCs VDCs Municipalities 
Population size:    
Average population 294,510 5,640 75,966 
Max. population 764,245 82,915 975,453 
Min. population 6,538 67 14,283
Total population 26,434,505 22,088,460 4,406,045 
Area:    
Average area (km2) 1,962 36.1 n/a 
Min. area (km2) 119 0.9 n/a 
Max. area (km2) 7,889 1,464 n/a 
Ecological zone:    
Mountainous 16 543 2 
Middle Hills 38 1,963 27 
Terai 21 1,409 29 
Total no. of local bodies 75 3,915 58 
 Source: National Population and Housing Census 2011, Central Bureau of Statistics 
 
50.   There is significant variation within the same types of jurisdictions. VDCs on average 
serve and represent relatively small populations. Their small size may prevent VDCs from capturing 
economies of scale in service delivery, thus potentially compromising their ability to function as 
viable local government units6. Yet there are outliers: VDCs in the Terai, are typically a great deal 
                                                     
6 See Boex (2012): 4-5 
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larger than VDCs in mountainous or middle hills areas in terms of population, but much smaller in 
terms of their area. DDCs also vary significantly by demography and topography. Municipalities 
include the large cities in the Kathmandu Valley and small towns of under 20,000 people. 
 
51.   The geography and topography of local jurisdictions have different implications in 
terms of their fiscal capacity. Most LBs in the Terai are likely to have access to more own source 
revenues than their counterparts in the mountainous or middle hills zones.7  Not only is agricultural 
land more valuable (and therefore a stronger tax base) in the Terai, but the area’s proximity to India 
and trans-national commerce also provides LBs there with a more vibrant tax base8.  LBs in mountain 
areas correspondingly lack these opportunities. At the same time, service provision is much more 
difficult in remote locations with less traversable geography and dispersed small populations. 
However, despite their objective differences there is no differentiation in the institutional framework 
for bodies of the same type. All VDCs, municipalities, and DDCs operate under the same regulations 
and arrangements as their respective peers. 
 
Linkages between DDCs and Municipalities/VDCs 
 
52.   Municipalities are largely autonomous of DDCs, while VDCs are more closely 
subordinated to DDCs by law and in practice. For example, the disbursement of fiscal transfers to 
VDCs is subject to DDC authorization in practice, but the same is not true of municipalities. VDC 
internal audits are carried out by DDCs, which also play a role in approving the selection of VDC 
external auditors; municipal internal and external audits, on the other hand, are not subject to any 
involvement on the part of DDCs. In addition, whilst the planning and scheme implementation 
processes for DDCs and VDCs are (in principle, at least) inter-twined, there are few linkages between 
DDCs and municipalities when it comes to planning and scheme implementation. Finally (and 
perhaps most importantly), LDOs are almost always Under-Secretaries and as such always outrank 
VDC Secretaries in the civil service hierarchy. However, EOs in municipalities are usually of the 
same civil service grade as LDOs. In the absence of elected local councils, this has reinforced the 
degree to which VDCs are subordinate to DDCs. In sum, while municipal performance is not 
constrained or enhanced by DDC performance, VDC performance is partly conditioned by how well 
(or badly) DDCs carry out back-office functions with respect to VDCs. 
 
53.   Though not in effect at present since elections have not been held, the de jure system for 
elected LBs provides for organic linkages between DDCs and VDCs/municipalities. Legislation 
provides for the direct election of village and municipal councilors. District councils and DDC 
leaders, however, are not directly elected – instead, they are indirectly elected by an electoral college 
made up of village and municipal councils within the district in question. This means that district 
councils and development committees are electorally accountable to village and municipal councils, 
which would imply that district governments are likely to be sensitive to the opinions and priorities of 
lower tier LBs. 
 
Governance and Staffing of Local Bodies 
 
54.   Despite the absence of elected representatives, the provisions of the LSGA continue to 
apply to LB governance arrangements, through non-elected local councils. At all levels, local 
‘councils’ remain in place as deliberative bodies, with the official function of approving plans and 
budgets, providing oversight and endorsing key decisions. Such councils, however, are not made up 
of elected members but instead consist of a mix of civil servants, local political leaders, and 
representatives from other stakeholder institutions (such as local NGOs)9. LDOs, EOs and VDC 
Secretaries function as both de facto chairpersons of these councils and as the day-to-day executives 
of their respective LBs. 
                                                     
7 With perhaps the singular exception of local bodies located in the Kathmandu Valley. 
8 See the section on the intergovernmental fiscal framework of this report. 
9 There are considerable variations in the composition of local councils. 
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55.   Core staff in local bodies are provided and financed through earmarked grants by the 
central government. The following table provides a summary of LB staffing positions that are 
typically filled by such civil servants. 
 
Table 2: LB staff positions filled by civil servants 
Local body Seconded civil servant staff 
DDC  DDC Secretary (Local Development Officer) 
 District engineer(s) in the District Technical Office (DTO) 
 DDC Planning, Monitoring and Administrative Officer 
 DDC Finance Officer and Accountants 
Municipality  Municipal Secretary (Executive Officer) 
VDC  VDC Secretary 
 
56.   Secondments of civil servants tend to be the same for and across all levels of the local 
government system, irrespective of the size or importance of the LB in question. Thus, central 
government provides VDCs with one secretary only regardless of whether the VDC serves a 
population of less than 5,000 or a population of more than 30,000. Institutional ‘equivalence’ 
translates into staffing ‘equivalence’ when it comes to civil service secondments. Moreover, seconded 
staffing levels tend to reflect the perceived roles of LBs. VDCs only have one secretary who is a 
junior civil servant. This appears to reflect the vision of their playing a role as conduits for funding of 
small works rather than units for ongoing service delivery. DDCs, on the other hand, have more 
seconded staff, reflecting their role as coordinating bodies. Municipalities are in between, with only 
one centrally appointed Executive Officer (EO) who usually has a rank similar to the LDO. 
 
57.   Generally speaking, the central government fulfils its requirement of providing DDCs 
and municipalities with core staff, though there are reportedly quite frequent rotations and 
occasional cases of absenteeism. At the VDC level, however, an estimated 500 VDCs throughout the 
country are currently without secretaries10; these VDCs are covered by secretaries from other VDCs. 
There are cases of one secretary covering even more than two VDCs. There is also a large degree of 
reported absenteeism among VDC secretaries. During the conflict this was justified by the dangers of 
a central government employee being exposed in the countryside, but the problem reportedly 
continues at present. Some VDC secretaries in Dhanusa indicated that they worked mostly in the main 
city in the district. 
 
58.   Other full-time staff at the local level are hired as needed by the LBs themselves and 
paid for out of their own budgets.11 For the most part, such locally financed positions are usually 
junior (e.g. book-keepers or filing clerks in DDCs and municipalities, overseers and assistants in 
VDCs) or of an administrative support profile (e.g. night watchmen or drivers). The five VDCs 
surveyed in Dhanusa, for example, had a total of 11 locally hired staff: a technical assistant and an 
office helper in each of the five VDCs and a health worker in one. The DDC in Dhanusa, in addition 
to seconded civil servants, employs 22 locally-hired staff as internal auditors, accountants, office 
assistants and administrative staff. 
 
59.   There has been policy debate about establishing a local civil service cadre, from which 
LBs would be able to recruit senior executive officials (such as LDOs). This debate recognizes that 
the current system – by which senior LB executive officials are central government civil servants – is 
                                                     
10 Himalayan Times, 8 March 2014. 
11 LSGA (articles 249-252) provides LBs with considerable latitude when it comes to hiring staff. The principal 
constraint to taking on more staff or short term employees is budgetary. 
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sub-optimal. Frequent rotations of senior LB staff, which are the result of central-level decisions12 
(rather than LB decisions), tend to reduce continuity. More importantly, key LB officers are 
effectively accountable to MoFALD, the entity which appointed them and provides a career 
framework. This line of accountability to the center has been significantly strengthened in the absence 
of local elected representatives who could monitor performance (and which was reputedly successful 
when there were elected LBs). The incentive structure for this staff is to be less responsive to local 
priorities and more responsive to central directives and policies. 
 
Central Government Agencies Engaged with Local Bodies 
 
60.   The Ministry of Federal Affairs and Local Development is responsible for policy and 
execution of programs on decentralization, local self-governance, and local development, 
including much local infrastructure.13 It also oversees coordination relations among LBs. MoFALD 
provides LBs with conditional and unconditional grants/transfers14 and for seconding (or deputing) 
core staff to LBs. MoFALD also provides LBs with guidelines and technical backstopping, as well as 
being responsible for regular monitoring of LBs and their performance15 Finally, a division within 
MoFALD runs the nation-wide social safety net programs, issuing guidelines and funds to LBs for 
providing social benefits.  
 
61.   MoFALD implements the Local Government and Community Development Program, a 
large technical assistance program for LBs funded by multiple donors. LGCDP has worked to 
institute a number of practices at the local level, particularly social accountability mechanisms. This 
has included deploying social mobilizers, developing Ward Citizen Forums and Citizen Awareness 
Centers, promoting social audit mechanisms, and addressing aspects of fiduciary risk. 
 
62.   MoFALD’s mandate of supporting local governance and decentralization and its role in 
ensuring development occurs in the form of rural infrastructure do not always coincide.16 
Previously known simply as the Ministry of Local Development, MoFALD is often seen as a line 
ministry, with LBs operating as if they were local level line departments of the ministry carrying out 
local development. MoFALD houses the Department of Local Infrastructure Development and 
Agricultural Roads (DoLIDAR), a central agency that oversees national schemes for local 
infrastructure, mostly with donor funding. DoLIDAR supervises District Technical Offices (DTOs) 
which in turn are authorized to supervise most local infrastructure projects financed by the DDCs. 
 
63.   Central level coordination on service delivery is hampered by a ‘sectoral’ orientation of 
government agencies. MoFALD focuses on local bodies and their operations, in much the same way 
as the Ministry of Education oversees the activities of its line departments and schools at the local 
level. Outside of the overall coordination which occurs in the national planning process, there are few 
mechanisms for MoFALD to coordinate with other line ministries on operational issues. For example, 
there are no permanent and functional inter-ministerial committees that work on roles and 
responsibilities in the education sector or coordinate inputs into service delivery. 
 
64.   MoFALD’s mandate related to Municipalities overlaps with that of the Ministry of 
Urban Development (MoUD). MoUD is responsible for urban development (see Government of 
Nepal Allocation of Business Rules 2008, amended in 2012) and has adopted an urban development 
                                                     
12 Understandably, LDOs and EOs often lobby the ministry to avoid being posted to remote or ‘problematic’ 
LBs or to be transferred to localities or to Kathmandu. 
13 The full listing of MoFALD’s functions is included in the Government of Nepal (Allocation of Business) 
Rules (2008, amended in 2009), 
14 Which are included in the ministry’s annual budget. 
15 Most notably through the annual MC/PM assessments of DDCs and municipalities, the results of which are 
endorsed and acted upon by the ministry. 
16 This tension is discussed in considerable detail in Institutional Assessment of the Ministry of Local 
Development, Atos Consulting (2008) – a report commissioned by DFID and submitted to (the then) MLD 
during the preparatory and design phase for LGCDP. 
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strategy. MoUD has jurisdiction over the Town Development Committees created under the Town 
Development Act, 1988 and the Town Development Fund (TDF). Responsibilities of the TDC 
(chaired by a government nominee) include “land use planning for the development of town and 
provision for services and facilities such as road, transport, electricity, drainage, sanitation and open 
space” which is what a municipality is also supposed to do under the LSGA. The autonomous TDF 
provides financial (lending) and technical support to municipalities in delivering ‘basic social 
services’ (e.g., streets, roads, electricity, bridges, drinking water, drainage, collection of garbage, 
public toilets, public libraries, and schools) and ‘income oriented projects’ (e.g., public markets, trade 
centers, bus terminals, slaughter houses, warehouses). The Department for Urban Development and 
Building Construction (DUDBC) is mandated to coordinate the activities of TDCs and TDF on behalf 
of the MoUD, and is involved in the formulation of municipalities’ periodic plans, GIS maps, poverty 
mapping and Town Development Committees. The National Urban Policy recognizes this challenge 
and advocates for better cooperation/coordination between MoFALD and MoUD at the central level. 
 
Planning in Local Bodies 
 
65.   LBs are required to formulate periodic and annual plans. The LSGA and the Resource 
Mobilization and Operation Management Guidelines (2013) provide for a participatory, inclusive 
framework for planning, management, implementation, resource allocation and budgeting, 
supervision, monitoring and evaluation, reporting and oversight activities.17 The participatory 
planning process is known as the fourteen steps planning process, which begins at the community 
level and moves up to the national level (NPC and MoF). Village, municipal and district councils are 
all expected to finalize their respective plans within their budget ceilings. LBs can submit project 
proposals for inclusion in the plans of higher tiers in the intergovernmental system. See Annex 2 for a 
detailed breakdown of the role of the principal institutional stakeholders and the planning process. 
 
66.   All LBs are expected to prepare five year periodic plans in a participatory way, in 
accordance with NPC directives.18 Local periodic plans should meet several criteria: 
 include long term goals, objectives and strategies and cover major functional areas or sectors 
that are devolved to local bodies; 
 include gender, social inclusion, the environment and children as cross-cutting issues in all 
sectors; 
 be prepared on a spatial basis and on the basis of an analysis of spatial factors; 
 encompass the key elements of sector-specific plans; 
 forecast and take into account resource projections; 
 take into account potential developmental and contributions from central government, NGOs 
and the private sector (which are to be coordinated with LB activities and investments included 
in LB periodic plans); 
 support and complement national plans and contribute to national goals, objectives and overall 
targets. 
 
67.   LBs are expected to formulate inclusive, participatory, integrated and comprehensive 
annual plans based on their periodic plans. This requires both the communication downwards of 
resource envelopes and an upward planning process to prioritize projects from grassroots community 
groups up to the DDCs. In terms of downward communication, line ministries are expected to provide 
their district level departments with annual budget ceilings, estimate sector grants to LBs and issue 
guidelines for annual planning. Local line department and district plans should be consistent with 
national development policies and plans. Included in this are MoFALD forecasts of annual 
                                                     
17 VDC, municipal and DDC planning processes are provided for in LSGA (Arts. 43-54, 111-124, and 195-214, 
respectively) and LSGR (rules 64-69, 134-139, and 197-206, respectively). The RMOM Guidelines (sections 3-
5) provide LBs with additional instructions for planning in the absence of elected councils. 
18 NPC directives are structured around four steps: (i) data collection; (ii) data and SWOT analysis; (iii) plan 
formulation on the basis of a logical framework; and (iv) implementation. 
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conditional and unconditional grants. District Resource Estimation Committees19 (DRECs) estimate 
the total resources that are expected to be available for each LB in the district for the following year. 
These resource envelopes (or budget ceilings) are communicated to the respective LBs. In addition, 
VDCs and municipalities will also be expected to estimate their respective resource envelopes. 
 
68.   The upward planning process involves several rounds of meetings and reviews of 
proposals. It begins with grassroots community organizations and user groups making proposals 
which are successively consolidated, reviewed, and forwarded successively upward to Ward Citizen 
Forums (WCFs)20; village level integrated plan formulation committees; the VDC (and municipality); 
the Ilaka level which combines several VDCs and municipalities21, the DDC Integrated Plan 
Formulation Committee (IPFC); the DDC; affected line agencies; MoFALD; and the National 
Planning Commission (NPC). At each level of government, the proposed programs and projects are 
reviewed for synergies and whether they fit into communicated budget ceilings. Central level line 
departments and ministries may also ask DDCs to include sector-specific projects (identified at the 
national level) in their annual plans. Finally, the NPC consolidates these plans and it is integrated with 
the budget and approved by Parliament. 
 
Figure 2: Normative Participatory Planning Process 
 
                                                     
19 The RMOM Guidelines (procedure 18) stipulate that each DDC should establish a District Resource 
Estimation Committee. 
20 WCFs consist of 25-30 members, selected in an inclusive way to ensure representation of women and 
disadvantaged communities. Although WCFs are not provided for in LSGA/R, the RMOM Guidelines (2013) 
do so in order to ensure citizen engagement in the local planning process in the absence of ward committees. 
Every VDC has nine Wards; each ward is to elect a member of the Village Development Committee. 
21 There are a total of 927 Ilakas and 3,915 VDCs. On average, Ilakas combine about 4-5 VDCs, although Ilalas 
in the Terai tend to be larger than those elsewhere. 
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69.   The plan is expected to serve as the basis for concerned ministries to authorize budgets 
for respective line departments, project offices, DDCs and municipalities. DDCs then authorize 
for VDCs. DDCs request all concerned implementing agencies to prepare their operational calendars 
(along with implementation responsibilities) for program implementation and also request them to 
prepare funding matrices. 
 
70.   DDCs are expected to form Monitoring Committees under the chairpersonship of an 
MP representing the district. If there is more than one MP representing the district, MPs will chair 
the committee in alphabetical order. However, few DDCs have followed this. To ensure monitoring, 
the RMOM Guidelines (2013) make special provision for the establishment of supervision and 
monitoring committees, the meetings of which are to be chaired by the chairpersons of the respective 
LBs. This committee monitors whether projects or programs have followed the operational calendar 
and whether the funds are used properly or not. The committee is also authorized to monitor outputs 
every trimester and submit its report to the LB chair. 
 
71.   The formal planning process does not appear to be followed in full... LBs are not 
systematically informed by central government of their budget ceilings on a timely basis. Instead, LBs 
are usually asked to prepare next year’s budget on the assumption of a 10% increase on the previous 
year’s budget22 On the basis of field observations, DDCs, in turn, generally do not provide 
municipalities with information about budget ceilings or guidelines for annual development planning. 
However, annual MC/PM (performance) assessments indicate that DDCs do so. The timely provision 
of budget ceilings to VDCs/municipalities by DDCs is included as one of the minimum conditions 
(MCs); the most recent MC/PM assessment report (201223) indicates that all but one, out of 75, DDCs 
complied with this MC. 
 
72.   Though the upward planning process is largely followed. Ward-level planning meetings 
do appear to be common, if not universal. In 2008-09, before WCFs were established (through 
LGCDP), 42% of a sample of households from just over 200 VDCs reported that ward-level planning 
meetings took place.24 Evidence from annual MC/PM assessments of LBs indicates that the majority 
do complete their annual planning process on time. Timely completion of annual planning is one of 
the MCs that LBs need to comply with. According to the 2011 MC/PM assessment25, only 147 (out of 
a total of 3,915) VDCs and 2 municipalities failed to comply with this MC; with the exception of 
Kathmandu Metropolitan city, all the LBs that failed to comply were located in the Eastern Terai 
region and included Dhanusa. 
 
73.   Grassroots citizen influence on planning is mixed though appears to be growing. A 2009 
study of citizen perceptions26 indicated that 39% of the households surveyed claim that VDC priorities 
are identified and selected by certain influential interest groups, without any prior community 
consultations. According to 35% of the VDC secretaries surveyed in 2008-09, local political leaders 
are more often than not able to have their priorities (without reference to proposals from local 
citizens) addressed in VDC and municipal plans. At the same time, the WCFs appear to be a 
functioning venue for influencing decision-making. As of mid-2013 there were over 35,000 WCFs 
established in virtually all districts. Roughly 40% of the over 100,000 projects proposed via WCFs in 
2012-13 were financed by LBs, taking up roughly 40% of the latter’s capital budgets.27 Yet survey 
results in the two target districts show about 20% of the population feels able to influence the quality 
of roads, even though this is an area that is a major expenditure item and for which LBs are seen as 
                                                     
22 See ADDCN/UNDP (2010) 
23 See MoFALD: MC/PM assessment report 2012. 
24 See INLOGOS/UNDP (2009). 
25 See MoFALD (2011). 
26 As documented in INLOGOS/UNDP (2009). 
27 LGCDP Progress Report 2013. 
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most responsible.28 In addition, there is anecdotal evidence suggesting that political parties play a 
major role in the WCFs and UCs as well. The level of ‘elite capture’ in the planning process and local 
institutions such as WCFs is difficult to assess, particularly in the aggregate (see Box 3). 
 
Box 3: Political parties and LB decision-making 
Political parties have played and continue to play an important role in local body decision-making about 
budgets and spending even without an elected local council. Between 2009 and 2012, this was officially 
sanctioned by the All-Party Mechanism (APM), through which local leaders of political parties were able to 
participate in council meetings at all levels of sub-national government. Although the APM was repealed in 
2012, in recognition of mal-practice and excessive politicization, political parties continue to have a say in 
local government affairs. Recent reports by the Asia Foundation (2013) and the Carter Center (2014) 
document how the APM operated in practice, how political parties continue to influence decision-making at 
the local level, and how the active engagement of political parties in local body processes has often been 
driven by partisan, patron-client and pork-barrel politics. 
Politicians everywhere may seek to channel resources to their constituencies. In the case of Nepal, according 
to these studies, there have been numerous reported cases of collusion and corruption associated with the 
involvement of political parties in local body budgetary and spending processes. Some Nepali political leaders 
appear to seek to spread resources widely, so as to satisfy, reward and attract as many supporters as possible. 
Choices appear to be made in terms of the demands that are immediately satisfied, rather than on the basis of 
a blend of political and technocratic considerations. 
The large number of projects also reportedly reflected a balance of party interests in jurisdictions. The 
stronger parties would obtain a bigger ‘piece of the pie’ but lesser parties would also benefit from directing a 
portion of LB resources. It could be argued that the large number of projects served a political purpose of 
providing a stake in local governance processes to a wide range of parties. 
 
74.   Analysis and prioritization of projects appear to be driven by local politics with limited 
technical analysis. Planning involves the mediation of a range of interests carried out in multiple 
successive meetings. Criteria exist for selection of projects but these do not appear to include rigorous 
identification or appraisal of proposed projects and programs. Cost benefit, cost efficiency, or other 
appraisal tools are not visibly utilized. Instead, specific individual projects may be proposed and, 
depending on general perceptions of importance at successive higher levels, are carried forward. 
Perceptions of importance appear to be in large part driven by the weight of the group proposing the 
project; decision-making is thus political without a detailed assessment of economic or social 
rationale that would allow for comparison according to objective indicators. Both MoFALD and local 
officials in the target districts noted that there were strong incentives to simply divide up the resource 
envelope equally among groups which represent political and geographical balance. This is reflected 
in the expenditure patterns of LBs where there are a large number of small projects in a broad range of 
sectors (see paragraphs 96 onwards below). For instance, the Dhankuta DDC decided to provide equal 
amounts of funding to each of 22 user committees involved with each of the 22 roads in the District 
Transport Plan. 
 
75.   There appear to be few genuine linkages between LBs’ plans and those of line agencies 
or national plans. VDC/municipal integrated plan formulation committees (IPFCs) exist and meet 
but there is little evidence that they analyze linkages between priority proposals across or within 
sectors. DDC level IPFCs also meet in order to comply with procedures but do not appear to analyze 
intra- or inter-sector linkages between proposed activities. Moreover the planning schedule for LBs 
does not correspond to those of line agencies, meaning that planning often occurs in parallel. 
Although line ministries are expected to examine the district-level annual plans that are submitted to 
them by DDCs, observations indicate that line ministries pay limited attention to local plans and do 
not provide DDCs with systematic feedback on their annual plans. The same appears to be the case 
with respect to the NPC. Given this, genuine linkages between district level priorities and national 
plans appear to be limited. 
                                                     
28 See Annex 5 
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Box 4: Do LBs manage their public investments effectively? 
The processes that govern public investment selection and management are critical in determining the 
efficiency of public expenditure, in general, and capital expenditure, in particular. When sound and robust 
processes and controls are used in public investment management, capital expenditure is more likely to be 
efficient, justifiable and yield value for money. A number of key features should be in place if public 
investment management is to be as efficient as possible29. 
While these key features are vital in the management of large public investments (such as building a new 
highway), some of them may be less appropriate in the case of the public investments that are typically 
undertaken by local governments. To begin with, local public investments are usually smaller, making for 
more of a trade-off between the time and resources to carry out a rigorous investment management process 
and the benefits derived from such a process. In particular, local governments have access to limited human 
resources and cannot be expected to follow all the steps that might be expected to be followed when managing 
large public investments. 
Nonetheless, the basic principles underlying ‘must have’ key features remain relevant to local government 
public investments. Many of the features provide for greater use of objective evidence in the selection and 
implementation of investments, while not negating the political aspects of government being responsive and 
delivering to local constituencies. The process in Nepal is relatively weak in providing for objective 
investment management. 
Key PIM feature Integrated into local PIM? How and why (not)? 
Investment guidance, 
project development & 
preliminary screening 
Partly 
Some (but not all) LBs have periodic or sector master 
plans, but these rarely provide a strategic framework to 
guide investments. Moreover, annual investment planning 
is infrequently linked to periodic or master plans. 
Formal project appraisal 
(feasibility studies etc.) Rarely 
LBs rarely conduct thorough feasibility studies of 
investment projects, due to a lack of technical capacity, 
small size of most investment projects and insufficient 
time in the planning process. 
Independent review of 
appraisal No 
Given that appraisal is rare, independent appraisal reviews 
do not appear to exist.
Project selection and 
budgeting Partly 
Investments are usually (but not always) linked into the 
annual budgeting process. However, there are no medium-
term budgetary frameworks at the local level. 
Project implementation No 
Given that the preferred implementation option is through 
user committees, there are no local procurement plans. 
Implementation planning is difficult given irregular 
disbursements and may not be appropriate given the small 
size of most investment projects. 
Project adjustment Mostly 
Local investment projects are – by force of circumstances 
rather than by design – implemented in flexible and 
adaptable ways. 
Facility operation Partly 
Investments are typically ‘handed over’ to local user 
groups, which may lack the resources to ensure adequate 
operations & maintenance 
Completion review and 
evaluation Very rarely 
Generally this may be unjustifiable given the relatively 
small size of local public investment projects. 
 
 
Financial Management in Local Bodies 
 
76.   LBs’ expenditures consist of recurrent costs for their own core administration, social 
benefit transfers, and a range of small, mostly capital projects. Budget execution for core 
administration is carried out via the accountant or accounting department for the corresponding LB. 
                                                     
29 See Rajaram etalia. (2010). 
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Delivery of social benefit payments to beneficiaries is carried out directly by VDC and municipality 
staff and accounted for accordingly. 
 
77.   User Committees are the primary vehicle for carrying out LB-funded projects. A 2009 
report reviewing over 200 VDCs found that 79% of projects funded out of block grant resources are 
implemented through user committees (UCs), 7% by school management committees, 5% by 
community organizations and the remaining 11% by NGOs and VDCs themselves. A survey on 
perceptions in the two target districts noted found that 20% of the population believed user 
committees to be most responsible for the quality of local roads.30 
 
Box 5: User Committees 
LBs can implement the approved project either directly, by contracting out, or via user committees (UCs). 
The formation, operation, management and implementation of UCs are provided for in the LSGA and further 
regulated by the LBFAR and Resource Mobilization Procedures. Among the reasons for this implementation 
method are the remoteness of many project sites and corresponding lack of contractors; and to mobilize 
project beneficiaries to contribute cash and labor, thereby increasing local ownership. However, UCs are often 
employed even in cities where there are contractors. 
UCs are formed by an assembly of users at the project site in the presence of LB officials or designated social 
mobilizers. The assembly is supposed to record the involved households and create a UC with 7 to 11 
members, of which 33% must be women. Field studies suggest that formation rules are not always followed 
and with political leaders playing a leading role rather than users. 
UCs are authorized to carry out programs of up to six million rupees (roughly US$ 60,000). Funds of more 
than 50,000 rupees must be held in a bank account which is jointly operated by the UC chair person, secretary 
and treasurer, requiring each of their signatures. The UC is required to mobilize cash and/or in-kind labor 
from the population to help fund the project cost. UC officials are supposed to receive training on operations, 
accounting and construction. 
A roster of subject-wise UCs (e.g. for roads, water etc.) has to be maintained by the LBs. The invitation 
notices published by LBs for UC applications and formation have to include information on basic cost and 
other relevant details. The UCs also have to disclose project progress reports and are subject to social audits. 
The LB’s supervision of the project implementation work carried out by UCs is generally limited. 
In practice, however, UCs are often not constituted as prescribed. In some cases, UCs may be dominated by 
political party representatives; in other cases, UCs act as ‘fronts’ for contractors. In addition, there are 
numerous reported cases of UCs acting in collusion with contractors and frequent reports of corruption and 
financial mismanagement by UCs. The integrity of UC social audits has also been called into question. 31 In 
addition, UCs – however representative and honest they are – have inherent technical limitations; despite this 
they are given implementation responsibilities for sometimes technically demanding activities. 32 
 
78.   LBs’ financial reporting is fragmented. LB reporting is driven by the type of revenue which 
is provided rather than providing a consolidated statement of revenues and expenditures. Moreover, 
while standard formats have been issued, financial reports from various LBs follow a variety of 
formats. Financial reports typically contain revenue sections divided up by revenue type (own source, 
government grants, etc.) and corresponding expenditure sections. For this reason, financial reports 
show for example VDC or DDC ‘recurrent grants’ as expenditures in some cases (while the 
expenditures are on core administration salaries) or ‘land registration fees’. In most cases, 
expenditures are listed by the name of the program, particularly in cases of funding from specific 
program grants. 
 
79.   There is currently no functional reporting on expenditures, i.e. by sector (education, 
water supply, local roads etc.). To some degree this reflects the approach where LBs are only 
expected to spend on development that is locally responsive without concern for specific sectors. 
                                                     
30 See Annex 5. 
31 Cf. Carter Center (2014), The Asia Foundation (2013). 
32 See Government of Nepal and The World Bank, Road Sector Assessment Study, Nepal (2013). 
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Sectoral focus can in some cases be inferred from the names of program expenditures but this is 
usually not aggregated or systematized, even at the level of LBs. Instead, LBs’ expenditure statements 
simply list hundreds of small ‘programs’. This practice of financial reporting currently does not allow 
MoFALD or any other central government agency to assess how much LBs are spending on any given 
sector. Line agencies such as the Ministry of Education also do not have a record of LBs’ financial 
contributions to education.  Even though the MoE’s semi-annual flash reports call for tracking these 
contributions, they are typically left blank. Specific studies such as this one have been carried out to 
ascertain this information, but as of yet there is no regular reporting mechanism to capture all funding 
flows to schools. 33 
 
80.   Financial reporting practices suggest that there is little, if any, joint funding from 
multiple revenue sources for activities. For instance, the use of block grant funding for the 
maintenance of a section of a local road and the use of own source revenue funds for the same road 
would be treated as two different projects with two different cost centers. 
 
81.   Accountability for the use of funds is similarly fragmented. For particular conditional 
grants, such as those provided for specific roads, LBs have to report back to the funding source 
(usually DoLIDAR). LBs are also required to report on own source revenues and shared taxes to the 
Local Bodies Fiscal Commission housed in MoFALD. These reports contain an aggregate reporting 
on grants only, without differentiating between conditional and unconditional grants. 
 
82.   Delays in fund transfers present financial management challenges. There appears to be a 
consistent delay in issuing authorization letters for fiscal transfers by the central government, 
particularly for conditional grants for specific programs. VDCs face a specific challenge in accessing 
funds due a requirement that district level LDOs accept trimester reports and authorize the release of 
funds; LDOs typically will wait to group VDC disbursement requests before authorizing release from 
the District Treasury & Comptroller’s Office. Issues with the timely receipt of funds can prompt less 
sound management as LBs are under additional time pressure to absorb funds. Delays create an 
incentive for LBs to move resources that have not been spent by the end of a FY to a ‘non-freezing’ 
account in order to avoid having to return unspent funds to the central treasury. Other coping 
strategies for anticipated fund transfer delays include providing advances to user groups or 
contractors, or pre-financing user group activities before final project approval. The delays make it 
very challenging for LBs to efficiently utilized funds and follow financial management rules. 
 
83.   Formal mechanisms to address fiduciary risk lack rigor and at times are not applied. 
LBs are required to have a Fiduciary Risks Reduction Action Plan (FRRAP) for managing their funds, 
but this appears to be a pro forma exercise, if at all conducted. There is no effective mechanism to 
check compliance with these plans. Municipalities and DDCs have an internal audit section, with the 
DDC audit section also responsible for carrying out internal audits of VDCs. In the two districts 
reviewed in this study not all VDCs were audited owing to capacity constraints. DDCs are subject to 
an external audit by the Auditor General’s Office while municipalities and VDCs are to hire an 
independent registered auditor approved by the municipal council and the DDC, respectively.34 Audit 
reports are to be tabled in the respective LB accounts committee and in their council meetings, but 
there is little practice of following up on audit findings. Although detailed procedural guidelines for 
public/social audits and public hearings on use of funds have been issued, only a few LBs reportedly 
comply with these guidelines. 
 
84.   The budgeting and financial reporting system limits LB accountability. There are strong 
regulations mandating transparency in LBs’ as well as in UCs’ operations, but there are apparent 
issues of compliance and fiduciary probity. Moreover, when reporting is available such as was 
observed in Dhankuta and Dhanusa, it consists of a list of projects and levels of financing. This limits 
                                                     
33 The Department of Education is planning to require such reporting in the next fiscal year 2014/2015. 
34 An audit bill presently in Parliament calls for all LB audits to be conducted by the OAG. 
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accountability and more strategic decision-making about prioritizing among sectors or among projects 
within sectors.35 
 
85.   Public trust in LBs is moderate in Dhankuta but low in Dhanusa. Surveys in Dhankuta 
and Dhanusa shows levels of trust in local bodies which are, on aggregate, slightly lower than they are 
for most other public institutions (including the police, DEO, district administration). There is 
substantial difference between the districts. In Dhankuta, citizens have as much, if not more, trust in 
their local bodies as they do in other public institutions; some 80% of the citizens interviewed in 
Dhankuta regard their VDCs as either moderately or very trustworthy and only 2.5% regard them as 
not trustworthy at all. In Dhanusa, on the other hand, there is less citizen trust in all public institutions, 
but LBs are rated particularly poorly: only 52.5% of respondents regard their VDCs as moderately or 
very trustworthy, while almost 20% regard their VDCs as not trustworthy at all. Citizen distrust of 
local bodies in Dhanusa resonates with deficient PFM and financial reporting practices that this study 
found in the district.36 
 
C. Functional Assignments 
 
86.   The normative basis for the assignment of functions and responsibilities across Nepal’s 
intergovernmental system is defined by a number of regulatory or policy instruments, inter alia: 
 The LSGA (1999), which sets out the ‘functions, duties and powers’ of each type of LB. This 
is the key law that provides for Nepal’s system of sub-national government and is the starting 
point for identifying sub-national functional assignments. 
 The Local Infrastructure Development Policy (LIDP, 2004), which provides a broad 
framework for the management of local (as opposed to national) infrastructure. 
 MoFALD regulations and guidelines. Of these, the most important in terms of assigning 
responsibilities are the 2012 Local Body Resource Mobilization and Operation Management 
Guidelines, which provide LBs with guidance as to how they are expected to spend both own 
source revenues and grants/transfers from central government. 
 Various Acts specific to key infrastructure and service delivery sectors (e.g. the Education 
Act of 1971, most recently amended in 2001), which provide the legal framework for their 
respective sectors. 
 The Government of Nepal (Allocation of Business) Rules (2008, amended in 2009), issued by 
the Council of Ministers. In effect, these rules allocate governmental responsibilities among 
all national ministries. 
 
The table on the following page summarizes the developmental and service delivery functions 
assigned to different types of LB in the LSGA and the Government Allocation of Business Rules.37A 
detailed description of the large number of functions assigned to LBs by the LSGA may be found in 
Annex 3. 
                                                     
35 For this reason efforts to conduct budget hearings in local jurisdictions have been challenged to produce 
budget-in-brief documents showing expenditures by sector. 
36 See Annex 5 
37 These are set out in LSGA Article 26 (for VDCs), LSGA Article 96 (for Municipalities) and LSGA Article 
188 (for DDCs). 
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87.   Local bodies have been assigned a wide range of functions. As per the LGSA, LBs are 
expected to assume some kind of responsibility for most key service delivery sectors. In that sense, 
the LSGA provides LBs with an ambitious service delivery agenda and enables LBs to intervene – in 
one way or another – in virtually all sectors38. This is somewhat constrained by the Local Body 
Resource Mobilization and Operation Management Guidelines (RMOMG), issued by MoFALD in 
201339, which limit exactly what LBs can finance in the functional areas for which they have 
normative responsibilities. In the education sector, for example, the RMOMG appears to prohibit LBs 
from financing recurrent costs (such as salaries for contract teachers) even though this proscription is 
not part of the LSGA’s provisions. 
 
88.   But there is ambiguity about what this means in terms of actual responsibility. For 
example, VDCs are expected to ‘supervise and manage the schools being operated within the village 
development area’ – which leaves open the question of what ‘manage’ means. Does school 
management by VDCs imply that VDCs are expected to finance schools or hire teachers? This does 
not occur and government rules indicate otherwise, yet it would appear that the LBs are supposed to 
engage in management of local schools. This formulation and resulting ambiguity is repeated for a 
large number of public services, including such areas as health, agriculture, and transport. (see table 3 
above and Annex 3) 
 
89.   Most functions assigned to LBs by the LSGA are voluntary. With the partial exception of 
municipalities, there is no indication of whether functional responsibilities are exclusively to be 
carried out by LBs, whether tasks within a function are shared, or if LBs in fact have no responsibility 
for outcomes. Given that the overall legislative framework shows a de facto sharing, it is not clear 
from the law what LBs are required to do and how this fits with line agencies’ responsibilities. The 
absence of mandatory assignments suggests that LBs have broad discretion to do as they see fit 
without explicit responsibility for outcomes or service levels. There is greater clarity in cases where 
LBs carry out delegated tasks for which conditional financing is provided. The situation is somewhat 
different for municipalities where the LSGA specifies that functions and duties are to be performed 
‘mandatorily’ although the description of functions is expansive and does not appear to correspond to 
municipalities’ resources and de facto practices. 
 
90.   Although LSGA functional assignments often do demarcate the respective 
responsibilities of DDCs, VDCs and municipalities, there remains considerable overlap among 
LBs. With respect to social protection, for example, DDCs (for their ‘women and helpless people’ 
function) and VDCs (as a ‘miscellaneous’ duty) appear to have almost identical functions. The same 
can be said of DDC and VDC/municipal responsibilities with respect to agriculture, education, health 
and the environment. MoFALD issued a Local Infrastructure Development Policy (LIDP) in 2004 
which does indeed provide a more consistent demarcation between national and sub-national 
infrastructure, but it does not assign specific and discrete infrastructure responsibilities to DDCs, 
VDCs and Municipalities. The local planning process, as prescribed by the LSGA, also tends to blur 
DDC and VDC functional assignments. While VDCs initially plan and then take on what they can at 
their level, they also ‘forward’ proposals to DDCs through the 14-step planning process, many of 
which would normally be considered to be VDC responsibilities. These may or may not be accepted 
by DDCs as part of their plans – which will (or will not) then finance the implementation of such 
activities or schemes. 
 
91.   The LSGA is not explicit regarding two key functions that LBs do play in practice: vital 
events registration and a share of responsibilities for social security payments. Vital events 
registration is categorized by the LSGA as a ‘miscellaneous’ function for both VDCs and 
municipalities, although it is exclusively carried out by the LBs and one of the most recognizable 
                                                     
38 This is not unique to Nepal. In many francophone African countries, for example, laws specify a very broad 
set of functions for local governments. The same applies to Bangladesh, where Union Parishads are assigned a 
wide range of functions. 
39 The RMOMG superseded earlier and separate guidelines for VDCs, municipalities and DDCs. 
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public services provided by LBs to the population. The delegated management of social security 
payments – identification of beneficiaries per national criteria and delivery of the benefits (e.g. 
pensions and widows allowances) – is also categorized as a ‘miscellaneous’ VDC function and not 
defined as a municipal function, although carried out by municipalities. 
 
92.   Functional assignments to LBs follow a principle of ‘supplementarity’ to line agencies 
rather than subsidiarity. While the LSGA provides LBs with a wide range of functional 
responsibilities, the overwhelming majority of the same responsibilities are also assigned to line 
ministries. A recent fiscal decentralization stocktaking study40 notes that although 23 sector laws were 
originally identified as conflicting with the LSGA, few have been amended to take into account LB 
functional responsibilities. The Government’s Allocation of Business Rules (2008) make it clear that 
major line ministries (such as the Ministry of Education or Ministry of Health and Population) 
continue to be responsible for the provision of the same sector services as are assigned to LBs by the 
LSGA. In sum, overall institutional arrangements with respect to functional assignments are not 
internally consistent. 
 
93.   Even in cases where line ministries have tried to align themselves with decentralization 
policies, there remains functional ambiguity. Primary education, for example, was defined as a 
devolved sector in 2002, for which the Ministry of Education drew up sector devolution guidelines. 
The guidelines, however, did little to make LBs genuinely responsible for primary education; instead, 
and consistent with previous primary education policies, School Management Committees (SMCs) 
and District Education Offices (DEOs) continued to be the principal managers of the primary 
education sector, with DDCs, VDCs and municipalities playing a largely symbolic role as chairs of 
their respective education committees. Managing funds for primary education also continued to be 
seen as a MoE/DEO responsibility. Even where funds for primary education have been channeled 
through DDCs (as is the case for the salaries of primary school teachers), this has not implied any 
meaningful involvement of DDCs in planning and budgeting; instead, the DDCs simply operate as an 
additional layer in the fund flow and bureaucratic process for the primary education sector41. 
 
94.   In the case of functions (or services) assigned to them by the LSGA and which are not 
undertaken or provided by other institutions, LBs appear to meet their responsibilities. This is 
notably the case for vital events and civil registration, which are typically local government functions, 
for which they are exclusively responsible and accountable. Moreover, vital events and civil 
registration are seen as key functions and expected by local populations – without official birth and 
marriage certificates, for example, it is technically impossible to obtain Nepali citizenship, without 
which children are not admitted into public schools and the old age are not entitled to non-
contributory pensions. 
 
95.   Where LBs are provided with earmarked grants or transfers, they take on the 
associated functional responsibilities.42 This is most obviously the case for social protection and 
cash transfers. On a delegated basis, VDCs and municipalities administer the vast majority of the 
government’s cash transfer programs (old age pensions, widows’ allowances, child grants, grants for 
disadvantaged households, etc.), using social security grants or transfers from MoFALD. The only 
major exception to this is the administration and management of scholarships – a form of conditional 
cash transfer – which are handled by schools and funded out of grants from the Ministry of Education. 
This is also the case for a variety of local infrastructure responsibilities, especially local roads, for 
which LBs often receive conditional grants from MoFALD. DDCs, in particular, are provided with 
substantial funds (in the form of conditional grants) for the maintenance and/or improvement of 
district-level road networks. The provision of such conditional grants ensures that LBs meet (some of) 
their assigned infrastructural responsibilities. 
                                                     
40 Kelly (2012). 
41 See Kelly (2012) for more on sector devolution in the primary education, health and agriculture sectors. 
42 This would appear to be a good example of ‘finance following functions’ – although it could be argued that, 
in practice, this is a case of ‘function following finance’. 
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96.   LBs use their discretionary resources for a wide range of activities. Discretionary funds 
are own source revenues, shared revenues and block grants. Although the recent RMOM Guidelines 
require LBs to spend at least 35% of their block grant allocations on targeting certain categories of 
beneficiaries (women, children, and disadvantaged groups such as Dalits) and a minimum of 60% on 
the development of economic and social infrastructure, they do not include sector-specific spending 
requirements (see the section on intergovernmental fiscal transfers, paras 113 onwards, below for a 
description of transfers). Observers have identified five reasons for this practice of diffuse spending 
on small infrastructure projects43: 
 Resource constraints that make it implausible to try to address many of the formal functional 
assignments; 
 The broadness of the legal framework permits LBs to pick and choose from a wide range of 
public sector functions;  
 The planning process is open-ended and appears to be driven towards providing for a large 
number of small projects to satisfy many constituencies rather than just a few strategic ones; 
 Preference for small capital projects which are visible, even if this is not necessarily what 
would be most important for the particular service; 
 Lower importance of supporting areas where there already is significant financing via line 
agencies even if it is a local function. 
 
97.   The broad functional framework means that the accountability framework for local 
government focuses on allocation of funding (inputs) rather than service delivery (outputs and 
outcomes). Outside of vital events registration and where there are delineated tasks such as social 
protection and the local road network, LBs are not clearly responsible for any public services. In 
particular, they are not responsible for ensuring delivery of services or making decisions about the 
quantity or quality of these services. LBs may take on such a role, but there is little legal impetus to 
do so. Accountability arises rather in the process of allocating and providing financing in a manner 
that meets local demands for small projects. The large degree of discretion means that LBs – in effect 
the VDC secretary, EO, or LDO – can cater to the needs and demands as formulated in localities. 
 
Local Bodies Functions in Practice 
 
98.   It is difficult to ascertain aggregate spending patterns which would give an indication of 
LBs’ de facto functions. Available consolidated fiscal reporting at the central level provides minimal 
characteristics of expenditures. It must be noted that the below proportions are based on reports on the 
use of centrally provided transfers, i.e. conditional and unconditional grants. Expenditures from own 
source revenues and shared taxes are not included. The following can be drawn from those reports: 
 High levels of capital expenditure, but with a decline as a proportion of total expenditures from 
80% in 2010/11 to 67% in 2012/13; 
 Cash transfers for social benefits through the LBs have increased by approx. 900% between 
2007/08 and 2011/12, now comprising nearly one-third of LBs’ expenditures; 
 For municipalities, where more data is available, average recurrent expenditures were 25%, but 
with some outliers as high as 51%; the seven largest municipalities (out of 58) account for 49% 
of all recurrent municipal expenditures, while the five largest municipalities account for 36% of 
total recorded capital expenditure.44 
 
99.   Expenditure patterns in LBs in the two case districts demonstrate a broad range of LBs’ 
activities. A functional breakdown of VDC expenditures in Dhankuta district is provided in Figure 3. 
This figure was derived by looking at the detailed lists of scores of small mostly capital projects in the 
five VDCs where such detailed expenditures could be captured. Record-keeping in the VDCs in 
Dhanusa district was not sufficiently comprehensive to construct reliably a composite picture of 
                                                     
43 Cf. Kelly (2012). 
44 Local Bodies Fiscal Commission 
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expenditures by function. See Annexes 1 and 6 for a detailed breakdown of expenditures and the 
methodology for compiling sectoral or functional grouping of expenditures. 
 
100.   VDC expenditure patterns in Dhankuta are dominated by social security payments, 
administrative costs and support for maintenance of local roads. Key features of VDC budgets 
are: 
 Overall, administrative costs, social security payments and local roads account for about 60% 
of the expenditures. The remaining 40% is spread out across a large number of sectors – 
education, water & sanitation, community infrastructure, agriculture, electrification, 
environment, health, police stations, temples and miscellaneous activities. 
 A significant proportion (30-35%) of VDC expenditure is accounted for by social security 
payments (pensions, widows’ allowances, etc). This is in line with earmarked grants to VDCs 
for social security and the exclusive mandate of VDCs to administer such cash transfers. 
 Spending on the construction and maintenance of local roads is also an important part (roughly 
15%) of overall VDC expenditure. Financed out of block grants, spending on local roads is 
both a response to demand and a reflection of VDCs’ mandate and the absence of other 
agencies to finance such activities. 
 
Figure 3: Dhankuta VDCs sector spending 2009-12 
 
 
101.   From the expenditure data for Dhankuta VDCs it can be seen that allocations are 
further fragmented within sectors. Given that average annual expenditure among the Dhankuta 
VDCs is a little under NPR 4 million (US$ 40,000), the absolute amounts spent on many of these 
sectors are relatively small. Detailed expenditure statements for VDCs45 show that: 
 VDCs tend to spend small amounts on discrete projects or activities. In 2009/10, Pakhribas 
VDC, for example, spent a total of NPR 580,000 on local roads, divided up into seven discrete 
projects, the largest of which cost NPR 300,000 and the smallest of which cost NPR 30,000; 
 VDC spending outside of social security and administration tends to be on small scale 
infrastructure or capital items (e.g. construction of school facilities, repairing irrigation canals); 
                                                     
45 Detailed expenditure statements for some VDCs in Dhankuta district are included in Annex 6. 
 33 
 
 VDC spending in sectors like basic education (which receives substantial ministry funding) is 
on items that are peripheral, such as building walls around schools or school playgrounds. 
 
102.   Municipal expenditure is similarly fragmented, although limited data shows more 
spending on local roads. Dhankuta municipality, for which fairly complete data on expenditures was 
collected, spent about 15% of its 2010/11 and 2011/12 budgets on administration and social security. 
Spending on local roads accounted for almost 40% of total expenditure and the remaining 45% was 
spent on education, health, water supply, solid waste management and a range of other sectors and 
sub-sectors.46 Moreover, expenditure items are typically small (see the local roads chapter below for 
details on the small size of roads projects). 
 
103.   The same eclectic patterns of spending are seen at the DDC level. Figure 4 provides a 
graphic summary of Dhanusa DDC’s development spending in 2010/1147. Although spending on the 
local roads and bridges sectors is important, accounting for roughly one third of the DDC’s total 
development expenditure, the DDC was also involved in providing significant funding for education, 
water & sanitation, livelihoods, community buildings, and religious buildings (for which expenditure 
was over ten times greater than for DDC spending in the health sector). 
 
Figure 4: Dhanusa DDC expenditure 2010/11 by sector 
 
 
104.   Dhanusa DDC also allocates funds to a very large number of often small items within 
each sector48. Moreover, many of the DDC’s expenditure items (such as spending on primary or 
lower secondary schools or spending on community buildings) might normally be VDC 
responsibilities – illustrating the extent to which functional assignments across tiers of the local 
government system may overlap in practice. 
                                                     
46 See Annex 6 for a detailed expenditure statement for Dhankuta municipality. 
47 The development section comprises most capital funding in the budget. Detailed expenditures that could be 
classified by function were only available for this part of the budget and only in Dhanusa. 
48 See Annex 6 for a detailed expenditure statement for Dhanusa DDC. 
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105.   Public perceptions about service delivery responsibilities correspond to de facto LB 
areas of focus. In the education sector, for example, about 65% of survey respondents claimed that 
they see SMCs, DEOs and MoE as responsible for the quality of education, while less than 15% of 
respondents hold local bodies or local education committees responsible. The responsibility of local 
education institutions is further reflected in the overwhelming public perception that it is to them that 
complaints about the quality of education services should be addressed. In the local roads sector, on 
the other hand, just over 70% of respondents identify local bodies as being primarily responsible for 
the quality of infrastructure, with a further 20% attributing this to UCs. These institutions are also the 
ones to which the public feels that any complaints about local roads should be addressed.49  
 
106.   LBs are not necessarily focusing on citizens’ highest priorities for public services, but 
rather in areas where they are expected (or required by conditional transfers) to deliver. In 
terms of local public services, citizens in both districts accord the highest priority to education and 
health. Almost 90% of respondents in Dhankuta and Dhanusa perceived these two services to be very 
or extremely important. Local roads were the third overall highest priority, rated as very or extremely 
important by just over 80% of respondents. These three sectors were all seen as more important than 
water & sanitation (75% finding it very or extremely important), electrification (61%) and vital/civil 
registration (62%). This appears to reflect a de facto division of labor between LBs and line 
departments, rather than a lack of responsiveness.50 
 
D. The Intergovernmental Fiscal Framework 
 
107.   Nepal’s intergovernmental fiscal framework is marked by a concentration of revenues 
at the central level, a complex system of transfers to LBs and an overall increase in recent years 
of LBs’ discretionary and non-discretionary revenues. The total expenditure of LBs as a 
percentage of central government expenditure has increased six-fold between 2006/07 to 2012/13, 
entirely due to substantial increases in intergovernmental fiscal transfers. Transfers to LBs made up 9 
- 12% of total central government expenditures in the last three fiscal years ending FY 2012.51 
 
Figure 5: Fiscal transfers to LBs for FYs 2006-2012 
 
 
                                                     
49 See Annex 5. 
50 See Annex 5. 
51 LBFC, Budget speech 2013. 
Source: LBFC Reports, 2006-2013
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Revenue Assignments 
 
108.   Major sources of revenue such as VAT, income tax or excise duties are collected 
nationally while LBs are assigned small, mostly so-called ‘nuisance’ taxes. VDCs and 
municipalities have eight local taxes apiece. This includes a ‘rent and tenancy’ property tax, which 
can be significant where there is substantial agricultural land, such as in the Terai. However, its 
collection is limited and is hampered by issues with maintaining a proper cadastre. VDCs and 
municipalities can also charge a range of service fees and license fees. Notably, outside of two cities 
in Kathmandu Valley no LB charges fees for solid waste collection. DDCs have four minor taxes and 
the right to levy service fees. LBs do not have authority to set tax rates or bases. There are generally 
not enough trained personnel for tax collection nor are there effective enforcement mechanisms for 
local taxes. See Annex 4 for a breakdown of revenue assignments. 
 
109.   Own source revenues (OSR) are a small and shrinking proportion of the total revenue of 
LBs. In FY 2006/07, OSR52 were around 17.5% and grants made up around 60% of the total revenue. 
In FY 2012/13, OSR saw a decrease to 13%, while the central government’s grant transfer increased 
to 83% of the total revenue.53 For example, OSR as a proportion of total municipality revenue has 
been declining from 33% of total municipal revenues in FY 2006/07 to 18% in FY 2010/11. This 
decrease in OSR as a proportion of total revenues is largely due to the substantial increase in fiscal 
transfers, as local OSR has in fact tripled over the same period. 
 
Figure 6: LB own source revenue for FYs 2006-2012 
 
 
110.   There are large variations in own source revenue potential and collection among LBs. 
The 58 municipalities collect roughly half of all LB own source revenues, while the nearly 3,915 
VDCs take in only 20% in total. A small number of DDCs in Kathmandu Valley and the Terai receive 
significant income from sand and gravel sales, which functions as a kind of excise tax on the transport 
of these. Similarly, the OSR collected by VDCs in aggregate in 10 districts accounts for more than 
20% of total VDC revenues, while, on the other hand, in the majority of districts (57 out of 75), OSR 
accounts for less than 10% of total VDC revenues.54 
 
111.   A large proportion of DDC and municipal OSR comes from user charges and fees. In FY 
2011/12, tax revenue in municipalities was only 41% of the total municipal OSR, while the remaining 
share came from non-tax revenues, service fees being the largest contributor with 42% of the total 
OSR. Similarly, in DDCs around 55% of the total DDC OSR is generated from tax, the remaining 
                                                     
52 This includes shared revenue of VDCs as disaggregated data was not available for VDCs. 
53 LBFC reports (2007 to 2012) and WB Staff estimates 
54 LBFC Report, 2013 
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percentage is generated from non-tax revenue. Income from taxing sales (of sand, boulders, wood, 
etc.) is the second largest revenue source and highest non-tax contributor to DDC budgets. 
 
Figure 7: Composition of Municipality and DDC own source revenue 
 
112.   The LSGA provides for vertical and horizontal revenue sharing between center and 
local government or among local governments. The types of shared revenues are outlined in Annex 
4. Of these revenues, the most important is the house and land registration fee shared between DDCs 
and the central government: in FY 2011/12 it accounted for one third of DDCs’ OSR and shared 
revenues combined. However, the share of the income from registration fees flowing back to DDCs is 
capped at 6 million NPR (about US$60,000). 
 
Intergovernmental Fiscal Transfers (Grants and Social Payments) 
 
113.   Conditional grants are transfers from central government agencies for specific 
recurrent or capital expenses. LBs are required to specifically report on the expenditures under each 
such conditional grant to ensure that they are meeting the criteria set by the central agency allocating 
the grant. Central agencies run multiple programs involving conditional grants to LBs and separate 
expenditure reporting for each program. Conditional grants make up a large part of LBs’ budgets. 
This is one of the reasons why major parts of financial reporting are done by revenue source55. The 
largest type of conditional grant in terms of budget is social benefit transfers, which are administered 
by LBs. The second largest conditional grant is for local infrastructure, usually provided via the 
Department of Local Infrastructure Development and Agricultural Roads (DoLIDAR) in MoFALD. 
 
114.   Unconditional grants, usually referred to as block grants in Nepal, provide largely 
discretionary revenue. There are capital block grants and recurrent block grants to be spent on staff 
and core administration costs. As for the capital block grant, LBs are required to spend a minimum 
proportion of it on project activities that benefit certain historically disadvantaged segments of the 
population, in that sense limiting the LBs’ discretion. The capital block grant comprises of two 
components: 
i)  Minimum grant: LBs receive an annual ‘minimum block grant’ for capital expenditures; VDCs 
receive between NPR 1.5 million and 3 million depending on criteria such as population or 
poverty levels, while DDCs all receive a flat amount of NPR 3 million; 
ii) Formula based MC/PM grant: in addition to the minimum block grant, LBs may be provided 
with an additional grant dependent on the fulfillment of meeting certain minimum 
requirements (e.g. proper financial management) and performance measures, trying to 
incentivize compliance with legal provisions and good performance. 
 
                                                     
55 See section on Financial Management (para 72). 
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115.   Per capita grant allocations vary considerably from one local body to another. 
Unconditional grants are driven by formulae that are specifically intended to give weight to poverty, 
land area and local costs, as well as population. However, the ‘equal shares’ component means that 
per capita allocations will be higher in smaller local bodies56. In addition, per capita conditional grant 
allocations – which are not allocated on the basis of any formula – are also variable: Dhankuta DDC, 
for example, received in FY 2012 a per capita conditional grant allocation (about NPR 1,500) that was 
over ten times greater than Dhanusa (about NPR 120). 
 
116.   Municipalities and VDCs exercise substantial discretion over about half of their 
revenues; DDCs have less such discretion. This is despite the fact that social payments via VDC and 
municipal budgets have increased faster than any other recorded revenue in local budgets. National 
financial statements for the FY 2012/13 (the ‘Red Book’) show that unconditional grants, conditional 
grants, and social benefit transfers make up 40%, 35%, and 25% respectively of all transfers. If one 
takes that proportion and applies it to the proportion of ‘grants’ reported in the Local Bodies Fiscal 
Commission on OSRs, then roughly 34% of LBs’ revenues are largely discretionary block grants and 
another 15% are fully discretionary OSRs. 57 It would appear based on available national level data 
that the proportion of discretionary spending is even higher at the VDC and municipality level. 
Whereas overall for LBs unconditional grants make up 40% of the total transfers, they made up only 
20% of total transfers to DDCs. A breakdown below DDCs is not available but it appears logical that 
VDCs and municipalities would have discretion over somewhat more than 50% of all revenues. 
 
Figure 8: Types of fiscal transfers in their proportions 
 
Data Sources: 
OSR, Shared Revenue = LBFC 2013 
Total Conditional and Unconditional Grant, Social Payment = Red Book, 2013 
 
 
117.   Data for Dhankuta58 reflect the nation-wide breakdown of discretionary versus non-
discretionary revenues. In Dhankuta VDCs enjoy discretionary powers over about 60% of their total 
revenues. VDCs typically receive only one conditional grant, for social security; other transfers are 
almost exclusively recurrent or capital block grants, over which they have substantial discretion. 
                                                     
56 See Boex (2012). 
57 Figures for grants in LBFC’s data differ from those of central transfers in the Red Book. This means that 
combination of proportions of central government transfers as per the Red Book with records of central grants 
received by LBs mixes data that does not match. However, the proportions derived from the Red Book provide a 
rough sense of scale between various types of conditional and unconditional transfers received by LBs. 
58 Revenue data for VDCs in Dhanusa is too inconsistent to be analysed. 
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III. SUB-NATIONAL SERVICE DELIVERY: 
LOCAL ROADS AND PRIMARY EDUCATION 
 
A. Local Roads 
 
Normative Institutional Framework 
 
118.   Local body functional responsibilities in the local roads sector are specified in several 
legal, regulatory and policy documents. The Local Self Governance Act (LSGA, 1999) spells out 
LB functional assignments, which include local roads and transport infrastructure. The LSGA also 
specifies that concerned line ministries are expected to assist LBs in the planning and implementation 
of their development programs. LSGR (2000) and LBFAR (2007) provide more detailed operational 
and financial management rules, applicable to all LB activities (including those related to the local 
roads sector). Finally, the Local Infrastructure Development Policy (LIDP, 2004) assigns 
responsibilities to LBs in seven local infrastructure sub-sectors, including local roads and transport. 
The LIDP further classifies local infrastructure as village level, municipal level and district level 
(without actually providing much detail on precisely what types of infrastructure correspond to which 
level). 
 
119.   The Public Roads Act (PRA) of 1974 remains the principal legal framework for the 
roads sector as a whole. Although the PRA is no longer up to date, a range of more recent policy 
documents have tried to address issues related to the roads sector – notably the National Transport 
Policy (2002) which classifies the local transport system as consisting of district roads, village roads, 
agriculture roads, municipal roads and major foot trails, for which planning, construction and 
maintenance are LB responsibilities. 
 
120.   This normative institutional framework for the roads sector is internally not fully 
consistent. The Department of Roads and DoLIDAR, for example, use different definitions for 
classifying roads and assign responsibilities for their management to different institutions. The 
harmonization and rationalization of the overall policy framework for the roads sector is a priority at 
present for DoLIDAR59. This is further complicated by the often low levels of LB compliance with 
policies, regulations and guidelines. This appears to be particularly marked in the local roads sector. 
 
121.   There are several key national and sub-national institutional stakeholders in the local 
roads sector60. At the center, the National Planning Commission (NPC) provides policy and 
budgetary directives; the Ministry of Finance allocates resources and authorizes the release of 
budgets, grants and transfers; MoFALD and DoLIDAR provide guidance and support to LBs with 
respect to their activities in the local roads sector; the Roads Board provides funding for local roads 
maintenance; and, finally, the Department of Roads (DoR) also directly undertakes local roads 
activities. 
 
122.   At the sub-national level, DDCs, VDCs and municipalities are responsible for the 
planning, prioritization and implementation of local roads within nationally set guidelines. Local 
roads sector activities are planned and undertaken according to the generic planning and 
implementation procedures for LBs (paras 65 onwards above). However, the authority of LBs 
(especially DDCs) in the sector is limited by conditions attached to earmarked roads sector funding. 
In some cases work on local roads is carried out separately by the Department of Roads. District 
Technical Offices (DTOs in DDCs are expected to provide all LBs with technical support. In practice, 
they tend to direct their limited capacity to district level roads and to GoN and donor-funded sector 
programs. The construction and maintenance of local roads are dominated by user committees (UCs) 
except for DoR roads, which are usually given to private contractors. 
 
                                                     
59 See Government of Nepal and The World Bank, Road Sector Assessment Study, Nepal (2013). 
60 See Annex 9 for a detailed description of the roles of institutional stakeholders in the local roads sector. 
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Local Roads: An Overview 
 
123.   The roads sector in Nepal is divided between the Strategic Road Network (SRN), which 
includes national highways and feeder roads, and the Local Road Network (LRN). All roads 
outside of the SRN are automatically local roads. Although estimates vary, the LRN consists of at 
least 50,000 km of roads. Only 5% of local roads are paved. Most paved roads are situated in the 
relatively flat Terai region, where the majority of other local roads are graveled. In the Middle Hills, 
on the other hand, there are few paved roads and most local roads are earthen. The overall consensus 
is that over half of all local roads are inoperable. 
 
Box 6: Local road networks in Dhankuta and Dhanusa 
Dhankuta: the current road network in Dhankuta district consists of a total of 1,010.5 km of registered roads; in 
addition, there are estimated to be about 500 km of unregistered roads. Of this, 119 km are strategic roads, 
538.1 km make up the District Road Core Network (DRCN, which link up the VDCs and Dhankuta 
municipality) and 353.4 km are village roads. Less than 1% of the DRCN consists of paved roads; the vast 
majority of DRCN and village roads are earthen. Only 20% of DRCN roads and 5% of village roads are 
considered to be ‘all weather’ (i.e. usable throughout the year, including the monsoon season); the remainder 
are only ‘fair weather’ (i.e. unusable in poor weather conditions). 
Dhanusa: the existing registered road network in Dhanusa district consists of just over 177 km of strategic 
roads, about 505 km of district level roads (making up the DRCN), and 427 km of village or municipal roads. 
A little over 5% of the DRCN is paved, 30% is graveled and about 65% is earthen. The vast majority of 
registered village or municipal roads are earthen. 65% of the DRCN is classified as being in poor condition and 
35% is classified as being ‘all-weather’, the remainder (65%) being ‘fair weather’. 
Source: Dhankuta DTMP (2013), Dhankuta DTO; Dhanusa DTMP (2014) 
 
Local Roads: Planning and Implementation in Practice 
 
124.   In practice, the ways in which local roads sector activities are planned and implemented 
by LBs appear to vary according to the source of funding. Where LBs rely on their own source, or 
shared revenues, and unconditional block grants (for which they enjoy a good deal of discretion with 
respect to the use of such funds), LBs appear to follow the ‘generic’ planning and implementation 
framework. In these cases, the overall priority accorded to the local roads sector (in relation to other 
sectors) and to specific roads sector projects are identified through a combination of bottom-up 
planning and council decision-making. In all types of LB, roads sector spending funded out of own 
source, shared and block grant revenues is a relatively high priority. 
 
125.   At the VDC-level, considerable priority appears to be given to spending on local roads. 
As can be seen from figure 9, VDC spending (in Dhankuta district) in the local roads & bridges sector 
accounts for 4-24% of annual expenditure. Taken over a three-year period (2009-12), the VDCs in 
Dhankuta spent just over 14% of their total budgets on the local roads sector. Local roads are the third 
largest spending category for the VDCs, after social security transfers and administrative costs. 
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Figure 9: Roads and other sector spending by VDCs 
 
 
 
126.   DDCs appear to give the local roads sector a higher spending priority than VDCs in 
their use of discretionary revenues. Dhankuta DDC, for example, spent just under a third of its 
block grant resources on the local roads sector between 2009 and 2011; indeed, the roads/bridges 
sector was the largest sector in terms of spending (see figure 10 below). 
 
Figure 10: Dhanusa DDC block grant spending by sector 
 
 
 
127.   Municipalities appear to place an even greater emphasis on the local roads sector. In 
Dhankuta municipality, for example, spending on the local roads sector accounts for almost 40% of 
total annual expenditure (based on all revenues) and is by far the biggest spending sector. 
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Figure 11: Dhankuta – municipal expenditure by sector 
 
 
128.   The annual roads sector planning process is supposed to be informed by District 
Transport Master Plans (DTMPs). DTMPs are prepared by technically competent roads sector 
planners, based on consultations with key local stakeholders, and approved by district councils. 
DTMPs focus on District Road Core Networks (DRCNs) and do not apply to village or municipal 
roads. DTMPs accord a high priority to maintenance and a low priority to the construction of new 
roads. The selection of which DTMP elements are to be funded each year is integrated into the regular 
annual DDC planning process. Up until recently, however, DDCs have paid limited attention to their 
DTMPs61 – which have generally been used as a framework for national roads sector programs, often 
funded by donors. 
 
129.   Data from Dhankuta and Dhanusa indicate that local roads sector activities funded out 
of discretionary resources follow the same pattern whereby LBs spread resources among a large 
number of projects. Planning for the roads sector is part of the standard LB planning process 
discussed in paras 65 onwards. The result is that spending on the local roads sector is spread out over 
a large number of individual projects for all types of LBs. These are typically small given that (a) the 
local fiscal budget is of limited size and (b) local councils and officials are under pressure to satisfy as 
many constituents as possible. In the VDCs, DDCs and municipalities surveyed, this tendency – 
described as the ‘sprinkler effect’ by a recent study62 – is readily apparent in the large number and 
small size of roads sector projects (see table 4 below). The average cost of VDC roads sector projects 
(of all types) is about NPR 122,000 (US$1,200),which is very small; Dhanusa DDC and Dhankuta 
municipality have larger projects, but these still cost remarkably little (on average less than NPR 
550,000). 
                                                     
61 This now appears to be changing, as the government and its development partners have begun to insist that 
annual planning and implementation of local roads activities by DDCs be strictly guided by DTMPs. 
62 See Road Sector Assessment Study, GoN/WB (2013). 
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Table 4: Local roads projects in selected local bodies 
Roads sector 
activities 
Dhankuta VDCs 2009-12 Dhanusa DDC 2009-11 Dhankuta municipality 2010-12 
Spending 
on roads 
sector 
(NPR 
million) 
No. of 
projects 
Average 
cost of 
projects 
(NPR) 
Spending 
on roads 
sector 
(NPR 
million) 
No. of 
projects 
Average 
cost of 
projects 
(NPR) 
Spending 
on roads 
sector 
(NPR 
million) 
No. of 
projects 
Average 
cost of 
projects 
(NPR) 
All activities 7.70 63 122,000       
Maintenance    29.91 88 340,000 34.30 64 535,000 
Construction    9.44 18 524,000 14.55 27 538,000 
 
130.   Local bodies do not appear to be engaging in the local roads sector in a strategic or 
systematic way. Rather than trying to maintain or upgrade entire stretches of the local roads network, 
LBs tend to take an approach of satisfying a range of local stakeholders (communities, UCs, political 
leaders, etc.), who may have parochial interests rather than a vision of the local roads network as a 
public good. Although most DDCs now have updated DTMPs, which potentially provide a coherent 
framework to guide investments and activities in the local roads sector, these do not appear to be 
rigorously adhered to given the local context (as Box 7 below illustrates). VDCs, on the other hand, 
have no strategic document for the local roads sector. This leaves them more vulnerable to parochial 
interest groups, and limits their ability to look at their road networks as a whole. 
 
Box 7: Dhankuta DDC’s current approach to the local roads sector: ‘Everybody gets something’ 
For the coming FY (2014/15), the DDC in Dhankuta intends to allocate about NPR 22 million to the local 
roads sector, to be financed out of the DDC’s unconditional block grant and from conditional grants. 
According to the DTO, the allocation of funds to individual road projects will be consistent with the DTMP, 
which was updated in 2013; priority will be given to maintenance and road improvements, rather than to new 
construction. Allocations will be limited to work on the district’s 22 DRCN roads, each of which has its own 
UC. The district council will meet to decide on how to allocate these funds – both the LDO and the head of the 
DTO agree that allocations from the overall roads envelope are almost certain to be made to everybody, in 
other words to all 22 UCs (but with some variations in the amount allocated, depending on ‘difficulties’ with 
certain UCs). Doing otherwise, the LDO and DTO head argued, would create problems with local 
stakeholders. Once the sub-allocations are made, the DTO and respective UC will discuss the exact nature and 
location of the works to be undertaken. 
Source: fieldwork notes (Dhankuta, January 2014) 
 
Conditional Financing and Other Fund Flows for Roads 
 
131.   DDCs also receive more tightly earmarked conditional grants for the local roads sector 
from the government and donors. During the period 2009-2012, Dhankuta DDC, for example, has 
received separate grants for agricultural roads, for bridges, for local transportation, and for road 
maintenance. These leave the DDC with little discretion as to their use – either in terms of locality or 
activity. Moreover, some of these conditional grants appear not to have been budgeted for, suggesting 
that they were allocated on an ad hoc basis and outside of the DDC’s regular planning and budgeting 
cycle. These diverse, unpredictable and typically ad hoc sources of funding do not foster a strategic 
approach to the planning and management of the local roads sector. In such cases, local planning may 
be limited in practice. 
 
132.   End of year budget reallocations are important. During the third trimester of each FY, the 
Ministry of Finance reallocates budgets from projects or activities that are likely to remain unspent 
before the end of the FY to ‘new’ projects or activities. Such reallocated budgets are often channeled 
through DDCs to finance earmarked works in the local roads sector, even though they are (more often 
than not) unplanned at the local level. This is a top-down process and does not follow any formal 
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national or local planning process. Given that these budget reallocations take place towards the end of 
the FY and do not correspond to any regular planning or project preparation process, the roads 
projects that are financed may be hastily implemented. It is often the case that UCs are created to 
implement them quickly while limited levels of technical support and supervision are provided. As a 
result, quality may be compromised. 
 
133.   Municipalities have an additional specific reallocation mechanism. Unspent Local 
Development Fee (LDF63) funds are allocated to municipalities on the basis of proposals (including 
roads projects) that they submit to central government and which municipalities are willing to co-fund 
out of their own source revenues or beneficiary contributions. These funds are so-called Jageda Kosh 
(matching funds). These funds are allocated by a central level committee, chaired by the Secretary of 
MoFALD and including representatives from MoF/FCGO and the Municipal Association. Operational 
guidelines for the management and use of such funds are in place. Again, this can lead to ad hoc 
planning. 
 
134.   Rural Community Infrastructure Works (RCIW), a food-for-work program jointly 
implemented by the GoN and WFP, also contributes to roads. RCIW includes an important local 
roads component. At the DDC level, a separate technical wing (distinct from DTOs and DoLIDAR) 
oversees RCIW implementation. Local roads planning under RCIW may or may not be consistent 
with the wider DDC road sector planning process. 
 
135.   MPs’ Constituency Development Funds of NPR 1 million apiece are often a source of 
financing for the local roads sector.64 This is disbursed through DDCs as authorized by the MP. 
DDC/DTO technicians are responsible for technical supervision of these projects. Given the limited 
capacity of DTOs, road projects appear to be often implemented without detailed engineering design 
and funds are released on a cost estimate basis. These roads projects are generally implemented 
through UCs, often selected by MPs themselves. The sole accountability for these types of program 
resides in the MPs, who are responsible for authorization. DDCs function like a post office for budget 
release, although they are responsible for all related audit functions. 
 
136.   The Department of Roads (DoR) also carries out works on the local road network, 
though it is supposed to limit itself exclusively to the Strategic Roads Network. Financing for this 
work comes via national budget heading 68/4/5/249, a heading that provides for specific local 
development spending determined by the central government. This provides an opportunity for 
national politicians and leaders to influence the selection of local roads sector projects that are 
included in the NPC’s annual program book. There is no coordination mechanism between DoR and 
LBs and in practice this occurs only if DDCs ask for the information.65 The amount of work on the 
local roads network that is carried out by DoR varies from year to year and from place to place. In 
Dhanusa, for example, DoR’s divisional office spent very little in 2010/11 (NPR 1.2 million) on local 
roads, but spent over NPR 20 million on local roads in the following year (2011/12), representing 
roughly 40% of its annual works budget. 
 
137.   While funding for the local roads sector has increased, the financing arrangements do 
not lend themselves to coherent planning and management of local road networks. Although LBs 
can generally rely on their own, shared and block grant revenues – all of which are fairly predictable – 
this is not the case for either conditional grants or the other funding/grant modalities described above. 
Conditional grants, earmarked for the local roads sector, are often not predictable nor are they based 
on a transparent formula. Instead, they appear to be allocated in a largely ad hoc fashion by central 
                                                     
63 The Local Development Fee (LDF) is provided to municipalities by central government as compensation for 
revenues previously mobilized through octroi taxes, which were abolished in order to comply with WTO 
regulations. See Annex 4 for more discussion of LDF. 
64 MPs elected through proportional representation can allocate such funds to more than one district, up to a 
maximum of 6 projects/ constituencies. 
65 According DTO in Dhankuta, field report. 
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government. There are also parallel sources of road sector funding and a number of ad hoc allocation 
mechanisms, few of which are predictable. 
 
Implementation Issues in Maintaining the Local Roads Network 
 
138.   Persistent delays in the release of funds can undermine work in the local roads sector. 
The late release of funds forces LBs to rush the implementation of local road works during the last 
trimester, which may further compromise quality. 
 
139.   LBs have limited technical capacity. The pool of qualified road engineers is relatively small 
in size. Inherent capacity limitations are exacerbated by the ‘sprinkler effect’ in the local roads sector, 
which results in a limited number of technical staff being spread thinly across a large number of 
projects and activities. The problem is further complicated by the reliance on UCs, many of which 
may have limited skills and other limitations requiring relatively frequent technical backstopping to 
ensure minimum standards. Increasingly large conditional and unconditional grants have expanded 
spending on the local roads sector – stretching still further local technical capacities. There is 
currently a mismatch between spending on local roads and the technical capacity of LBs to properly 
manage activities in the local roads sector. 
 
140.   Quality of implementation of roads building, maintenance, and upgrading could be 
improved. Although LBs can implement road sector projects through contractors, UCs or directly by 
themselves, in practice the majority of local road projects are implemented through UCs (see box 5 on 
UCs above). Leaving aside problems associated with the composition and management practices 
associated with UCs, the LBs’ reliance on them to implement local roads works may result in reduced 
quality. Whatever their benefit in terms of local participation and ownership, UCs often appear to 
have limited capacity and technical skills to carry out quality road works. 
 
141.   VDC level road projects in particular tend to be of limited quality. Detailed engineering 
design is rare, costing is largely driven by the amount of money allocated (rather than on the basis of 
design and bills of quantities), technical supervision is limited, and works are rarely completed within 
the year.66 VDCs spend much of their budgets on local roads, accounting for by one assessment about 
18% of all spending on local roads.67 VDCs can hire technical staff or share with other VDCs the 
associated costs. But VDCs rarely appear to take on full-time engineers, even when they are making 
significant investments in the local roads sector or funding large numbers of local roads projects. 
While some VDCs do indeed share the cost of hiring overseers to monitor and supervise works, they 
may have limited qualification and experience. A major challenge appears to be the lack of qualified 
engineers available at the local level. DTOs are stretched too thin to be able to provide VDCs with 
sufficient technical support for any sector, including the local roads sector. 
 
142.   At the DDC level, local roads sector activities are also characterized by limited technical 
inputs. Although the local roads sector absorbs about 6.7% of the total national budget, DoLIDAR 
and DTO staffing levels remain modest. Less than 1,200 DoLIDAR/DTO technical and administrative 
staff provide full-time support for the local roads sector (see table 5 below). This staffing pattern has 
not been reviewed to determine whether it is compatible with the growing volume of work at both the 
central and local levels. DTO staff is thus frequently over-stretched and unable to carry out pre-
feasibility or feasibility studies, even when these are mandatory. This is compounded by DTOs having 
technical responsibilities for several local infrastructure sub-sectors (water supply, suspension 
bridges, micro-hydropower, irrigation), in addition to local roads. This situation may lead to shortcuts 
in the design and costing of roads works; and lack of proper supervision in construction, upgrading 
and maintenance activities. 
                                                     
66 Moreover, LBs and UCs often ignore environmental standards: bulldozers are used, labor-based and 
environmentally-friendly approaches are not applied, etc. This non-compliance with environment-related 
standards results in roads that rapidly degrade, subject to landslides, etc. 
67 See Road Sector Assessment Study, GoN/WB (2013): p14. 
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Table 5: Authorized DTO staffing positions 
No. of DTOs 
Senior 
Divisional 
Engineer 
District 
Engineers 
Junior 
Engineers 
Other 
administrative 
staff 
Total no. of 
DTO staff per 
DDC 
17 districts 1 3 6 8 18 
25 districts 1 2 6 8 17 
33 districts - 1 3 9 13 
 
143.   DTOs are not fully anchored within DDC organizational structures. In terms of policy, 
DTOs are sector sections of DDCs, but effectively they operate as DoLIDAR outreach offices for 
technical support to LBs. DTOs are supervised by DoLIDAR and not the LDO. This arrangement 
reportedly can result in internal conflicts between DTOs and DDCs and lead to coordination or 
communication problems. Authorization mechanisms for fund flows are not fully institutionalized and 
may function on the basis of the personal relationship between LDOs and DTO chiefs. This can also 
lead to delays in meeting project implementation schedules and reporting requirements. In some 
districts, conflict and limited coordination appear to send negative messages to the general public and 
undermine service delivery.68 
 
144.   Monitoring, reporting and evaluation in the local roads sector could be improved. 
Progress and financial reporting systems face important challenges at all levels. Monitoring and 
reporting functions are given limited priority or importance by stakeholder organizations in the local 
roads sector. The personnel responsible for monitoring and reporting may lack skills and/or the 
budgetary resources they need to undertake their allocated tasks. There are challenges in regularly 
updating and reviewing information about local road networks: VDCs face particular limitations in 
this respect, but even DDCs/DTOs do not appear to systematically keep reliable and updated data 
about the condition, use and expansion of their road networks. This implies that planning in the sector 
is not sufficiently grounded in regular assessments of the local road network. 
 
145.   Despite issues with planning and execution, there is an overall assessment that the 
quality of rural roads is improving, particularly in Dhankuta district. This is not to say that roads 
are in good shape: over 50% of the public surveyed for this study responded that the quality of local 
roads is either very bad or bad. There are significant differences between the two districts: in 
Dhanusa, 70% of respondents classify local roads as being of very bad or bad quality while in 
Dhankuta less than 35% of respondents assessed the roads to be bad or very bad. More importantly, 
just over 50% of people think that the quality of road infrastructure has improved over the last three 
years. There is again a strong difference between the two districts: over 73% noting improvement and 
23% noting no change in Dhankuta while only 27% saw improvement and 62% noted that quality 
remained the same in Dhanusa in the past three years. Given the increase in LBs’ funding envelope 
and the prominence of expenditures on roads, at least some improvement is to be expected. At the 
same time, the continued poor overall quality suggests that there remains much still to be done. 
 
 
B. Primary and Lower Secondary (Basic) Education 
 
Introduction 
 
146.   In Nepal, education is the biggest public service delivery sector. The importance of the 
sector is underlined by: (a) the size of the population benefiting directly and indirectly from services; 
(b) the annual budgetary allocation, which consistently accounts for more than 15% of total public 
expenditure (of which about 85% is earmarked for basic and secondary education); and (c) the 
workforce involved in service delivery. Nationwide, the school education system consists of almost 
                                                     
68 See Roads Sector Assessment Study, GoN/WB (2013): p11. 
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35,000 schools, nearly 7 million students, more than 200,000 teachers, 1,000 resource persons, and a 
few thousand administrative officials of various categories. 
 
147.   School education in Nepal consists of 5 years of primary, 3 years of lower secondary, 2 
years of secondary, and 2 years of higher secondary education. Ongoing reforms will restructure 
this into basic education (grades 1-8) and secondary education (grades 9-12). This study focuses on 
basic education which refers to a combination of what is presently primary and lower secondary 
education. 
 
148.   Nepal has made notable progress in enhancing equitable access to all levels of school 
education. The net enrollment rate (NER) has reached 95.6% in primary and 55% in secondary 
education in 2013/14, compared to 92.6% and 40% in 2009/10. Gender parity in NER has been 
achieved at all levels of school education. Likewise, dropout and repetition rates have decreased 
significantly in the past five years (although they still continue to be high in grade 1, with a dropout 
rate of 7.1 and repetition rate of 17.5, respectively). Cycle completion rates have improved at all 
levels. These improvements are indicative of the overall success of government strategies (such as 
free textbooks, scholarships for various disadvantaged groups, and mid-day meals in food-deficit 
regions) in bringing all children to schools and retaining them. 
 
149.   Progress in improving the quality of education, however, has been modest. Pass rates in 
the annual school leaving certificate examinations are below 50%, especially in the public schools 
where more than 80% of all students study. Likewise, results from the national assessments of 
students from grades 3, 5 and 8 students show on average scores at or less than 50% in the major 
subjects, with substantial variations in performance between public and private schools as well as 
among public schools. This indicates significant variations in service delivery across districts and 
schools. 
 
150.   There is a growing private sector provision of education. As elsewhere in South Asia, 
private schooling is an important and growing part of the overall school system, particularly in urban 
areas: of the total of about 35,000 schools in the country, 5,500 are private, and approximately 16% of 
all school students (grades 1-10) go to private schools. This report, however, focuses largely on the 
provision of public education. 
 
151.   Education is more than just the operation of schools. Of course, schools themselves are the 
primary mechanism for delivery of education. The inputs of staff, infrastructure, curricula, and 
supervision of schools that allow them to perform are critical aspects of service delivery in the sector. 
However, provision of education services also includes a broader framework for learning, including 
ensuring access to schooling and corresponding attendance of school age children, maintenance of 
libraries, non-formal education, adult literacy and early childhood development.  These broader issues 
fall out of the remit of entities responsible for school management. 
 
Institutional Framework for Basic Education 
 
152.   At the national level, basic and secondary education are the responsibility of the 
Ministry of Education (MoE) and the Department of Education (DoE), a central agency that is 
responsible for overall implementation of all school education programs. In addition, a number of 
semi- and fully autonomous central agencies (such as the Curriculum Development Center) provide 
inputs to the education sector. 
 
153.   At the sub-national level, there are Regional Education Directorates (REDs) in each of 
the five development regions, and District Education Offices (DEOs) in each of the 75 districts. 
DEOs are responsible for a range of functions: financial management (including the disbursement of 
funds to schools, school inspections and monitoring). Resource Centers (RCs), each of which serves 
and supports several schools, also act as an outreach arm of their respective DEOs. 
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154.   Since 2001, the governance of school education has been highly decentralized, with local 
School Management Committees (SMCs) playing a primary role. SMC core members are elected 
from among parents, who are entrusted with functions such as school management and development, 
teacher recruitment, financial management, and transparency and accountability in the use of funds. In 
the absence of LB elections for over a decade, SMC elections have generated significant political 
party interest, with winning SMC berths linked to the strength of the party at the local level.69 
 
155.   As provided for in the Seventh Amendment to the Education Act (2001), each tier in the 
local body system also has a corresponding Education Committee (EC), which is intended to 
ensure horizontal linkages between MoE line departments, LBs and education sector 
stakeholders. Accordingly, at the district level, DECs are formed and VECs/MECs at the 
VDC/municipality levels. The DEC is headed by the chair of the DDC and the VECs/MECs are 
headed by the chairs of the VDCs/municipalities. Other members include GoN officials (including 
DEO staff), representatives from lower tier ECs, representatives of School Management Committees 
(SMCs), and teachers. 
 
156.   DEC and VECs/MECs have three broad areas of responsibility: planning, resource 
mobilization and monitoring & evaluation (see table 6 below for more details). DEC functions are 
specified in Education Act (2001), while those of VECs/MECs are prescribed in the Education 
Regulations (2011). In practice, DECs are generally operational; VECs/MECs, on the other hand 
display limited activity. 
 
Table 6: Roles and responsibilities of DECs and VECs/MECs 
Activity 
Key roles and responsibilities 
DEC VEC/MEC 
Planning  Formulate District Education Plan 
(DEP) 
 Formulate and ensure implementation 
of school educational programs in 
accordance with the approved DEP* 
 Deploy or redeploy teachers based on 
student numbers or subjects to be 
taught  
 Formulation and implementation of 
Village/Municipal Education Plans 
(VEPs/MEPs), approved by respective LB 
councils 
 Maintain updates on school education plans 
Resource 
mobilization 
 Encourage VDCs and municipalities to 
provide financial assistance to schools 
 Mobilize resources for education in the 
district 
 Support SMCs the mobilization of local 
resources 
 Mobilize resources for education in the 
Village/Municipality 
M&E  Take action with respect to school audit 
reports 
 Grant approval for closure of existing 
schools 
 Monitoring of school education plans 
 Recommend school establishment  
 
157.   In addition to their role in their respective DEC, VEC or MEC, LBs have (according to 
the LSGA) a number of functions with respect to the basic education sector. The 1999 LSGA 
includes provisions for the devolution of authority over school education to local bodies (see paras 86 
onwards on functional assignments in this report). However, few LBs appear to play an active role in 
the management of schools or the basic education sector as a whole, although (as shall be seen below) 
some LBs do provide schools with funding or finance certain expenditures (especially the 
construction and maintenance of school buildings and facilities). In addition, LBs are to provide 
support to other education sub-sectors, such as non-formal education, adult literacy and early 
childhood development (ECD). 
 
                                                     
69 See The Asia Foundation (2012). 
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Planning 
 
158.   In theory, the education sector follows a decentralized, bottom-up planning framework. 
The basis for this planning is the formulation of 3-year School Improvement Plans (SIPs) at the 
school level and village/municipal education plans (V/MEPs) at the VDC/municipality level. These 
are then consolidated at the district level in the form of 3-year District Education Plans (DEPs). All of 
these plans are expected to be updated every year. While there are no provisions and practices for 
approving the SIPs, the VEP/MEPs and DEPs are expected to be formulated and approved by their 
respective Village/Municipal Education Committees (VECs/MECs) and District Education 
Committees (DECs).The SIPs are not tied with budget flows from the central treasury. Likewise, there 
is no flow of funds from the MoE system to the DECs, MECs and VECs. Furthermore, there is no 
official monitoring and reporting of the implementation status of these plans, and several studies70 
have suggested that SIPs largely amount to school wish lists, rather than realistic plans per se. 
 
159.   At the same time, the school education sector’s annual planning and budgeting cycle is 
driven by a largely top-down process. The annual planning cycle in the MoE (and all other 
ministries as well) is aligned with the fiscal calendar (16 July-15 July) and commences with the 
receipt of budget ceilings and guidelines from the MoF. Upon receipt of such ceilings and guidelines, 
the MoE sends the same to the Department of Education (DoE) and other central level line agencies. 
The DoE forwards them to REDs and DEOs, generally by the third week of December (although, in 
practice delays happen in sending them). The DEOs prepare their annual strategic implementation 
plans (ASIPs) based on the guidelines received from DoE, which are discussed and finalized at the 
RED level. These district ASIPs are then submitted to the DoE, which prepares a consolidated 
national ASIP together with an annual work plan and budget (AWPB). The ASIP/AWPB is shared 
with external development partners in the education sector during the joint annual review mission in 
April/May and finalized after discussion. The MoE then incorporates the ASIP/AWPB into its School 
Sector Reform Program and submits this to the NPC and the MoF, which finalize it. This final MoE 
program and budget is incorporated into the overall national budget by the MoF, which then presents 
it to parliament after getting cabinet approval. The expected date of budget approval is usually just 
before the beginning of the new fiscal year. 
 
Financing 
 
160.   The central government provides funds to schools through earmarked and non-
earmarked grants. These include grants for salaries, per child funding (PCF) grants, scholarship 
grants, grants for school feeding programs in targeted areas, capital grants, and un-earmarked grants 
to cover operating costs. These school grants are provided by the MoE and routed through the DoE 
and then the DEOs, which then make disbursements to the schools in their district. There is an 
additional step involving DDCs signing off on funding allocations for salaries from DoE to DEOs for 
onward disbursements to schools in the case of primary teachers’ salaries, but in practice this appears 
to be purely pro forma with DDCs lacking authority to do anything other than confirm the allocations 
and reroute them to schools through the DEO. In addition, the DEO receives funds for its own 
operations from the DoE/MoE. 
 
161.   Central government financing of basic education is significant. As noted above, education 
makes up over 15% of total central government expenditures. In Dhankuta and Dhanusa districts, 
education sector spending (which was largely for basic and secondary education) in 2011/12 was, 
respectively, NPR 514 million and NPR 464 million. For 2011/12, education sector spending in 
Dhankuta was greater than all LB revenues combined (NPR 482 million) and about 80% of all LB 
revenues (NPR 583 million) in Dhanusa. 
 
                                                     
70 e.g., Norad, Joint Evaluation of Nepal’s Education For All 2004-2009 Sector program. Evaluation Report 
1/2009. Oslo: Norad. Moriani et al. (2013). 
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162.   Figures available for Dhankuta and Dhanusa show differences in the levels of central 
government funding of education in the two districts. In terms of per student71 funding, for 
example, Dhankuta consistently received roughly two to three times more from central government 
than Dhanusa has over the period 2009-12. This difference in per student funding in the two districts 
explains the differences in student-teacher ratios (see figure 12 below). 
 
Figure 12: Student-teacher ratios 
 
 
163.   Apart from the central treasury, schools/education institutions also can receive funds 
from local bodies, I/NGOs, and local individuals. In addition, various school fees (especially for 
secondary level students) and other own source resources (e.g. rent from land and buildings belonging 
to schools) contribute to school income. 
 
164.   The schools that were surveyed in this study appear to receive very modest financial 
contributions from local bodies. In a review of 35 schools in Dhankuta district, all LB contributions 
to schools amounted to less than 1.5% of total school income. In 27 schools reviewed in Dhanusa, the 
proportion was even lower (less than 0.5% of total school income). See figure 13 below.72 
 
165.   Local body financial contributions to schools are declining in the districts under review. 
In Dhankuta, there has been a decline in VDC financial contributions to schools in their jurisdictions – 
for the surveyed schools, VDC contributions to school income declined from a little under NPR 0.9 
million in 2009/10 (representing 1.5% of total school income) to around NPR 0.75 million in 2011/12 
(representing about 1.1% of total school income). VDC officials in Dhankuta confirmed this in 
interviews, reporting that education sector spending was a declining VDC priority. The same trend 
applies to DDC and municipal contributions to school income in Dhankuta. The same reduction in the 
size of VDC contributions to school income has also taken place in Dhanusa – in 2009/10, the VDC 
contribution to school income amounted to a little under NPR 0.3 million (or 0.8% of total school 
income); in 2011/12 VDCs made no contribution to school income. 
                                                     
71 All students – primary, lower secondary, secondary and higher secondary – taken together to calculate per 
student funding rates. 
72 More detailed data on school budgets can be found in Annex 7. 
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Figure 13: Dhankuta – sources of school income 
 
 
166.   When looked at from the point of view of LB budgets, the contribution of LBs to the 
basic education sector is somewhat more important – but is still a small proportion of total LB 
expenditure. The VDCs surveyed in Dhankuta have been spending about 6.5% of their total 
expenditure on the primary and lower secondary education sector. In Dhanusa, however, VDCs spend 
less than 0.1% of their total expenditure on education. However, these are probably underestimates of 
VDC spending in the education sector because some VDC datasets do not disaggregate spending by 
sector for all expenditure items (especially capital). 
 
167.   Recorded (and overall) VDC spending on education has been declining – not only as a 
proportion of total VDC expenditure (from 7.2 % in 2009/10 to about 2.8% in 2011/12), but also in 
absolute terms (from about NPR 1.4 million in 2009/10 to less than NPR 0.5 million in 2011/12). 
 
168.   This decline in VDC spending on education appears to be part of a longer term trend. 
The 2008 UNCDF study of VDCs showed that in 2006/07 education sector spending accounted for 
about 13.5% of total VDC expenditure; the 2009 UNDP/INLOGOS study showed that in 2007/08, 
education sector spending by VDCs accounted for 18% of block grant expenditure (and presumably a 
somewhat smaller % of total expenditure73). 
 
169.   This decline is in response to perceived lack of need for additional funding from LBs. 
Income data for the schools in Dhankuta and Dhanusa shows that they are carrying over, every year, 
substantial unspent ‘surpluses’, as can be seen from figure 13 above). In Dhankuta, the amounts being 
‘brought forward’ account for almost 17% of annual income – and, indeed, are getting larger ever 
year (accounting for 10.3% of total income in 2009/10 but 21% of total income in 2011/12). Schools 
in Dhanusa carry over less than those in Dhankuta (about 12% of total income as opposed to 17%) – 
but this is still substantial74. These carry-overs imply that schools are effectively saving, are 
accumulating substantial cash reserves75, and do not have a cash flow problem. Given this, VDCs may 
not see any reason to provide local schools with additional funding. Alternatively, and precisely 
because their schools have financial reserves, school management committees or head teachers may 
not be lobbying their VDCs for additional funding. 
 
                                                     
73 In the case of VDCs in the Middle Hills (such as those in Dhankuta), the UNDP/INLOGOS study estimated 
that block grants accounted for approximately 70% of total revenues. If this was the case, then 18% of total 
block grant expenditure being used for the education sector would have represented about 12.5% of total VDC 
expenditure. 
74 This is consistent with the findings of the recent School and Household Survey (New Era 2013), which shows 
that carried over funds account for about 17% of total annual school income. 
75 One school in Dhankuta, for example, has actually deposited its ‘savings’ (of some NPR 800,000) into a 
‘blocked’ bank account that yields a higher rate of interest than a regular bank account. 
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170.   Another possible explanation for reduced VDC engagement in the basic education sector 
in Dhankuta district may be declining levels of enrolment in primary and lower secondary 
schools. Overall primary school enrolment in the district has declined steadily over the period 2009-
2013, going from about 31,500 students to just over 24,000 (see figure 14 below). The total student 
population in Dhankuta in public primary schools has declined steeply – from almost 30,000 in 
2009/10 to under 21,000 in 2012/13. FLASH report data shows that the decline is very steep in VDC 
jurisdictions while remaining constant in Dhankuta municipality. The survey shows that in Dhankuta 
enrolment rates at the household level are high, with 96.2% of respondents saying they have school 
age children that are enrolled. Only 2.9% of the 1,600 respondents state not to send their children to 
school. There is no significant difference between VDCs and Dhankuta Municipality, or between boys 
and girls enrolment of children in the 5-15 year cohort.  
 
171.   There are several potential causes for declining enrolment in public primary schools in 
Dhankuta. One reason is the increased enrolment in private schools, although enrolment in private 
schools has risen little (see figure 14 below). Anecdotal reports indicate that private schools are 
particularly attractive for providing more English medium instruction; there are also disproportionate 
numbers of boys going to these schools. Other reasons for decline include more accurate reporting 
and greater uptake of very young children in expanding ECD centers rather than having them attend 
school. Finally, there are demographic changes, including an overall decline in population (for 
Dhankuta) and the effects of lower fertility rates. Overall in Dhankuta 3% of the surveyed households 
do not have school age children, but this includes Veddetar, a VDC where 13% of households do not 
have children between 5 and 15. Declining school enrolment rates in Dhankuta, coupled with school 
financial surpluses, would be an understandable reason for LBs to de-prioritize funding of the basic 
education sector. 
 
Figure 14: School enrolment in Dhankuta district 
 
 
172.   In Dhanusa district, primary school enrolment is modestly increasing. Enrolment in all 
primary schools has grown, but with both public and private school enrolment being unstable (see 
figure 15 below). The survey shows that here enrolment rates are also above 90%, but on aggregate 
slightly lower than Dhankuta. In part this is due to Lohanna, Supahi and Basbitti, three VDCs where 
between 4 and 6% of school age children do not enroll, but attend Madrasas, Muslim religious schools 
(which means they are not counted as attending school). The demographic shift in Dhanusa is slightly 
behind Dhankuta: household size is on average one person more per household: 6.4 persons per HH in 
Dhanusa, against 5.4 per HH in Dhankuta. However, the reduction in school aged children also 
manifests itself in Dhanusa.76 
                                                     
76 See UNFCO District Profile for Dhanusa, page 2. 
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Figure 15: School enrolment in Dhanusa district 
 
 
173.   DDCs also spend in the education sector. Between 2009-11, Dhanusa DDC77, for example, 
spent almost 8% of its unconditional block grant and land registration revenue78 on the education 
sector as a whole, most of it in the primary and lower secondary sub-sectors. After roads & bridges 
and community buildings expenditure, education spending is the third largest expenditure item in 
Dhanusa DDC. 
 
174.   Of all local bodies, municipalities appear to spend the lowest proportion of their total 
expenditure on education. Expenditure data for Dhankuta municipality show that education is a low 
spending priority: in both 2010/11 and 2011/12, municipal spending on education represented less 
than 2% of total expenditure and – in absolute terms – less than NPR 1.3 million (or $13,000) per 
annum. The low priority accorded to public sector schools by municipalities is probably linked to the 
relatively greater importance of private schools in urban areas. 
 
175.   Within the education sector, LBs appear to be spending on much the same types of 
items. Expenditure data for VDCs in Dhankuta, for example, indicate that VDC financing in the basic 
education sector is paying for school operating grants, the purchase of furniture and equipment, the 
construction/maintenance of school buildings and facilities, and early childhood development. These 
are almost exactly the same types of expenditure incurred by Dhanusa DDC, and in exactly the same 
types of schools (primary and lower secondary). The LBs’ financial statements also contain a number 
of general purpose grants to schools. 
 
176.   There appears to be a mismatch between what LBs describe as their expenditure in the 
basic education sector and what schools record as financial contributions from local bodies. 
Schools in Dhankuta, for example, record LB contributions as if they were grants – thus providing 
general budgetary support which can be used for a variety of purposes (construction, paying contract 
teachers, etc.). LBs, on the other hand, generally record education sector spending in terms of specific 
items (such as the purchase of school furniture or school maintenance), rather than as school grants. It 
is unclear as to why there is this mismatch. 
 
Financial Management and Reporting 
 
177.   Schools have become de facto cost centers but they are not financially audited through 
the state audit mechanism (OAG). Schools are required to carry out financial audits by using 
auditors certified by the Institute of Chartered Accountants of Nepal and designated by the DEC. Only 
                                                     
77 Data for Dhankuta DDC is not sufficiently detailed to properly assess education sector spending. 
78 These DDC revenue sources are highly discretionary. 
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60% of schools report that they have undergone regular financial audits.79 Schools continue to receive 
central funds irrespective of whether or not they conduct these audits. 
 
178.   The financial audit report is required to be made public through a teacher and parent 
meeting and needs to be submitted to the DEO, which will only release third trimester 
disbursements to schools if they submit their audit reports on time. Likewise, schools are also 
required to conduct an annual social audit through a social audit committee (coordinated by the PTA 
chair) that includes an audit of the school’s financial and educational performance. The social audit 
report also needs to be submitted to the DEO and has to be made public through a parent assembly. 
There are no formal reporting requirements of the school to LBs, though the chair of the respective 
ward in which the school is located is a member of the school social audit committee. 
 
179.   Schools are required to report to the MoE line agencies at the district levels on financial 
and educational outputs/outcomes. For example, they have to report twice a year on the numbers of 
students and teachers, the school’s physical status, etc. through the school FLASH reports that are 
collected and verified by the RCs and compiled by the DEOs. School financial reports, however, only 
provide a partial picture of their finances: they are limited to expenditures financed out of central 
government grants, and do not include income from LBs or other sources of revenue or on the 
expenditures financed out of such off-budget income. The DoE is currently in the process of changing 
this, so that in the coming FY 2014/15 school financial reports are to include all sources of income 
and all expenditure. 
 
Supervision of Schools and Schooling Outcomes 
 
180.   Supervision of public and private schools is undertaken by School Supervisors (SS), 
based in DEOs, and by Resource Persons (RP), based in Resource Centers. Resource centers 
(RCs) are usually located in the main high school. According to the Education Regulation, the SS is 
required to visit schools on a monthly basis, focusing primarily on the regularity of school operations 
(including teacher attendance), adequacy of physical facilities and teachers, and teaching-learning 
processes. In doing so, the SS is required to work closely with the head teacher and SMC members, 
and present supervision reports to the DEO as well as to the concerned VECs/MECs. However, the 
geographical area covered by an SS is typically very large (with the school-SS ratio of more than 100 
to 1) and the incentives for supervision do not match the enormous task of covering all schools on a 
regular basis. In addition, schools are supposed to be more closely supervised by the RPs.80 There are 
in total 1,053 RCs nation-wide, usually located in the main local high school, each staffed with one 
resource person. Like the SS, the RP is required to visit schools in his/her cluster on a regular basis, 
primarily focusing on classroom observations and providing on-the-site professional support to 
teachers. However, over the years, the role of the RP has gradually evolved from teacher support to a 
more administrative function, acting as a postbox between the DEO and schools. There is also a 
duplication of roles and responsibilities between the SS and RP, with the RPs being considered as 
subordinate staff of the SS. 
 
181.   Record-keeping for school supervision could be improved. There are no standard formats 
used by the SS and RP for school supervision. At the most, they maintain a personal diary. As a result, 
there is no systematic recording and availability of data on school performance across a range of 
indicators (such as educational, financial and management) at the RC or DEO level. 
 
182.   School performance at the local level is measured in FLASH reports through enrolment 
and repetition rates. Repetition rates (see figure 16 below) in Dhankuta declined up until 2010, but 
have now flattened out over the past three years; in Dhanusa, repetition rates increased slightly until 
                                                     
79 See Nepal Education Studies 2012-13: School and Household Survey, New Era 2013. 
80 The legal status of RPs is not clear in the Education Act and Regulations, although they have been an integral 
part of the institutional arrangements at the school level since the 1990s. 
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2011, but have since declined. This suggests at least satisfactory performance among primary schools 
in both districts. Figures at the VDC and municipal level are not available. 
 
Figure 16: Repetition rates in all Dhankuta and Dhanusa primary schools (public and private) 
 
 
 
183.   Drop-out rates in Dhankuta primary schools have risen, as they have in Dhanusa, but to 
a lesser extent. Although it is not clear whether this is part of a persistent trend, it does raise 
questions about the external factors that might be at play in making it difficult for children to stay in 
the schooling system and what might be done to address them. 
 
Figure 17: Drop-out rates in all Dhankuta and Dhanusa primary schools (public and private) 
 
 
184.   Data on school performance in Dhankuta and Dhanusa is contradictory. While the NERs 
for both districts have improved over the years, the NER of Dhankuta is higher than the national 
average whereas that of Dhanusa is lower. In both districts, the share of private school enrolments has 
been gradually increasing. Dhankuta has achieved gender parity in NER at all levels whereas Dhanusa 
is yet to achieve this, particularly at the lower secondary and secondary levels, indicating that girls 
still face challenges in accessing education, in particular in villages with higher poverty rates or 
significant numbers of minorities. It should be noted however, that on average the age at which girls 
start to attend school is not higher than for boys (5.75 against 5.83 for boys) and children in rural 
VDCs actually start almost a year earlier than those in municipalities. With respect to the efficiency of 
education, both districts have higher primary and lower secondary dropout rates than the national 
average, with these rates being higher in Dhankuta compared to Dhanusa. In the case of repetition 
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rates, Dhanusa surprisingly reports lower repetition rates than the national average whereas they are 
higher in Dhankuta. However, in both the districts, the efficiency of primary and lower secondary 
education has gradually improved since 2009.  
 
185.   Survey data on local perceptions show that over 85% of citizens view public primary 
and secondary education to be of average or good quality and is moreover improving. This 
assessment of quality is higher overall than for private education, though this may be the case because 
many fewer respondents have knowledge of or an opinion about the quality of private schooling.81 
There is also a general sense among the public that local education services have improved over time: 
almost two thirds of respondents perceive that the quality of education has improved over the last 
three years, and less than 7% feel that this has worsened. However, there are differences between the 
two districts: in Dhankuta, just over 70% of respondents perceive that the quality of education has 
improved, while less than 20% feel that quality has remained unchanged; in Dhanusa, the figures are 
57% and 32%, respectively. In Dhanusa there are also significant differences among VDCs. Based on 
survey results the population in Umaprempur and Lobatoli have consistently the lowest perception of 
the quality but even more the infrastructure and facilities in public schools. These are also the two 
VDCs with the highest levels of unemployment and poverty.82 
 
 
Broader Concerns in Frontline Delivery of Local Basic Education 
 
186.   LBs are not active in the school education sector, but this has little impact on schools per 
se. Basic education at the local level is not short of government funding, SMCs and DEOs (for the 
most part) manage inputs, and the private sector provides an ever more significant alternative to 
public sector schools. Given all this, LBs are not major players in financing or supporting basic 
education schooling. 
 
187.   LBs in general and the local education management institutions that they lead 
(VECs/MECs) are also not active in addressing broader educational issues in their jurisdictions. 
Neither schools nor local authorities are active in trying, for example, to increase enrolment. In Nepal 
as a whole, an estimated 9.4% of children aged 5-12 are out of school83 in 2011. Currently, there do 
not appear to be initiatives at the local level to bring those children into the schooling system, even 
though this might be a way for local institutions to engage with education. In a similar way, external 
factors that exacerbate repetition or drop-out rates are not addressed by local authorities (such as 
scarce or distant water supplies, which may force families to keep their children at home in order to 
take on domestic chores). Addressing these broader educational challenges could be a part of 
VEPs/MEPs. 
 
188.   This includes addressing the overall deployment of resources to meet the changing local 
needs for formal education. There is a major decline in primary (public) school enrolment in 
Dhankuta. In some cases there are less than fifteen children in schools for grades 1-3. This raises 
important issues on rationalizing the use of public resources for education. VDCs and the DDC might 
be expected to lead and coordinate a process of school consolidation and teacher redeployment 
through their positions in VECs and the DEC. Reconfiguring the primary school network within 
localities is highly political, and is something that goes beyond the competence of SMCs which are 
concerned only with their individual school. At the same time, it is beyond the capacity of a small 
DEO which has limited human resources in supervising the existing schools, let alone taking on a 
more comprehensive challenge of rationalization. There is no indication that VECs and the DEC meet 
regularly, or look at systemic education issues in their jurisdictions. 
 
                                                     
81 30% of the VDCs did not have any private schools. 
82 For instance, in Lobatoli 60% of respondents are unemployed and earn less than NPR 10,000 per month.  
83 Department of Education (unpublished manuscript based on an analysis of 2011 census data). 
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189.   Finally, there is no evidence that local bodies plan their priority service delivery 
functions (especially local roads and water supply & sanitation) in ways that complement school 
education. The planning of local roads activities, for example, is not based on improving access to 
other basic services, including school education. This may not be a significant issue. Survey data 
indicate that roads and transport is not a major obstacle to access to education facilities. In Dhankuta 
99% of the students walk to school, in Dhanusa 87% and a significant number frequently uses a 
bicycle. In both districts it takes on average 20 minutes to reach the school.  
 
190.   There is an apparent conundrum between the progress observed nationally and in 
reviewed districts in the education sector and the convoluted structure of inputs to service 
delivery in schools. The mix of financing of inputs and lack of local and national level coordination 
mechanisms may be affecting frontline service delivery, but evidence indicates that the impact is 
operationally not significant. The system is improving according to basic operational indicators such 
as net enrolment rates. Survey data suggests that citizens on balance see improvement in their 
schools’ operations. The available evidence suggests that the decentralization carried out through the 
SMCs, overseen by DEOs, with negligible and decreasing involvement of LBs is effective. At the 
same time, there remains cause for concern about quality of education, particularly as parents are 
proving increasingly ready to spend on private schools for their children. 
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IV. Conclusions and Recommendations 
to Improve Frontline Service Delivery 
 
A. Conclusions 
 
On Local Bodies’ Role in Nepal’s Public Service Delivery Framework 
 
191.   Nepal has increased LB revenues six-fold over the past six years without corresponding 
changes in the institutional framework for local government. The jump in funding has not been 
matched by an overhaul of LBs’ responsibilities, relationship to other entities involved in public 
service delivery, or administrative arrangements and skills. Capacity building programs have focused 
mostly on local participation rather than technical expertise or improved management. 
 
192.   LB responsibilities reflect an approach of ‘supplementarity’ rather than the principle of 
subsidiarity. The legal framework sets out an expansive list of functions which LBs may choose to 
undertake, but government rules make central government agencies actually responsible. The only 
major function where LBs are mostly responsible is vital events registration. Outside of this service, 
LBs either carry out functions as a result of conditional grants – such as delivery of social benefits and 
local roads – or pick and choose from a large menu of possible small projects without consideration of 
their relationship to issues in the given sector. This has led to proliferation of micro projects ranging 
from income generation to buying land for the local police station. Despite survey results indicating 
that health and education are a priority, LBs undertake work that is de facto in areas where there are 
no deconcentrated service providers or separate decentralized entities such as School Management 
Committees.  
 
193.   Disparities in geography and demography are not reflected in LBs’ institutional 
framework or operations. All VDCs, municipalities, and DDCs operate under the exact same legal 
framework for their respective units despite great disparity in size, population density, the nature of 
service needs, and revenue potential (though this is less important given the limitations on OSRs). For 
instance, the five largest municipalities have the same population as the next 23 municipalities, yet 
they operate under the same rules. Localities with more potential capacity and revenues are not given 
greater responsibilities. Moreover, DDCs and primary level VDCs and municipalities perform similar 
functions: financial reports for Dhankuta and Dhanusa LBs showed little variation in expenditures’ 
sectoral profiles. 
 
194.   LBs appear to have become a successful conduit for local empowerment. The roughly 
50% of LB revenues that are largely discretionary appear to provide for significant responsiveness to 
the local population. It is difficult to assess the extent to which these resources benefit the 
disadvantaged or are captured by local interest groups such as political parties or local elites. At a 
minimum the bottom-up planning process takes place in many locations and it appears that the Ward 
Citizen Forums influence allocation decisions. The requirement to use proportions of the block grants 
to benefit underprivileged segments of the population may also contribute to forestalling elite capture. 
 
195.   While the planning process promotes participation, it is complex and its orientation 
towards addressing public service delivery could be strengthened. Local planning is characterized 
by a lack of timely information about budget ceilings; lack of coordination with planning by line 
agencies compounded by different schedules for these often parallel processes; and a large number of 
steps. More importantly, LB planning – except in the use of conditional grants, e.g. for most local 
roads – does not appear to be based on a structured assessment of needs or a holistic view of what is 
needed to improve service provision within sectors. While there is a five-year periodic plan, the 
annual plans do not reference prior year activities (except in cases where continued funding is 
proposed) or future year activities. There is limited technical input into planning overall or in the 
assessment of individual projects, particularly among VDCs. 
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196.   The intergovernmental finance framework does not focus on addressing imbalances. The 
assignment of revenues and design of transfers do not take into consideration LBs’ expenditure 
assignments and needs. There is no implicit or explicit assessment of the vertical imbalances that LBs 
might face. The grants also do not systematically address horizontal imbalances. Although there is 
some weighting of the block grants by population and density, there remain important disparities in 
per capita revenues among LBs. This was shown in the 10-fold per capita differences in block and 
conditional grant transfers for Dhankuta DDC and Dhanusa DDC. 
 
197.   The intergovernmental finance framework does not stimulate local revenue effort. The 
system for local taxes is limited by low capacity, insignificant types of taxes outside of real property 
taxes, and insufficient powers over setting rates and the base. Steadily increasing intergovernmental 
transfers appear to crowd out incentives to gather local taxes, though the inherent limitations of local 
taxes also likely play a role in the lack of tax effort. There currently does not appear to be a ‘virtuous 
circle’ of citizens paying taxes and local leaders delivering services which benefit citizens and 
increase the value of their assets. Instead, temporarily posted civil servants divide up funds provided 
by the center. 
 
198.   There is significant scope for strengthening the management systems at the local level. 
Nepal’s LBs face objective difficulties due to limited professional staff, high turnover, and scarcity of 
suitably skilled accountants, engineers, and other specialists to work in often remote localities. These 
challenges are compounded by rules which are complex and practices which are not conducive to 
good management. LBs are reliant on transfers, but these appear to be frequently delayed either from 
the center or, for VDCs, at the district level. There are many separate transfers for a variety of 
purposes. The delays and complexity of transfers can hinder efficient planning and execution. 
 
199.   LB-citizen relations are not qualitatively different from other public institutions in spite 
of their greater proximity. Respectively a quarter and a fifth of citizens found primary level LBs and 
DDCs to be very or completely trustworthy according to survey results; in all cases a plurality found 
LBs to be moderately trustworthy.  Perceptions of other public institutions such as the DEO or the 
police were similar, indicating no particularly higher or lower levels of trust. A third of respondents 
noted that it could influence their VDC/municipality regarding education and only 20% felt the same 
concerning roads construction, despite the fact that roads are seen as more clearly a LB function.  
 
On Service Delivery in the Local Roads Sector 
 
200.   The local roads sector is a key sector for LBs. While LBs, particularly VDCs, are 
intensively involved in social protection, the local roads sector is significant for all three types of LBs. 
It was by far the largest sector where expenditures could be identified in the target districts. It is a 
service for which LBs are in large part responsible for the identification, allocation, and conduct of 
activities to improve the local road network. This is driven in part by conditional grants to DDCs, but 
evidence from the LBs reviewed in this study suggests that they additionally spend between 15% to 
40% of their total discretionary funds on local roads. The large number of small roads projects 
suggests that the sector allows for meeting a large number of localized demands while also being 
effective in meeting block grant beneficiary targeting requirements since a road is a public good 
serving a range of persons. 
 
201.   The institutional framework for local roads is a mix of local management and central 
direction. While there is no other entity on the ground involved in maintaining the local roads 
network (except in some instances the Department of Roads), LBs nonetheless in important respects 
fall under DoLIDAR’s supervision. As DoLIDAR falls under MoFALD coordination at the central 
level is presumably easier than, for instance, with the Education Ministry. At the same time, 
DoLIDAR plays a substantial oversight role over DDCs through the provision and monitoring of 
several types of conditional grants. Moreover, the DTO is subordinate to DoLIDAR rather than the 
DDC, meaning that technical inputs and approvals are not fully under the DDC’s authority. 
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202.   Planning for district level roads is mostly integrated but not comprehensive. The DTMPs 
provide overall information about the local roads networks; DoLIDAR requires identification of a 
core district network upon which the DDCs are to focus in utilizing some of conditional grants 
provided to it (in part as a function of credit agreements with donors financing the roads sector). 
However, as was seen in Dhankuta where each of the 22 core roads received a small allocation for 
maintenance regardless of need, this does not necessarily obviate the ‘dividing up’ approach to 
allocating resources as the local level. In addition, other conditional grants are provided at different 
times with yet other conditions that can impair cohesive planning. Finally, at least in Dhankuta DDC 
the use of resources outside of conditional grants by DDCs was decided via the LB planning process 
without reference to the DTMP. 
 
203.   There is no systematic planning for village level local roads. Outside of DTMPs – which 
only apply to the DRCN – there is no technically-informed planning for development of the local 
roads network. VDC planning for roads occurs within the general framework for local bodies’ 
planning. 
 
204.   Earmarked financing of the local roads sector is not conducive to stronger planning. 
Some roads sector grants are provided on an ad hoc and unpredictable basis. In addition, a range of 
strictly earmarked and semi-parallel funds (such as Constituency Development Funds, budget re-
allocations made by central ministries, ‘matching’ funds for municipalities) are allocated to local 
bodies, further limiting any coherent approach to the management of local roads. 
 
205.   LBs generally lack basic engineering capacity. There is a limited number of technical staff 
spread thinly across a large number of projects and activities. For example, a half-dozen DTO 
technical staff in Dhanusa are responsible for at least 60 district roads projects every year (in addition 
to scores of other infrastructure projects, such as water supply facilities). Increasingly large 
conditional and unconditional grants have expanded spending on the local roads sector which has 
further stretched local technical capacities. There is a mismatch between spending on local roads and 
the technical capacity of local bodies to properly manage activities in the local roads sector. 
 
206.   Monitoring, reporting and evaluation in the local roads sector are limited. Progress and 
financial reporting systems for roads projects are spotty for smaller projects, particularly when not 
related to donor-funded projects which usually have more rigorous reporting requirements. 
Monitoring and reporting functions are given limited priority or importance by stakeholder 
organizations in the local roads sector. 
 
207.   Citizens nonetheless assess that there has been improvement in the local roads network 
over the past three years, albeit much remains to be done. Over half of the respondents saw 
improvement while over 40% felt that the quality remained the same. At the same time, a solid 
majority still felt that roads were bad or very bad.  
 
On Service Delivery in the Basic Education Sector 
 
208.   Basic education service delivery is decentralized to School Management Committees. 
Reforms beginning in 2001 have directed funding for various service inputs such as staff, 
infrastructure, stipends to the SMCs. Most funds are earmarked for salaries for permanent and 
temporary teachers. The SMCs exercise substantial discretion over hiring of contract staff, including 
teachers. 
 
209.   There is limited effective local oversight of schools’ use of funds. Many of the same 
challenges with financial reporting and controls in LBs occur with respect to schools. Financial 
reports are driven by revenue source; although changes are now planned to introduce more 
comprehensive reporting until now schools have submitted reports only on use of centrally provided 
funds to the DEO, leaving out own source resources and LB contributions. Schools have become de 
facto cost centers but their financial reporting is subject to only cursory review by the local DEO; nor 
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are schools audited by the Auditor General’s Office. Schools are required to carry out annual financial 
audits by using certified private accountants, but only 60% of schools report that such regular audits 
take place. Similar to the situation with LBs, audit findings are not systematically acted upon; schools 
continue to receive central funds irrespective of whether or not they conduct these audits. 
 
210.   A marked decline in students at public (community) schools raises the need for 
rationalization. The decline appears due to demographic factors such as out-migration and lower 
birth rates as well as family choices to send their children, especially boys, to private boarding 
schools. Field workers for this study found schools with actual attendance of some 15 children in 
grades 1-3. The decline could prompt a rationalization of the number of schools in operation and 
staffing. 
 
211.   LBs’ role in basic education is limited and declining in terms of financing. Studies from 
five years ago suggested local bodies taking a keener interest and spending as much as 13% of their 
total expenditure on schools. However, the recent Education sector QSDS/PETS as well as the data 
collected from schools in the target districts for this study point to LBs playing a tiny role (3% and 1% 
of school income, respectively); as a proportion of LB spending education is also declining. The 
decline appears due to the combination of robust central funding for schools and a decline in the 
numbers of children in community schools. 
 
212.   The limited role of LBs is not affecting the efficiency of delivery of basic education in 
schools. The relative progress in terms of net enrolment rates nationally and in the target districts 
gives little compelling reason for increasing the role of LBs in school management. 
 
213.   LBs are not playing an active role in ensuring education for all children in their 
jurisdictions. The administrative heads of LBs have a de jure role chairing corresponding village, 
municipal, and district education committees. These committees are supposed to provide broad 
oversight of schools operations and facilitate planning. The committees are also positioned to identify 
education needs beyond what is visible in the schools, i.e. identifying and addressing issues with 
children not attending school and/or attending private schools. However, these committees display 
limited activity. LBs treat education as a central government function. 
 
214.   Overall service outcomes appear to be positive in terms of efficiency and citizen 
satisfaction. A total of 63% and 72% of survey respondents felt that respectively primary and 
secondary education had improved in the past three years. Overall dropout rates and net enrolment 
rates have improved over the past three years as well.  
 
B. Recommendations for Improving Frontline Service Delivery 
 
215.   The findings of this study point to two sets of potential measures to improve frontline 
service delivery: long term changes in the institutional framework and actionable steps within 
the existing framework. Improvements could be made both in local bodies’ general performance and 
capacity to contribute to service delivery, as well as actions that directly concern the local roads and 
basic education sectors. 
 
216.   Work on the institutional framework is a complex task since current arrangements for 
frontline service delivery involve numerous stakeholders with multiple interests. Changes to 
these arrangements go to the heart of how the state operates and interacts with citizens. Therefore, the 
details of implementing changes to frontline service delivery would benefit from substantial 
consultation with stakeholders. 
 
217.   Issues concerning the role of local bodies are also part of the broader, contentious 
deliberations around federalizing Nepal’s governance structure. While these deliberations have 
focused on defining federal units, the role of local bodies and the lower links in the service delivery 
chain are critical elements. Local governments are near certain to have a place in any new federal 
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system, albeit not necessarily the existing territorial units. For this reason factors which promote 
better local government practices under the current system merit consideration irrespective of the 
deliberations on federalism (see Box 8). 
 
Box 8: Frontline Service Delivery and the Deliberations on Federalism 
Nepal’s major political parties have committed to establishing a federal system of government though 
consensus has not been reached on the details of such a system. The preceding Constituent Assembly (CA) 
eventually dissolved without drafting a new Constitution in large part due to unresolved issues about 
federalism. The present Assembly elected in November 2013 has renewed work on drafting a Constitution and 
has decided to base its efforts on previously developed analysis and proposals. 
The prior CA’s Committee on Restructuring of the State and Distribution of State Power produced a 186-page 
report summarizing extensive research on domestic preferences, international practices, and theory on the 
potential design of a federal system in 2010. The report provides a comprehensive framework for designing an 
effective decentralized system, laying out the decisions which the country’s political leadership must make. In 
particular, it provides detailed exposition of the ‘building blocks’ for a strong system of sub-national 
governance and service delivery: 
i. Principles for identification of sub-national units; 
ii. Assignment of functional responsibilities for public services to national, federal, and local governments; 
iii. Principles to underpin an intergovernmental fiscal system through assignment of own source revenues 
and intergovernmental transfers; and 
iv. Provision of administrative authority to levels of government to carry out service functions, including 
control over relevant staff and intangible and physical assets associated with the service. 
 
The present organization of frontline service delivery is important when considering a transition to a federal 
state for two main reasons. First, Nepal could draw on its own experience with sub-national governance and 
service delivery when designing the future system. Issues in the current system, particularly ambiguities in 
functional assignments and the long practice of LBs mostly playing a supplemental role in service provision, 
could be addressed in a new design. Addressing shortcomings could begin prior to a more far reaching 
transition to a federal system that might be undertaken. Second, setting up a new system of sub-national 
governance will necessarily involve a complex transition from the existing system to the new design. A 
detailed mapping of how services are delivered at present and when and how they are transferred to new 
entities could help minimize disruption of service delivery in the transition. 
 
218.   Changes should consider building on ongoing efforts to strengthen the institutional 
framework for local service delivery. Since 2006, for example, MoFALD has extended performance 
(‘MC/PM’) assessments to all local bodies and calibrated block grant allocations to assessed 
performance. The country-wide Local Governance and Community Development Program (LGCDP), 
implemented by MoFALD with funding from a range of development partners, has also provided a 
framework for incremental local governance reforms (such as establishing WCFs, revising LB 
guidelines, and reviewing grant allocation formula). Recommendations could build on the 
considerable work heretofore undertaken. At the same time, this study finds that there remains more 
that might be done to strengthen local bodies’ performance. 
 
Long Term Institutional Considerations 
 
219.   Local Bodies could be oriented to fulfill the role of a local government that is more 
clearly responsible for public service outcomes. While present practices have had success in social 
mobilization and transferred resources to localities, they have not encouraged local bodies to ensure 
delivery of public services, a role commonly played by local governments in many countries. Such a 
shift in orientation will be complex because expectations among officials and the population have 
been conditioned by LBs’ practice of ‘picking and choosing’ small projects for the past 15 years. The 
institutional framework would need to be changed to build in stronger lines of accountability for 
service delivery, addressing the classic ‘building blocks’ of decentralized government: functions, 
finance, and functionaries. 
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220.   Accountability for functions might be assigned more clearly, spelling out LBs’ authority 
in sufficient detail. This does not mean an increase in functions for LBs. It is rather an increase in 
accountability for specific functions which could efficiently be carried out at the local level. These 
reforms could ideally include: 
 Introducing the concept of ‘own exclusive’ assignments for LBs, for which they are fully 
responsible and have corresponding authority; 
 Allowing for asymmetric assignment, recognizing the different geographic and demographic 
circumstances for local government units (which would remain true even if there is a change 
among units as a result of federalism and a new constitution); 
 With respect to functions that are shared with central government, delineating tasks within 
functional areas and then assigning them unambiguously among the different tiers of LBs and 
line agencies; 
 Retaining substantial local discretion to take on functions voluntarily in response to local 
needs and priorities; 
 Ensuring harmonization with other (sectoral) legislation, particularly the Government Rules 
of Business. 
 
221.   Transfer of responsibilities can be done sequentially for different public services or 
occur in all areas at the same time. Some countries, most notably Indonesia, have adopted ‘big 
bang’ approaches to decentralization where responsibilities in all functional (service) areas were 
reassigned in one round. Other countries have adopted a more incremental approach whereby 
responsibility for a small number of public services is transferred at first. These services are usually in 
areas where the role of local governments would be expected to be significant and/or a division of 
responsibilities is relatively straightforward (e.g. ensuring potable water or local roads). It is expected 
that local governments would increase capacity and hence be better able to absorb more complex 
responsibilities in successive rounds. 
 
222.   Changes to the intergovernmental financial system should provide more predictability 
and stimulate local revenue collection effort. To the extent possible, reforms in revenue 
assignments could focus on boosting own source revenues, as well as harmonizing, simplifying and 
clarifying them. Intergovernmental fiscal transfers could be consolidated, made more predictable and 
equitable, and designed so as to incentivize own source revenue collection at the sub-national level. 
 
223.   Development of personnel management systems that support LBs’ administrative 
authority could be considered. Providing a framework to motivate skilled persons to work in local 
bodies while also being accountable to LBs is a challenge. Although the present system of 
secondment of senior officers subordinate to MoFALD raises few issues in the absence of locally 
elected bodies, administrative officials could be answerable to the LBs when they are elected. 
Discussion underway regarding the development of a sub-national government cadre, presently in the 
context of a potential move to a federal system, reflects the importance of making staff locally 
accountable. A key element of such as a transition could ensure ease of movement between local and 
national civil service cadres. 
 
224.   LBs’ accountability could be increased through holding elections. Though elections are 
far from the only means of building downward accountability, they would play an important role in an 
overall framework that could incentivize performance in serving citizens in localities. 
 
225.   The transfer of functional responsibility, financial resources to address these 
responsibilities, and authority over personnel should be concomitant and aligned to the extent 
possible. The expansion of local government responsibilities should coincide with an assessment of 
levels of finance to execute those responsibilities and corresponding changes to the intergovernmental 
fiscal framework to provide for those levels. Local bodies should also administratively be empowered 
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to have sufficient staff needed for ensuring the execution of what is required to deliver services for 
which they are responsible. 
 
Potential Actionable Steps in the Short and Medium Term 
 
226.   Addressing the areas identified for areas for improvement of frontline service delivery 
must take into consideration Nepal’s specific circumstances. In particular, there are substantial 
challenges due to dispersion and remoteness of many jurisdictions and a related lack of technical and 
administrative capacity. For instance, the problems with local reporting are much less a question of 
guidelines than of local capacity. The lack of technical inputs for planning and execution in the roads 
sector is in part due to the scarcity of qualified persons in many of the country’s localities. Actionable 
recommendations must be simple and geared to these capacity constraints. 
 
Short Term Steps 
 
For the Government of Nepal, initiated by MoFALD: 
 
227.   Address LB human resource constraints. LBs, especially VDCs, would benefit from 
additional capacity in accounting and in basic engineering (at the level of an overseer). More regular 
book-keeping could improve accountability and ultimately allow for better coordination with line 
agencies. More technical input into LBs’ planning and execution of infrastructure projects could be 
beneficial. Two options may be considered: 
 Provide for accountant and overseer positions among VDC staff, and augment positions in 
DDCs and municipalities. 
 Facilitate the hiring of accountants and overseers which could be shared by several VDCs and 
perhaps municipalities and DDCs. Five VDCs in Dhankuta reportedly share an overseer – this 
approach could be replicated. MoFALD could provide guidance to facilitate the establishment 
of joint committees of LBs to share staff. 
 
Such a change could involve establishing links with professional associations (such as the Institute of 
Chartered Accountants of Nepal) that have members who could provide these technical and 
managerial inputs. The linkage could include orienting professionals to the particular needs of LBs. 
The horizontal linkages would over time help to improve capacity. Finally, additional personnel may 
require additional financing, though this could be justified given that LBs are receiving six times more 
funds than before. Financing might be through grants; any increase in funding for personnel could be 
matched with more rigorous monitoring of standards for financial management and technical inputs. 
 
228.   Carry out a review of DoLIDAR and DTO staffing needs. While many technical functions 
can be out-sourced to the private sector, core design and supervisory functions probably require 
additional full-time staff. At the same time, more thought needs to be given to the ways in which 
VDCs can be provided with basic technical support from DTO offices. 
 
229.   Adjust planning processes. Although much of the planning process is mandated by law and 
hence not easily changed, there may be adjustments that could lead to more strategic and service-
focused plans which incorporate principles of good public investment management. These are: 
 Introducing simple needs assessments into the planning process. This could involve having 
mandatory planning formats that LBs would use to estimate the baseline levels of service, 
constraints and problems in key local service sectors, e.g. roads, water & sanitation, 
education, and health. These assessments might encourage more strategic investments as well 
as consideration of how LB activities can contribute towards improving the quality and/or 
quantity of those services. 
 Harmonizing the LB and sector planning calendar. This could allow for more synergy at the 
local level. 
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 Orienting local planning processes towards a medium-term or ‘pipeline’ perspective. This 
might address issues of short-term orientation and the danger of ‘participation fatigue’ of the 
annual planning process. 
 
230.   Strengthen LBs financial management framework. The increase in resources makes 
improving the framework whereby local bodies manage their funds a priority. There are several 
actions that might be considered: 
 Unifying, harmonizing and simplifying reporting formats and making their use mandatory. 
Reports could consolidate various revenues and expenditures, regardless of source into one 
document that is the same for all LBs of the same type. 
 Strengthening MoFALD capacity to ensure reporting and interpret LBs’ spending patterns. 
MoFALD could become able to collate and use LB reports for purposes of monitoring and 
broader strategic planning. 
 Incrementally introducing functional expenditure reporting. This could start with reporting on 
capital or developmental expenditures, for which LBs would be expected to provide a simple 
but clear breakdown in terms of sectors. 
 Consolidating bank accounts held by local bodies. This could reduce fiduciary risk as well as 
encourage LBs to report on expenditures and revenues in a more comprehensive way. 
 Removing a local bottleneck in the disbursement of transfers. While delays in 
intergovernmental transfers are a longstanding issue with causes beyond the scope of this 
report, at the local level LDOs’ authority to release funds to VDCs creates additional delays. 
Rather than having LDOs wait to group requests from VDCs before approving disbursements, 
VDCs could submit their financial reports directly to the DTCO with a copy to their DDC. 
The DDC could have a set time period (for instance two weeks) to raise any concerns; in the 
absence of written concerns, the DTCO could be authorized to release funds directly to the 
VDC’s account. 
 
For DoLIDAR/MoFALD 
 
231.   More fully integrate the District Technical Offices into the DDC structure, rather than 
preserving the at times competitive structure in place. While there are valid reasons to insulate 
DTOs from local influence (including political), if LBs are to be made accountable for service areas 
they will need to have an integrated management structure to deliver. 
 
For the Ministry of Education and the Education Sector 
 
232.   Carry through with plans to consolidate school reporting of all revenue and 
expenditures, including from LBs, NGOs and OSR in FY 2014/15. This could help SMCs make 
more strategic use of available resources. It would also allow for better overall planning and 
deployment of resources for basic education at the national level. 
 
233.   Clarify the roles and responsibilities of Education Committees at local levels to address 
issues of providing education beyond the operation of schools. The VECs/MECs/DECs could be 
promoted as fora within which education sector activities are coordinated at the local level without 
getting into issues of individual school management that are handled by SMCs and supervised by 
DEOs. Local level Education Committees could play a role in addressing questions of attendance, 
enrolment, and, given demographic trends, rationalization. This would require amending the 
Education Regulations and cooperation between the Education Ministry and MoFALD to provide 
local Education Committees with active guidance and support. Such work could be undertaken 
irrespective of whether a more profound delineation of functions is undertaken in the sector. 
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Medium Term Recommendations 
 
For the Government of Nepal, initiated by MoFALD: 
 
234.   Delineate service responsibilities to the extent possible within existing legislation. 
Delineation should occur between DDCs and primary tier VDCs and municipalities, as well as in 
relation to central government agencies. Expenditure patterns show that DDCs, VDCs and 
municipalities finance the same types of expenditures with the only difference being that DDCs take 
on more costly capital projects. The District Transport Management Plans largely achieve a 
delineation of responsibilities in the local roads sector through distinguishing between the District 
Core Roads network for which DDCs are responsible with the presumption that VDCs and 
municipalities are responsible for other local roads. The same kind of demarcation of functional 
responsibilities between DDCs, VDCs and municipalities could be made in other sectors where LBs 
presently play a large role, such as water & sanitation or irrigation. For services which presently are 
essentially central in nature, such as education, guidance on what LBs are responsible for could be 
developed in conjunction with sector agencies. 
 
235.   A delineation of service responsibilities might first be modeled and tested for a few 
functions. It is a complex task to transfer service responsibilities. There are many types of inputs and 
activities that are carried out to deliver services. Moreover, the inputs and activities for each public 
service will differ. In the short term, the GoN might consider modeling a detailed description of what 
LBs (with differentiation among VDCs, municipalities, and DDCs) and what line agencies would be 
responsible for in two or three functions. One would be a case where there is clearly a large role 
played by LBs (e.g. local roads, water supply) and the other might be a case where central agencies 
will play a major role (e.g. social services such as basic education or primary healthcare). The 
delineation would distinguish between operational authority to make decisions on quantity and quality 
of services delivered; long term planning, including capital investment; service standards; oversight 
and monitoring functions; and incentives for performance. Undertaking such a delineation of 
responsibilities would need to be reflected in changes to existing regulations to avoid overlap and 
inconsistencies. It would also likely require a program to prepare LBs for greater responsibilities. 
 
236.   Simplify the system of intergovernmental fiscal transfers. Conditional grants that target 
the same sector, such as local roads or water & sanitation, could be provided at the same time and 
have harmonized reporting requirements. This would require intensive consultations with donors 
which are the ultimate source of many of the grants and have their own conditions, often including 
traceability of fund flows. Consolidation would help central management of fund flows and, more 
importantly, would provide an enabling framework for a more strategic approach to service delivery 
in these functional areas. 
 
237.   Improve the predictability of intergovernmental fiscal transfers. There are three major 
ways where improvement may be sought. First, avoid ad hoc and mid/end year allocations as is now 
often the case with conditional grants. Second, provide local bodies with next year transfer ceilings 
before the beginning of the annual local planning/budgeting cycle. This might be considered in the 
context of the budget calendar mandated in the Fiscal Responsibility Bill. Third, stronger formula-
driven allocations which recognize objective disparities among LB jurisdictions, particularly for 
conditional grants, could be considered. 
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ANNEX 1: METHODOLOGY OF THE STUDY 
 
This report is largely based on two field-level surveys. The first survey, carried out by INLOGOS, 
collected quantitative and qualitative data concerning local level public expenditure and financial 
management. The second survey, carried out by Solutions Consultant Pvt. Ltd., collected information on 
public perceptions about local level service delivery. Both surveys were carried out in the same sample of 
local body jurisdictions in two districts. 
This annex provides a short description of the methodology used in the first survey to collect data and 
information for this study, as well as an assessment of the data collected. The methodology used for the 
second survey (on public perceptions regarding local service delivery) is described in annex 5. 
 
1. Case study approach 
 
Given time limitations, data collection was not intended to provide a representative database for local 
service delivery in Nepal. Instead, a ‘case study’ approach was taken, whereby data was collected from a 
relatively small sample of local governments and frontline service delivery units in order to provide 
illustrative material and evidence-based grounds for exploring issues related to local service delivery. 
 
2. Selection of districts, local bodies and sectors 
 
The study focused its data collection on two districts – Dhanusa and Dhankuta. These districts were 
selected on the basis of a number of criteria. Firstly, they are located in different ecological zones: 
Dhanusa in the floodplains of the Terai and Dhankuta in the Middle Hills. Secondly, they are very 
different in terms of local governance: the performance of local bodies (LBs) in Dhanusa is poor, largely 
because of political conflict, while that of Dhankuta’s LBs is assessed as being good. Thirdly, Dhanusa 
and Dhankuta have different poverty profiles, the former being considerably poorer than the latter. 
Two sectors were selected for detailed data and information collection. Basic education was selected 
because: (a) earlier studies had indicated that LBs were providing significant funding for schools; (b) 
although a ‘devolved’ sector, funding and policy remain very much the responsibility of the Ministry of 
Education; and (c) the primary and lower secondary education sectors are some of the most important 
public services. The local roads sector was selected because: (a) it is very much a core local government 
mandate; (b) local roads spending by LBs is significant; and (c) the sector makes a major contribution to 
socio-economic development. 
A sample of LBs were selected in each of the two districts: five VDCs in each district, the DDC and the 
municipalities. VDCs were selected so as to be more or less representative of socio-economic diversity. 
Within VDCs, all basic public schools were included in the study; in each municipality, a sample of 
schools was selected. District Education Offices (DEOs), District Treasury & Comptroller Offices 
(DTCOs), and Divisional Offices of the Department of Roads (DoR) were also included in the study. 
 
Table 1: VDC, municipality and schools sample 
Dhankuta Dhanusa 
Local Body Population Schools Local Body Population Schools 
Bhedetar VDC 2,789 6 Basbitti VDC 2,948 1 
Bhirgaun VDC 4,297 8 Labtoli VDC 5,106 2 
Hattikharka VDC 4,968 3 Lohana VDC 6,927 2 
Pakhribas VDC 4,811 4 Sapahi VDC 9,017 8 
Rajarani VDC 2,577 4 Umprempur VDC 11,854 6 
Dhankuta municipality 26,440 10 Janakpur municipality 97,776 8 
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Table 2: Dhankuta and Dhanusa compared 
DHANKUTA AND DHANUSA IN NUMBERS 
Variables Dhankuta Dhanusa 
General 
  Ecological region Middle Hills Terai 
Population 163,412  754,777  
Land area (kms2)  891  1,180  
Population density (persons/km2} 183  640  
Estimated incidence of poverty (2011) 0.169  0.231  
Local bodies   
No. of VDCs 35  101  
Total population of VDCs 134,958  637,339  
Average population of VDCs 3,856  6,503  
Largest VDC 9,379  17,835  
Smallest VDC 2,594  2,594  
No. of Municipalities 1  1  
Population 26,440 97,776 
Basic education   
Total number of schools offering basic education (grades 1-8) - 2012-13 352 390 
- of which no. of public schools 315 341 
- of which no. of private schools  37 49 
Total number of students in basic education (grades 1-8) - 2012-13 38,346 159,614 
- of which no. attending public schools 33,567 152,651 
- of which no. attending private schools 4,521 6,963 
- of which no. attending other schools 258 -    
Fiscal (2012) – VDCs   
Total OSRs and shared revenues - NRs '000s 1,928  10,236  
Total block grants (recurrent and capital) - NRs '000s 72,933  200,247  
Total VDC revenues - NRs '000s 74,861  210,483  
Total revenue per capita (NRs) 555  330  
Total grant revenue per capita (NRs) 540  314  
Fiscal (2012) – DDC   
Total OSRs and shared revenues 16,880  44,546  
Total block grants (recurrent and capital) - NRs '000s 32,972  55,493  
Total conditional grants - (recurrent and capital) - NRs '000s 283,552  110,186  
Total DDC revenue - NRs '000s 333,404  210,225  
Total revenue per capita (NRs) 2,040  279  
Total grant revenue per capita (NRs) 1,937  220  
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3. Collection of data and information 
 
Primary local level data 
 
The field-level survey was undertaken by INLOGOS and was carried out by two teams of four 
enumerators, with each team being supervised by a district coordinator under the overall guidance of a 
national team leader. The INLOGOS teams collected data in their respective districts in two rounds: a first 
round lasting about 3 weeks, followed a month later by a second round of less than a week. 
The survey teams used standard forms for each type of institution for collecting data: forms for 
quantitative data (revenues, expenditure, staffing, students, etc.) and checklists of questions for qualitative 
data. 
The teams collected revenue and expenditure data for three FYs (2009/10, 2010/11 and 2011/12) from: 
VDCs, schools, DDCs, municipalities, DEOs, divisional DoR offices and DTCOs. To the extent possible, 
hard copies of financial statements, planning documents, audit reports, council minutes and other 
documents were collected and information transcribed from these into the standard forms. The same 
applied to staffing and, in the case of schools, to student numbers. 
Additional and more qualitative information (about planning, management, etc.) was collected through 
interviews with LB staff, school teachers, and others. In addition, the enumerators pieced together small 
case studies and recorded them as notes. 
After the first round of fieldwork, the INLOGOS team returned to Kathmandu in order to verify and 
collate data. Data gaps and inconsistencies were identified. A second round of fieldwork in the two 
districts took place in order to iron out inconsistencies and to complete – as far as possible – datasets. 
 
Secondary data and other sources of information 
 
In addition to the INLOGOS teams in the field, several consultants or World Bank staff collected data and 
information at the center, with a focus on the local roads sector, primary and secondary education, and the 
intergovernmental fiscal framework, This involved collecting information from a number of institutions: 
DoLIDAR, DoE, MoFALD, and the Local Bodies’ Fiscal Commission. Relevant documentation and 
reports were also consulted. 
 
Difficulties and limitations 
 
Data collection in the districts proved to be as difficult as expected, if not more so. LBs’ financial records 
often proved to be fragmented, incomplete, inconsistent and – on occasion – non-existent. High staff 
turnover among VDC Secretaries and other LB staff exacerbate these problems. In Dhanusa, for example, 
Umaprempur VDC has had four different VDC Secretaries in the last three years, while Labtoli VDC has 
had three different VDC Secretaries in the last twelve months. Such high rates of turnover inevitably result 
in weak institutional memory. 
Data collection in Dhanusa district was particularly challenging. Several DDC staff have been suspended 
pending investigations into malpractice and corruption. In addition, the DEO was under investigation by 
the CIAA, which had been alerted to the existence of ‘phantom’ schools in the district – allegedly 
registered officially and receiving government grants, but non-existent in reality. Finally, the district 
suffers from chronic political conflict and poor local governance. Dhanusa has consistently been rated by 
MoFALD as one of the worst performing districts in the country. All of this made it difficult for the 
enumerators to meet with local officials in Dhanusa in order to get information. Financial and other 
records in Dhanusa proved to be very difficult to obtain and, moreover, were usually incomplete. For 
example, in four of the five VDCs surveyed in Dhanusa, financial reports were not available in VDC 
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offices and could only be found in the homes or briefcases of VDC Secretaries. Even when such records 
could be located, they were – more often than not – incomplete.  
Although data collection was easier in Dhankuta, where most financial and other records were filed in 
local body and other offices, the INLOGOS team still faced difficulties in collecting financial data from 
LBs due to inadequate/inconsistent record keeping and missing documents. It was particularly difficult to 
collect financial data that would allow the study to analyse LB sector-wise expenditure. However, many 
fewer difficulties were encountered in collecting financial data from local schools. 
Given the difficulties encountered in the collection of primary data, the existing datasets for Dhankuta and 
especially Dhanusa are incomplete (and sometimes inconsistent). Excepting a few cases in Dhanusa, 
school datasets are generally the most robust and consistent. VDC datasets from Dhankuta are relatively 
good; for Dhanusa, however, the VDC datasets include several major gaps. The two municipal datasets 
are reasonably solid, although the dataset for Janakpur is incomplete. Surprisingly, DDC-level financial 
data from Dhanusa is much more complete than for Dhankuta. 
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ANNEX 2: LOCAL LEVEL PLANNING 
 
LBs are required to formulate periodic and annual plans. The LSGA and the Resource Mobilization and 
Operation Management Guidelines (2013) provide for a participatory and inclusive framework for 
planning, management, implementation, resource allocation and budgeting, supervision, monitoring and 
evaluation, reporting and oversight activities.1 The participatory planning process is known as the fourteen 
steps planning process (see figure 1 on the next page), which begins at the community level and moves up 
to the national level (NPC and MoF). 
 
All LBs are expected to prepare five year periodic plans in a participatory way, in accordance with NPC 
directives.2 Local periodic plans should meet several criteria: 
− include long term goals, objectives and strategies and cover major functional areas or sectors that 
are devolved to local bodies; 
− include gender, social inclusion, the environment and children as cross-cutting issues in all sectors; 
− be prepared on a spatial basis and on the basis of an analysis of spatial factors; 
− encompass the key elements of sector-specific plans; 
− forecast and take into account resource projections; 
− take into account potential developmental and contributions from central government, NGOs and 
the private sector (which are to be coordinated with LB activities and investments included in LB 
periodic plans); 
− support and complement national plans and contribute to national goals, objectives and overall 
targets. 
 
Based on their periodic plans, LBs are expected to formulate inclusive, participatory, integrated and 
comprehensive annual plans. This requires both the communication downwards of resource envelopes and 
an upward planning process to prioritize projects from grassroots community groups up to the DDCs. In 
terms of downward communication, line ministries are expected to provide their district level departments 
with annual budget ceilings, estimate sector grants to LBs and issue guidelines for annual planning. Local 
line department and district plans should be consistent with national development policies and plans. 
Included in this are MoFALD forecasts of annual conditional and unconditional grants. District Resource 
Estimation Committees3 (DRECs) estimate the total resources that are expected to be available for each 
LB in the district for the following year. These resource envelopes (or budget ceilings) are communicated 
to the respective LBs. In addition, VDCs and municipalities also have to estimate their respective resource 
envelopes. Village, municipal and district councils are required to prepare their respective plans within 
their budget ceilings. LBs can submit project proposals for inclusion in the plans of higher tiers in the 
inter-governmental system. 
 
1 VDC, municipal and DDC planning processes are provided for in LSGA (Arts. 43-54, 111-124, and 195-214, 
respectively) and LSGR (rules 64-69, 134-139, and 197-206, respectively). The RMOM Guidelines (sections 3-5) 
provide local bodies with additional instructions for planning in the absence of elected councils. 
2 NPC directives are structured around four steps: (i) data collection; (ii) data and SWOT analysis; (iii) plan 
formulation on the basis of a logical framework; and (iv) implementation. 
3 The RMOM Guidelines (procedure 18) stipulate that each DDC should establish a District Resource Estimation 
Committee. 
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Figure 1: The fourteen step planning process 
 
 
 
 
 
The Local Level Planning Process – The Key Steps 
 
Resource forecasts and budget ceilings 
 
• Line ministries are expected to communicate the annual budget ceilings to their district level line 
departments; this includes information on the estimated sector grant amounts and guidelines for 
annual planning, consistent with more general NPC instructions. 
• Similarly, the Ministry of Federal Affairs and Local Development (MoFALD) forecasts annual 
conditional and unconditional grants and communicates the estimated grant amounts to LBs. 
• The District Resource Estimation Committees4 (DRECs) then estimate the total resources 
(unconditional and conditional grants, own-source revenues, shared revenues, etc.) that are expected 
to be available for each LB (DDC, VDCs and municipalities) in the district for the following fiscal 
year. These resource envelopes, or budget ceilings, are communicated to the respective LBs. VDCs 
and municipalities are also required to provide an estimate of their expected resource envelopes. 
 
4 The RMOM Guidelines (procedure 18) stipulate that each DDC should establish a District Resource Estimation 
Committee. 
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The annual planning process at the VDC/municipal level 
 
• After receiving the resource projections/budget ceilings, policy guidelines and a description of the 
priority areas from their VDC/municipality, community organizations (COs), user groups (UGs), 
NGOs and line agencies initiate the planning process at the community level. In the community level 
plan formulation committee meetings community groups submit their priorities to their respective 
Ward Citizen Forums5 (WCFs). 
• The WCFs then select their priority projects/activities and submit them to their VDC or 
municipality. Priority activities, projects or investments should be classified as: 
- Activities which can be completed/implemented by communities themselves or in partnership 
with other agencies; 
- Activities which can be completed/implemented within the forecasted VDC/municipality budget 
ceiling; 
- Activities which should be referred to the district or central level; 
- Activities which have been carried over from the previous FY. 
• The VDC/municipality then holds an integrated plan formulation committee meeting to: 
- Prioritize among proposed activities and ensure synergy between the different sectoral 
activities/projects submitted by WCFs, taking into account NPC and DDC directives regarding 
national development policies and VDC/municipal periodic plans; 
- Forward the prioritized sectoral activities to village/municipal councils for approval; the 
councils can only approve activities or programs within their jurisdictions and within their 
annual budget ceiling; 
- Review all programs under implementation and determine their linkages with other sectors; 
- Determine which projects/activities should be submitted to the Ilaka level6 to be included in the 
district or national level planning. 
 
 
The annual planning process at the DDC and national level 
 
• The plan formulation committees at Ilaka level7 prioritize among the proposed projects/activities as 
per the policy guidelines and within the limits of the available resources; they then recommend the 
selected priorities to the concerned sectoral plan formulation committees at the district level. 
• The sectoral plan formulation committees further prioritize among the projects/activities submitted 
by the Ilaka plan formulation committees and then forward their recommendations to the DDC. 
• The DDC’s Integrated Plan Formulation Committee (IPFC) reviews the priority proposals submitted 
by the sectoral committees to ensure inter- and intra-sector synergies and to eliminate overlap or 
duplication and sends its recommendations to the DDC. 
• The DDC then classifies the proposed projects into district and central level programs/activities and 
submits the annual district program proposal including recommendations to the district council. 
After verifying that the proposed projects/programs are below the approved budget ceiling, the 
district council approves district level programs and budgets8; it forwards central level priority 
projects/activities to the concerned line ministries, MoFALD and NPC. 
5 WCFs consist of 25-30 members, selected in an inclusive way to ensure representation of women and 
disadvantaged communities. Although WCFs are not provided for in LSGA/R, the RMOM Guidelines (2013) do so 
in order to ensure citizen engagement in the local planning process in the absence of Ward Committees. 
6 Ilaka level meetings are scheduled to take place before the end of January each year 
7 Each DDC is divided into 9-17 Ilakas, the exact number depending upon the number of electoral constituencies for 
national parliament elections. There are a total of 927 Ilakas in Nepal. Ilakas are no administrative or local 
government units and are used only for electoral or district planning purposes. 
8 The district councils are supposed to approve district programs and budgets by mid-March. 
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• At the central level, ministries review the district plans for consistency with national sector policies 
and whether they are within the agreed budget ceiling guidelines. In case of inconsistency with the 
guidelines the proposal including directives and/or comments is sent back to the concerned DDCs.  
• Central level line departments and ministries may also ask DDCs to include sector-specific projects 
(identified at the national level) in their annual plans. 
• Taking into account the recommendations/proposals from all DDCs – among other things – the NPC 
consolidates the national level plans. DDCs are informed by the NPC if their recommendations or 
proposals have been incorporated into central level plans. 
• The NPC then approves the national plan and submits it to the MoF which submits the approved 
national plan and annual budget to parliament for approval. 
 
The approved plan should serve as the basis for concerned ministries to authorize budgets for respective 
line departments, project offices, DDCs and municipalities. DDCs authorize for VDCs. DDCs request all 
concerned implementing agencies to prepare their operational calendars (along with implementation 
responsibilities) for program implementation and also request them to prepare funding matrices. 
 
Supervision and monitoring 
 
In line with LSGA provisions, DDCs should form Monitoring Committees under the chairpersonship of an 
MP representing the district. If there is more than one MP representing the district, MPs will chair the 
committee in alphabetical order. However, few DDCs have followed this. To ensure monitoring, the 
RMOM Guidelines (2013) make special provision for the establishment of supervision and monitoring 
committees, the meetings of which are to be chaired by the chairpersons of the respective LBs. This 
committee monitors whether projects or programs have followed the operational calendar and whether the 
funds are used properly or not. The committee is also authorized to monitor outputs every trimester and 
submit its report to the LB chair. 
 
 
The table on the following page provides a detailed overview of the principal stakeholders in the local 
level planning process, their roles and responsibilities. 
 
12 
 
Table 1: Local Level Planning – Principal Stakeholders, Roles and Responsibilities 
CENTRAL GOVERNMENT LEVEL DISTRICT LEVEL VILLAGE/MUNICIPAL LEVEL 
Institutional 
stakeholder Main roles and responsibilities 
Institutional 
stakeholder Main roles and responsibilities 
Institutional 
stakeholder Main roles and responsibilities 
National 
Planning 
Commission 
(NPC) 
- Provide budget ceilings and guide-
lines for local planning by 
November 15 (LSGA: Art. 203) 
- Provide directives for formulation 
of local periodic and annual  plans 
(LSGA Art. 297 and LIDP) 
- Approve  local conditional  & 
unconditional grants and program 
budgets 
- Provide guidelines for M&E and 
harmonization for bringing 
uniformity in the local plan 
structures (LIDP) 
District 
Council 
(DC) 
- Approve district periodic plans, and 
annual plans and budgets, including 
sectoral programs 
- General functions of district council 
 
Village/-
Municipal 
Council 
(VC/MC) 
- Approve plans, programs and 
budgets submitted by 
VDC/municipality 
- General functions of village and 
municipal councils 
Ministry of 
Finance (MoF) 
- Allocation and mobilization of local 
and foreign resources 
- Approval of local infrastructure 
plans, programs, projects and 
budgets 
- Issue authorization letters for 
budget release to respective 
ministries 
- Authorize unconditional grants 
directly to LBs as recommended by 
MoFALD 
- Review national priority programs 
on bi-monthly basis 
- Fund release and tracking through 
FCGO/DTCOs 
District 
Develop-
ment 
Committee 
(DDC) 
- Implement plans, programs as 
approved by DCs, and follow 
instructions of DC 
- Planning, implementation, 
monitoring, evaluation and 
maintenance of district roads (LSGA 
Art. 189) 
- Develop district periodic plan 
(LSGA Art.195) 
- Establish district plan formulation 
committees and integrated plan 
formulation committee (LSGA Art. 
197) 
- Prepare resource maps, conduct 
feasibility studies, prioritize and 
select projects (LSGA Arts. 199-202) 
- Coordinate among different GoN 
agencies and I/NGOs at district level 
(LSGA Art. 204, 209)  
Village 
Development 
Committees 
(VDC) and 
Municipalities 
- Implement, monitor and maintain 
programs within VDC/municipality 
(LSGA Arts. 28 and 96F) 
- Prepare periodic plans, resource 
maps, feasibility studies 
- Prioritize and select projects 
- Coordinate among different GoN 
agencies and I/NGOs (LSGA Arts. 
47, 51, 115, 120) 
- Implement, manage ,supervise, 
monitor and review projects under 
their jurisdictions (LSGA Arts. 43-
54 and 111-124)  
- Conduct internal and final audits of 
VDCs/municipalities 
- Conduct public/social audits 
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- Form user groups and identify NGOs 
for implementation of projects 
(LSGA Arts. 208-209) 
- Supervise, monitor, review and 
evaluate projects (LSGA Arts .210-
211)  
- Establish sector specific sections to 
carry out development functions 
(LSGA Art. 257) 
- Coordinate VDCs, municipalities 
and line agencies, share and allocate 
resources among LBs and line 
agencies as conditional, 
unconditional and revenue sharing 
grants to VDCs 
- Select final auditors for VDCs and 
conduct internal auditing of VDC 
accounts  
- Conduct public/social audits  
Ministry of 
Federal Affairs 
and Local 
Development 
(MoFALD) 
- Focal ministry for LBs and local 
infrastructure 
- Support to policy formulation, 
implementation, monitoring and 
standard setting, and information 
management 
- Coordinate with different ministries, 
agencies, development partners and 
institutions I/NGOs, private sector 
and LBs (LIDP: 6.2.6) 
- Provide directives and guidelines to 
LBs 
- Depute or facilitate deputation of 
officials if requested by LBs who 
will be accountable to concerned 
LBs (LSGA Art. 256) 
Local 
Developmen
t Officer 
(LDO) 
- Secretary of DC and DDC 
- Coordinate development activities at  
district level 
- Due to the absence of local elections 
since 2002, the DDCs themselves are 
currently headed by the LDO 
- Report to MoFALD 
- Responsible for financial and 
administrative management, and 
operates DDF, the “local” treasury to 
which all LRN funds are allocated 
and from which funds are  released 
to the operational accounts of 
different sector wise offices, line 
agencies and the DDC secretariat 
- Facilitate coordination  of VDC level 
activities 
- Recommend budget releases to 
VDCs by DTCO 
 
VDC 
secretary/ 
Municipal 
Executive 
Officer (EO) 
- Each VDC and municipality has a 
central government representative, 
appointed to work as the secretary 
of his/her respective 
council/committee 
- responsible for implementation, 
monitoring, financial and physical  
management and reporting to 
concerned local agencies 
- Operate VDC/municipal treasuries 
- Administrative coordination of 
VDC/municipal level activities 
- Responsible for internal and final 
audits 
- Report to respective agencies and  
to DDCs 
14 
 
Ministry of 
Urban 
Development 
- Provide support for municipal 
infrastructure including physical 
planning of municipalities and 
Town Development Committees 
Subject 
specific plan 
formulation 
committees 
- Scrutinize construction-related 
programs and projects that are 
received from Ilaka level service 
centers, line departments and other 
agencies and forward to IPFC 
(LSGA Art. 197) 
Integrated 
Plan 
Formulation 
Committee 
(IPFC) 
- Recommend plans and programs 
that are submitted by different ward 
citizen forums (WCFs) to 
respective VDCs/municipalities 
(RMOMG sections 15-16) 
  Integrated 
Plan 
Formulation 
Committee 
(IPFC) 
- Recommend synergized plan and 
programs that are submitted by 
different subject specific plan 
formulation committees to DDC 
Ward Citizen 
Forums 
(WCFs) 
- Prepare compile, integrate and 
prioritize different projects/ 
programs received from different 
communities/groups from 
settlement and neighborhood levels 
(RMOMG section 20) 
Financial 
Comptroller 
General Office 
(FCGO) 
- Release budget according to 
authorization letter of MoF, and 
other ministries 
- Treasury management, tracking and 
FMIS 
Ilaka level, 
service 
centers 
- Examine and prioritize programs and 
projects that are submitted by VDCs/ 
municipalities and make 
recommendations to different subject 
specific plan formulation committees 
at DDC level 
Community 
groups and 
users 
- Identify and submit projects to 
WCFs 
Department of 
Local 
Infrastructure 
Development 
and 
Agricultural 
Roads 
(DoLIDAR) 
- Provide technical support to LBs to 
fulfill the objectives of the LIDP 
and national strategies. 
- Provide technical supervision of 
programs and projects implemented 
by LBs, GoN and different DPs 
- Provide technical support for 
maintaining quality and developing 
professionalism and competency of 
LBs 
- Establish linkages with other 
technical departments for quality 
outputs 
- Provide technical support for 
preparation of DTMPs 
- Planning, budgeting, 
implementation, monitoring and 
reporting along with technical 
guidance and follow-up 
- Provide technical support to 
MoFALD to formulate local 
District 
Technical 
Office 
(DTO) 
- Provide technical support to LBs for  
planning, implementation, 
supervision, monitoring, evaluation 
and reporting 
- Prepare district specific norms and 
specifications and establish quality 
control labs or ensure quality control 
- Support local mechanisms for 
ensuring technical quality, develop 
guidelines and manuals for DDCs 
and other LBs 
- Prepare cost estimates, bid 
documents, design, drawings, 
agreement documents, measurement 
books, and other construction related 
documents and submit for approval 
to respective agencies for 
management and final payment 
activities 
- Conduct technical supervision of 
local level infrastructure projects and 
Construction 
Committees, 
User Groups 
- Facilitate participation by users of 
services 
- Promote inclusive, representative 
and gender friendly construction 
committees for project 
implementation 
- Establish monitoring committee 
during construction 
- Conduct public audits 
- Conduct local procurement of 
goods and services 
- Collect service charges 
- Report to concerned LBs (LSGA 
Arts. 49,119 and 209) 
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infrastructure policies/ strategies 
and operational guidelines for LBs 
- Support LBs for capacity 
development, human resource 
development and training for DTOs 
- Develop manuals, guidelines, 
technical norms, standard 
specifications related to local 
infrastructure services (LIDP 
responsibility matrix) 
- Coordinate with different 
departments, LBs and other 
stakeholders concerning local 
infrastructure  
prepare cost variations 
- Prepare progress reports and forward 
to respective agencies, including 
DDCs and DoLIDAR 
Steering or 
Coordination 
Committee 
- Review project progress reports and 
take necessary action to deal with 
project specific implementation 
issues 
 District 
Treasury 
Comptroller 
Office 
(DTCO) 
- Release approved budget at local 
level 
- Handle single treasury account 
- Fund tracking, FM, operate FMIS 
- Submit periodic financial reports to 
central FCGO 
- Conduct internal audits of 
government accounts 
- Coordinate account related officials 
at local level 
I/NGOs - Social mobilization, group 
strengthening and capacity 
development 
- Support for basic services along road 
side corridors (LSGA Arts. 47, 51, 
115, 120, 204, and 209) 
- Carry out local level activities by 
partnering with LBs 
Private 
sector 
(contractors, 
consulting 
firms) 
- Provide services for the 
implementation of road construction 
- Provide consulting services for 
designing, supervision and technical 
quality control 
- Conduct IEE/EIA, monitoring and 
reporting 
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ANNEX 3: LOCAL BODY FUNCTIONS 
 
Functional area DDCs (within their respective jurisdictions) 
VDCs 
(within their respective 
jurisdictions) 
Municipalities 
(within their respective jurisdictions) 
Agriculture • General responsibilities (including 
management and implementation) 
• General responsibilities (including 
management and implementation) 
 
Drinking water & housing • General responsibilities (including 
management and implementation) 
• Planning for housing and market 
development 
• General responsibilities (including 
management and implementation) 
• To carry out or cause to be carried 
out sanitation programmers in the 
Municipality area. 
Hydropower & electricity • General responsibilities (including 
management and implementation) 
for micro-hydropower 
 • Generation/distribution of electricity 
Works & transport • General responsibilities (including 
management and implementation) 
for district roads and transport 
infrastructure 
• General responsibilities (including 
management and implementation) 
for rural roads and transport 
infrastructure 
• General responsibilities (including 
management and implementation) for 
municipal roads and transport 
infrastructure 
Land reform and 
management 
• Management of cultivated and 
barren public lands 
  
Women and helpless people 
(social protection) 
• Promotion of women’s 
development. 
• Protection of orphans, helpless 
women, the aged, disabled and 
incapacitated persons as per the 
national policy 
  
Forests & environment • To prepare and implement plans on 
forests, vegetation, biological 
diversity and soil conservation. 
• To protect and promote the 
environment. 
 
• Re-forestation of public lands. 
• To prepare and implement plans 
on forests, vegetation, biological 
diversity and soil conservation. 
• To protect and promote the 
environment. 
 
 
• To preserve rivers, streams, ponds, 
deep water, wells, lakes, stone water-
taps etc. and utilize, or cause to be 
utilized them properly. 
• Pollution control 
• Environmental protection 
• Solid waste management 
17 
 
Functional area DDCs (within their respective jurisdictions) 
VDCs 
(within their respective 
jurisdictions) 
Municipalities 
(within their respective jurisdictions) 
Education & sports • Prioritization for establishing new 
schools 
• Recommend closure of schools. 
• To supervise and monitor schools in 
the district development area and 
assist in their operation and 
management. 
• To formulate policies and programs 
for adult education. 
• Formulate and implement sports 
programmers. 
 
 
• To establish, operate and manage 
pre-primary schools. 
• To supervise and manage the 
schools in the village development 
area. 
• To assist in providing primary 
level education in mother tongue 
within the village development 
area. 
• Manage adult and non-formal 
education programmers. 
• To establish and manage libraries. 
• To formulate and implement 
sports programs. 
• Provide scholarships to the 
students of oppressed and 
disadvantaged ethnic 
communities. 
• To establish, operate and manage 
pre-primary schools. 
• To support operation and 
management of schools within the 
Municipality 
• Make recommendations for the 
establishment and closure of schools. 
• To assist in providing primary level 
education in mother tongue within 
the Municipality. 
• Provide scholarships to the students 
of oppressed and disadvantaged 
ethnic communities. 
• Manage adult and non-formal 
education programmers. 
• To formulate and implement sports 
programs. 
Wages for labor • Determination of wage rates 
• Abolition of child labor 
  
Irrigation & erosion control • Irrigation: general responsibilities 
(including management and 
implementation) for irrigation 
schemes which cover more than 1 
VDC 
• Erosion control: general 
responsibilities (including 
management and implementation) 
• General responsibilities (including 
management and implementation) 
• Irrigation development. 
• To control and prevent soil & water 
erosion. 
Information & 
communication 
 
• Regulation of cinemas 
• Libraries and information centers 
(outside of Municipalities) 
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Functional area DDCs (within their respective jurisdictions) 
VDCs 
(within their respective 
jurisdictions) 
Municipalities 
(within their respective jurisdictions) 
Language & culture • General responsibilities (including 
management and implementation) 
• General responsibilities (including 
management and implementation) 
• General responsibilities (including 
management and implementation) 
Cottage industries and 
industry 
• Keep records of cottage industries in 
district 
• Identify industrial zones in district 
• Facilitation for development of 
cottage industries 
• Promotion of cottage industries 
Health services • General responsibilities (including 
management and implementation) 
for district level health services 
• Authorization to open sub-health 
posts 
• General responsibilities (including 
management and implementation) 
for primary health services 
• General responsibilities (including 
management and implementation) for 
primary and municipal health 
services 
Tourism • General facilitation of tourism 
development 
• General facilitation of tourism 
development 
• Promotion of tourism 
Physical development 
(community buildings, 
housing, land use planning, 
drainage) 
 • General responsibilities (including 
management and implementation) 
• General responsibilities for land use 
and urban planning 
Social welfare   • Disposal of the deceased, protection 
of women and children 
Miscellaneous (selected)  • Vital registration 
• Social protection: protection of 
orphans, helpless women, the 
aged, disabled and incapacitated 
persons as per the national policy 
• Vital registration 
• Social protection: 
- To maintain inventory of the 
helpless, orphans and 
disabled children. 
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ANNEX 4: INTERGOVERNMENTAL FISCAL FRAMEWORK 
 
 
1) Background 
The key feature that distinguishes fiscal decentralization from other forms of decentralization is the 
constitutional or legal power to raise taxes and carry out service delivery by the lower tiers of 
government (Tanzi, 1995). The central government while devolving both expenditure and revenue 
responsibilities to lower tiers is also hoping to improve economic efficiency, service delivery and 
accountability in local governments (Jenkins, et al., 2000). However, (Oates, 1999) notes that the 
relationship between fiscal decentralization and development outcomes is not straightforward. 
Additionally, various tenets of fiscal decentralization – expenditure mandates, revenue assignment, 
intergovernmental transfers, coordination among tiers – are complex and fraught with challenges. 
There is no magic bullet in terms of designing fiscal decentralization which is further complicated by a 
country’s history, culture, geography, institutional setting, bureaucracy and politics. 
 
The Local Self Governance Act (1999) provided for a comprehensive transfer of central decision 
making power and implementing authority to local bodies in Nepal. However, the LSGA faced several 
constraints and challenges which led to the slow decentralization reforms. A total of 23 sector laws 
conflicting with the LSGA were never harmonized. As a result, the Nepalese government structure has 
remained centralized. This is evident by the own source revenue generated by LBs in Nepal. After 12 
years of passing of LSGA, own source revenue generated by LBs was 0.3% of GDP while the central 
government’s total revenue has reached 15.7% of GDP in FY 2012/139. LBs’ total expenditure as a 
percentage of central government expenditure has increased significantly in recent years (reaching 
approx. 10%, 12% and 9% of total central government expenditure in FY 2010/11, FY 2011/12 and 
FY 2012/13 respectively). However, own source revenue has remained flat, comprising 2% of total 
central government revenue in FY 2012/13.10). 
 
2) Revenue  
Revenue Assignments 
Major sources of revenue (income tax, VAT, custom, excise etc.) are collected by central government 
while minor sources are provided to LBs in Nepal. The LSGA and Local Bodies Fiscal Administration 
Regulation (1999) provided that local governments can mobilize resources from different sources: 
internal resources (tax and non-tax revenue), revenue sharing, transfers from the central government 
and donations/grants from various agencies. Revenue assignment between different tiers of 
government is listed in the table below: 
 
9 LBFC, 2013, Fiscal Situation Analysis of Local Bodies, Budget Speech 2013 
10 LBFC, Budget speech 2013 
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Table 1: Revenue assignment: own source revenue 
Central Government DDC VDC Municipality 
• Taxes on Income, 
profits, capital gains: 
Income tax, company 
profit tax, capital gain 
tax, dividend tax, 
interest tax, house and 
land rent tax on urban 
properties, social 
security taxes on 
payroll.  
 
• Taxes on Goods and 
Services: value added 
tax, excise duties, 
vehicle tax, air 
passenger service tax 
etc.  
• Taxes on International 
Trade and transactions: 
customs and other 
import duties, export 
duties. 
• Taxes on the use of 
infrastructures such as 
roads, bridges etc. 
• Tax on the export of 
goods produced in the 
district. 
• Tax on the recyclable 
and waste materials 
(including Kabadi)  
• Tax on agricultural and 
animal products 
• Vehicle Tax 
• Entertainment Tax 
(Cinema hall, video 
hall, cultural show 
halls and theatres) 
• Rent and tenancy tax 
• Advertisement Tax 
• Business enterprise tax 
on specified industries, 
trades, professions or 
vocations  
• Commercial video tax  
• Tax on commercial 
exploitation of natural 
resources 
• Haat Bazaar tax 
• Integrated Property Tax 
• Vehicle Tax 
• Entertainment Tax  
(cinema hall, video 
hall, cultural show halls 
and theatres) 
• Rental Tax on property 
rented 
• Advertisement Tax  
• Business enterprise tax 
on specified industry, 
trade, profession or 
vocation 
• Commercial video tax 
• Haat Bazaar tax 
 
• Service fee on the use 
of guest house, library, 
city hall and canals, 
embankments and 
dams 
• Licensing and renewal 
charges on rafting, 
boating, and tuins and 
fishing on rivers 
• Income from sale of 
sand, aggregate, 
boulders and woods 
swept by river, etc. 
 
• Parking charges 
• Other charges including 
the charges for the 
valuation of immovable 
properties 
• Recommendation Fee 
Charges on building 
permits 
 
• Service Charges 
(sanitation, drainage/ 
sewerage, solid waste 
mgmt., etc.) 
• Entrance charges 
(tourist places, parks, 
gardens, etc.)  
• Approval and 
recommendation 
charges 
• Licensing and 
Renewal fees 
• Building permit fee 
 
 
• Non-tax revenue: 
interest, dividends, rent 
& royalty, sales of 
goods and services, 
Administrative fees, 
penalties and fines 
 
Sources: LSGA; LSGR; Budget Speech of Nepal 
 
Historically, own source revenue (internal revenue) resources account for a small proportion of the 
total revenue of LBs in Nepal. In recent years, the share of OSR has been shrinking, resulting in an 
increased dependence of LBs on central government transfers to carry out their functions. In FY 
2006/07, OSR11 and fiscal transfers were around 17.5% and 60% of the total revenue respectively. In 
FY 2012/13, OSR decreased to 13% while the central government’s grant transfers increased to 83% 
of the total revenue (Various LBFC reports and WB Staff estimates). LBs OSR increased by more 
than three times between FY 2006/07 to FY 2012/13 while grants increased by more than six times 
during this period. As a result, despite the increase of OSR in nominal terms, the percentage of OSR in 
total LB revenue has significantly declined in recent years. 
11 This includes shared revenue of VDCs as disaggregated data was not available for VDCs. 
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Figure 2: LB own source revenue for FYs 2006-2012 
 
 
 
Local bodies’ contribution to total OSR has also been changing over the years. Up until FY 2006/07, 
municipalities followed by VDCs were the largest contributors to OSR, which changed starting from 
FY 2007/08 when DDCs took over VDCs as the second largest contributor of OSRs. As of FY 
2012/13, municipalities and DDCs were the largest contributors of OSR – contributing 47% and 33% 
of the total OSR respectively – while VDCs’ share has increased only marginally starting from FY 
2010/11. 
 
Figure 3: VDC, DDC and Municipality shares in OSR for FYs 2006-2012 
 
 
 
OSR collection is extremely skewed among the VDCs, districts and municipalities i.e. most of the 
OSR are collected by a handful of VDCs, districts and municipalities.  
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VDC Own Source Revenue 
 
VDC own source revenue (including shared revenue) is a very small component in the total VDC 
revenue. Further, its proportion of the total revenue has been declining: from FYs 2006/7 to 2012/13, 
OSR (and shared revenue) has declined from 16% to 10% of the total VDC revenue. Moreover, 
because of considerable differences in revenue potential across VDCs in the country, this is skewed by 
VDCs of a few districts. Most VDCs have extremely low internal revenue generating capacity: in FY 
2012/13, the VDCs of 57 districts (i.e. VDCs in 80% of the districts) collected less than 10% of their 
revenue from own source. For instance, in FY 2012/13, the internal revenue of VDCs in Kathmandu 
district amounted to NRs 179 million while the internal revenue of VDCs in Bajura district was only 
NRs 389,000. 
 
Table 2: VDC OSR in comparison 
VDCs OSR % of total revenue 
(FY 2012/13) No. of districts 
Less than 10% 57 districts 
10-20% 8 districts 
More than 20% 10 districts 
Source: LBFC, 2013 
 
DDC Own Source Revenue 
 
Although the LSGA and LSGR assign few OSRs to DDCs compared to VDCs and municipalities (see 
table 2 above), the OSR of DDCs has increased both in nominal and comparative terms. In nominal 
terms, the OSR of DDCs increased five times in the FYs 2006/07 to FY 2012/13. The DDCs’ share of 
OSR of the total LB OSR increased from 20% to 33% during this period. However, the DDCs’ OSR 
share as a percentage of their own total revenue has not changed much and remained between 8% to 
12% of the total DDC revenue between FYs 2006/07 and FY 2012/13. 
 
Around 55% of the total DDC OSR is generated from tax, the remaining portion is generated from 
non-tax revenues. Income from ‘sales’ of sand, boulders, wood and other items (in reality a kind of tax 
on the transport of commercial quantities of such items) is the second largest revenue source and 
highest non-tax contributor to DDC budgets. 
 
Figure 4: Composition of DDC own source revenue 
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Municipality Own Source Revenue 
 
Municipalities are the largest contributor to OSR among LBs. However, OSR as a share of total 
municipal revenue has also been on the decline: from 33% of total municipal revenue in FY 2006/07, 
it declined to 18% in FY 2010/11. 
Non-tax revenue contributions have been higher than tax revenue in the case of municipalities. In FY 
2012/13, tax revenue was only 41% of total OSR, while the remaining share came from non-tax 
revenue, service fees being the largest with 42% of the total OSR. 
 
Figure 5: Composition of Municipality own source revenue 
 
 
 
LB Own Source Revenue – Some Issues 
• Low OSRs for LBs generally and the trend seems to be a further decrease. 
• LBs have little discretion over determining revenue rates or base. 
• There are few incentives for LBs to increase OSR and/or tax revenue. Even in the current 
formula for central government grants, only municipalities have direct incentives (see grants 
section below). 
• Capacity issues are another reason for low LB tax revenue. Even when tax could be a good 
source of income, LBs are unable to determine the optimal tax policy. It also appears that LBs 
have not been sufficiently prepared for managing the revenue assignments transferred to them. 
As for land revenue for instance, VDCs and municipalities face difficulties in handling cadastral 
information, account keeping and other complex administration tasks12. 
• Issues with tax administration at the local level: low tax compliance by taxpayers is further 
compounded by problems in enforcement and monitoring enforcement measures. 
• Unclear, overlapping and ambiguous revenue assignments create confusion on responsibilities, 
jurisdiction and tax rates. For example, tax on rental income from house and land is under the 
tax authority of both, central government and LBs. The central level levies 15% tax on such 
rental, whereas the LSGR permits municipalities to charge 2%. The regulations do not specify 
whether the 2% municipal share is in fact included in the central government tax rate of 15% or 
if municipalities can raise their 2% on top of central governments share. Municipalities have not 
been able to collect any substantial revenue from this source due to this confusion13. 
 
2.1) Revenue Sharing  
The LSGA 1999 (section 220) and the Local Self Governance Regulation (LSGR, 1999, rule 211) 
provide for vertical and horizontal revenue sharing between center and local government or among the 
local governments. There are several revenue sharing categories, described in the table below: 
12 Shrestha, 2002, page 23 
13 LBFC report, page 23 
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Table 3: Types of revenue sharing 
Revenue sharing from 
central government to 
DDC 
Revenue sharing 
from DDC to 
VDC 
Revenue sharing 
from DDC to 
municipality 
Revenue sharing 
from VDC/ 
municipality to 
DDC 
Revenue sharing 
between central 
government and 
VDC/municipality 
• House and land 
registration tax 
(shared with DDC) 
• Royalties from mines 
(50%), forest 
products (10%), 
hydropower (50%) 
• Entrance fees and 
royalties from 
tourists/trekkers 
visiting national 
parks and wild life 
conservation areas 
(30%) 
• Royalties received 
from mountaineers 
and entry fees for 
tourists entering the 
DDC territory (30%) 
• Tax on the 
utilization of 
natural 
resources: 50% 
to be shared 
with VDCs 
• Tax earned from 
the export of 
materials, 
recyclable and 
waste materials 
(35-50%) 
• Income earned 
on the sale of 
sand, soil, 
aggregate, 
boulders, wood 
swept up by 
rivers (35-50%) 
• Tax on the 
utilization of 
natural resources: 
35% to be shared 
with 
municipalities 
• Tax earned from 
the export of 
materials, 
recyclable and 
waste materials 
(35-50%) 
• Income earned on 
the sale of sand, 
soil, aggregate, 
boulders, wood 
swept up by 
rivers (35-50%) 
• Land revenue 
or land tax: 
25% to be 
shared with 
DDC 
• Vehicle tax 
(renewal and 
ownership) 
• Entertainment 
tax 
• House and rent 
tax 
 
Revenue Sharing – DDCs 
 
DDCs share a tax base with central government for the land and registration fee, royalties from mines, 
forests and power generation from hydropower plants with the biggest share coming from land 
registration followed by hydropower royalties. 
 
Figure 6: Composition of shared revenue for DDCs, FY 2012/13 
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Revenue Sharing - VDCs and Municipalities 
 
VDCs share 25% of the collected land revenue with DDCs. Municipalities receive a ‘Local 
Development Fee’ (LDF), which is supposed to be a share of the import surcharge (1.5% of the import 
value) from the central government. In effect it is actually a grant not tied to import surcharges. The 
LDF was devised in 1999, originally as temporary measure to compensate municipalities for the 
revenue loss as a result of the abolishment of the octroi. However, it has become one of the largest 
sources of revenue for municipalities. Its reporting has been inconsistent over the years and there is 
confusion over whether it is a central transfer or shared revenue. 
 
Revenue sharing issues: 
• Contradictory provisions regarding responsibilities for tax collection in the LSGA and other 
related regulations, for example on royalty collection for tourist entrance fees, royalties from 
mines, forests and power generation from hydropower plants, the house rental tax, land 
registration fee, land revenue and the motor vehicle tax (Pandey, 2008, p. 43) (page 20, 
Shrestha, 2002). This creates conflicting and unclear assignment of responsibilities between 
central government and LBs as well as among LBs. 
• Overlaps between jurisdictions is a major problem; between DDCs and VDCs/municipalities as 
well as between central government and DDCs. 
• Ambiguities regarding the revenue base, rate and the applicable sharing mechanism. 
• Delays in transfers of shared revenues from central government. 
• Revenue sharing bias towards central government in some cases: As for the registration fees 
shared between central government and DDCs, the DDC share is capped at 6 million NRs. The 
excess amount is kept by central government (Shrestha 2002, page 25) 
 
Vertical Imbalance 
 
Vertical imbalance is defined as ‘a mismatch between expenditure functions that local governments 
have been assigned and their access to locally generated finances to fund activities to meet their 
mandates’ (Bhatta, 2011, p. 3). Vertical imbalances are common since major sources of revenue are 
typically administered more efficiently and with less distortions at the national level and hence 
assigned to the central government. From the discussion on revenue assignments and expenditure 
mandates above, it is evident that there is high vertical imbalance for LBs in Nepal. For instance, in 
FY 2012/13, LB own source revenue accounted for a mere 2% of the total central government 
revenue. LB OSR (including shared revenue) of the total LB revenue was 17% (also FY 2012/13) and 
the deficit of 83% was covered by central government transfers (calculated based on LBFC 2013). 
 
Horizontal Imbalance 
 
Horizontal imbalance is the mismatch ‘in the resource capacity of local governments; it is a function 
of different spatial, resource base, and other factors’ (Bhatta, 2011, p. 3). LBs in Nepal face 
considerable differences in revenue potential and tax capacities, largely due to the diverse 
geographical conditions in the country. For example, there is a stark difference in the availability of 
natural resources, the demographic patterns and economic base, in districts in the mountain, hill and 
Terai regions. This greatly influences LB revenue generating capacity. Not surprisingly, tax collection 
rates per capita are very unequal among LBs. 
 
There is also great variation in expenditure needs of LBs in Nepal, again due to their diversity in size, 
population, cost of service provision, level of economic development and accessibility. It is therefore 
important that central government transfers take into account these diverse conditions and differences 
in LB revenue generating capacity through an appropriate and well-accepted transfer formula. The 
various transfers currently being used in Nepal are discussed in the following section. 
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Intergovernmental Transfers 
Overall, intergovernmental fiscal transfers to LBs have been growing significantly in Nepal in both 
nominal terms and as a proportion of total revenue. In nominal terms, grants increased from NRs 5.6 
billion in FY 2006/07 to more than NRs 30 billion in FY 2012/13, i.e. over five times in six years 
(Source: LBFC reports and WB Staff Estimates). As a proportion of total revenue, grants transferred 
to LBs in FY 2006/07 accounted for 60% and increased to 82% of total revenue in FY 2012/13. In 
comparison, OSR decreased from 17% to 12% of total revenue during the same period, although in 
nominal terms OSR tripled. This shows that fiscal transfers have grown substantially, particularly 
comparing them to OSR. 
  
Figure 7: VDC, DDC and Municipality shares in fiscal transfers (FYs 2006/07-2012/13) 
 
 
Figure 8: Proportion of OSR, shared revenue and grants of LBs (FY 2012/13) 
 
 
Intergovernmental fiscal transfers in Nepal fit into two broad categories: grants and social payments. 
Social payments (or social transfers), such as payments to senior citizens, persons with disabilities the 
disabled, endangered ethnicities, single women security scheme, etc., are transferred to LBs under a 
separate budget line (different from the one for grants). 
There are two types of grants provided by central government to LBs: 
i) Conditional grants: recurrent and capital grants. 
ii) Unconditional grants: also known as block grants which can be for recurrent or capital 
expenditures. The unconditional capital grant has two sub-categories: the minimum block grant 
and a formula based block grant. 
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Conditional Grants 
Conditional grants are specific purpose grants, the central government specifying the purpose for 
which the recipient LB can use the funds. Conditional grants can be recurrent or capital and are one 
way to bridge the gap between revenue and expenditure and maintain fiscal equity among LBs. 
However, conditional grants limit the fiscal discretion of LBs and also affect their budget allocation 
decisions (Shrestha, 2002). Conditional grants are mostly tied to education, roads and other 
infrastructure spending in Nepal. 
 
Unconditional Grants (Block Grants) 
Unconditional grants, also known as block grants in Nepal, provide largely discretionary revenue to 
LBs. They can be recurrent or capital. Capital block grants can be further divided into two main types: 
i) Minimum block grants: LBs receive an annual ‘minimum block grant’ for capital expenditures; 
VDCs receive between NRs 1.5 million and 3 million depending on criteria such as population or 
poverty levels, while DDCs all receive a flat amount of NRs 3 million. 
ii) Formula and performance based block grants: in addition to the minimum block grant, LBs are 
provided with additional grants; these are allocated based on a) an allocation formula and b) the 
performance of LBs (evaluated against a set of indicators – the minimum conditions and 
performance measures, or MC/PMs). 
The allocation formula includes criteria which seek to take into account and equalize the 
considerably different conditions in LBs, such as population, area, poverty level, cost index and 
capacity for own source revenue generation (Local Body Fiscal Commission, 2005; Bhatta, 
2011). The following criteria are used for allocating these grants: 
− For DDCs: (i) population–40%, (ii) weighted poverty–25%, (iii) area–10%, and (iv) weighted 
cost–25%. 
− For municipalities: (i) population–50%, (ii) weighted poverty–25%, (iii) area–10%, and `(iv) 
weighted tax effort–15%. 
− For VDCs: (i) population–60%, (ii) area–10%, and (iii) weighted cost–30%. 
 
The allocation of the additional formula and performance based block grants to LBs is dependent 
on the fulfillment of meeting certain minimum requirements (e.g. proper financial management) 
and performance measures, trying to incentivize LB compliance with legal provisions and good 
performance. The MC/PM indicators are based on legal and financial management requirements 
to which LBs must adhere. 
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Box 1: Performance Based Block Grants 
In 2004 a UNCDF/DfID supported program (the Decentralized Financing and Development Program – 
DFDP) started piloting a performance based grants funding mechanism in 20 districts for capital 
development grants provided to DDCs by the program. Annual assessments of pilot districts’ performance 
evaluated against a set of indicators (the so-called minimum conditions and performance measures – 
MC/PMs) were introduced. Pilot districts had to pass certain access conditions (minimum conditions) to 
be eligible for the program grant. In addition, the actual size of the grant was dependent on the districts’ 
performance on the performance measure criteria; i.e. good performance in PM areas increased the grant 
share, while poor performance reduced the amount allocated. 
Generally, MCs function as minimum safeguards for proper utilization of public resources and for 
identifying the basic absorption capacity and financial discipline. The objective of the additional criteria, 
the performance measures, is to provide incentives for improved performance in a number of areas that 
are seen as priorities (e.g. by government, donors etc.). While seeking to improve performance, MC/PM 
assessments, at the same time, can be a useful tool to identify capacity gaps that can be addressed 
specifically when performance assessments are linked up with capacity building mechanisms. 
The performance based funding system in Nepal (in some variation) has been rolled out to all LBs in the 
last years and applies to the GoN unconditional block grants provided to LBs. DDCs and municipalities 
are evaluated on the basis of both, MCs and PMs. Currently, DDCs have to pass 9 and municipalities 10 
MCs to be eligible for the block grant. DDC performance is assessed on 46 and municipalities’ on 40 PM 
indicators, determining the actual size of their respective block grant allocation. VDC performance is 
assessed on the basis of 7 MCs. In 2013 PM indicators (13) have also been introduced for VDCs. The 
MC/PM assessment process is now carried out every three years. 
A total of 64 DDCs, 54 municipalities and 3,407 VDCs passed the MC criteria in the last performance 
evaluation carried out in FY 2012/13 (Economic Survey, 2013). 
 
VDC grants 
VDCs have been receiving block grants since 1996. Over the years the amounts have been increased: 
o Until FY 2006/07, VDCs each received NRs 0.5 million. 
o From FY 2007/08, VDC grants were increased to NRs 1 million per VDC. 
o From FY 2009/10, VDC grants have been provided based on a formula (population, VDC 
area, population and cost) and range from NRs 1.5 million to 3 million per VDC. 
Since 2009, all 3,915 VDCs have been receiving a minimum grant amount of NRs 1.5 million each. 
VDCs that pass a number of basic minimum conditions (MCs) are allocated an additional grant 
amount. Additional grants are supposed to be used for programs that directly benefit particular target 
groups. In FY 2012/12, for example, 3,407 VDCs passed the MCs and were provided with additional 
grants (mostly from donors foreign grants) based on the indicators. 
 
DDC grants 
DDCs are provided with a minimum capital grant of NRs 3 million. The allocation of the additional 
formula based grant is dependent on the compliance with the MC/PM indicators. There are 9 MC 
criteria and 46 PM criteria for DDCs currently. A total of 64 DDCs had passed the MC criteria in in 
the last performance evaluation carried out in FY 2012/13. The allocation formula takes into account 
population, geographical region, area, cost and poverty criteria. 
 
Issues with Grants 
Equity: VDCs used to receive equal amounts (in nominal terms) of transfers, despite the huge 
variations in their local conditions and thus needs. To address this problem, VDC grant allocations 
have been revised and are provided based on a formula since FY 2009/10, with grant allocations 
between NRs 1 - 3 million. Given the great disparity among VDCs in Nepal and the difficulties to 
capture and equalize this through the VDC grant allocation formula there are questions on the equity 
of the current distribution mechanism. 
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Creating the right incentives: Earlier, municipalities generating more than NRs 10 million OSR were 
not eligible for receiving a development grant, in effect creating a disincentive for municipalities to 
increase their OSR. This was changed with the introduction of the new transfer formula which 
provides incentives for better revenue collection. Incentives regarding revenue generating capacity of 
VDCs and DDCs have not yet been explicitly included in grant formula or MC/PMs for VDCs and 
DDCs. 
Late and unpredictable transfers: Delays in fund transfers are a common issue, compromising the 
proper utilization of grants. There is a consistent delay in issuing authorization letters for fiscal 
transfers by the central government, often taking three to six months. Also, the total annual grant 
amount allocated to a LB is transferred in 3 separate tranches, rather than just one early on in the FY 
which further exacerbates the problem of delays in authorization letter issuance and grant transfers. 
Apart from other problems these delays in the fund flow cause, it also creates an incentive for LBs to 
move resources that have not been spent by the end of a FY to a ‘non-freezing’ account in order to 
avoid having to return unspent funds to the central treasury. This creates incentives for doubtful 
financial management practice, even though there may not be an intention to engage in malpractice. 
As other coping strategies for anticipated fund transfer delays LBs have been providing advances to 
user groups or contractors, or pre-financing user group activities before final project approval. The 
delays make it very challenging for LBs to provide efficient quality services and follow financial 
management rules. 
 
Expenditures 
Overall, total LB expenditure has increased from NRs 13 billion in FY 2007/08 to NRs 31 billion in 
FY 2012/1314. Despite this significant increase in nominal terms, total LB expenditure as a % of total 
central government expenditure has remained around 10%, with a high point of 12% in FY 2011/12. 
 
Figure 9: LB expenditure as % of total central government expenditure 
 
However, there have been considerable changes in expenditure patterns, particularly with regard to 
spending on transfers. LBs manage or execute expenditures from three major sources of revenue: 
OSR, shared revenue and fiscal transfers. Fiscal transfers are further divided into grants and social 
payments. 
LB expenditure on transfers has increased from 7.2% in FY 2007/08 to 10.3% of total central 
government expenditure in FY 2012/13. While grants to LBs have increased by three times during that 
period, social payments have increased by eight times. As a percentage of total central government 
expenditure, social payments have increased from 0.7% to 2.5%, and grants from 6.5% to 7.7%. 
 
 
 
14 Source: LBFC  
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Figure 10: LB transfers: grants and social payments 
 
 
Within the grants system, there have been major shifts with regard to recurrent and capital 
expenditures, indicating a worrisome trend. In FY 2007/08, capital expenditure accounted for 80% of 
total LB grants. This has dropped to 67% in FY 2012/13. This figure does not include social payments. 
Social payments are effectively handouts and can also be considered as recurrent expenditure. 
Including social payments in the above calculation, LB capital expenditure accounted for 71% (instead 
of 80%) of total LB grant expenditure in FY 2007/08, dropping to 53% in FY 2012/13. 
 
Figure 11: Share of recurrent grants, capital grants and social payments 
 
 
 
Social payments have increased by 9 times in 5 years – from NRs 0.9 billion in FY 2006/07 to 8.5 
billion in FY 2011/12 in nominal terms. Accounting for only about 7% of total LB expenditure in FY 
2007/08, social payments have now become almost one third of the total LB expenditure. 
As for recurrent expenditures – on average, recurrent expenditures for municipalities have been around 
25% between FYs 2007/08 - 2010/11. Looking closer at individual municipalities though, some show 
very high recurrent expenditure figures and there are huge variations across municipalities. For 
example, the average recurrent expenditure of Nepalgunj municipality was 51% between FYs 2007/08 
- 2010/11, so much higher than the municipality average of 25%. 51% of the total recurrent 
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expenditure is incurred by only seven municipalities and the other 49% by the remaining 51 
municipalities. 
Regarding municipal capital expenditure – 36% of the total capital expenditure was incurred by five 
municipalities alone (Kathmandu, Lalitpur, Birjung, Biratnagar and Pokhara) on average between FYs 
2007/08 - FY 2010/11. 
Unconditional and conditional grants have seen less of a change in the last few years. In FY 2012/13, 
unconditional grants accounted for 53% and conditional grants for 46% of total LB grants. In FY 
2007/08 this was at 57% for unconditional and 43% for conditional grants. 
The two charts below illustrate these changes in fiscal transfer compositions. It can be seen, that in FY 
2012/13 unconditional grants to LBs constituted about 40% and conditional grants and social 
payments combined (earmarked grants) about 60% of total LB fiscal transfers. 
 
Figure 12: Share of unconditional, conditional and social payments to LBs (FY 2012) 
 
 
Figure 13: Share of conditional and unconditional grants and social payments 
 
Another trend that can be observed in LB expenditure patterns is the occurrence of unspent funds. LBs 
are usually unable to spend the full amount of allocated grants or OSR by the end of the FY. This has 
been a recurring problem and has not seen any improvement over the years – on the contrary: in FY 
2002/03, unspent funds of all LBs amounted to about NRs 2 billion, increasing to NRs 6 billion by FY 
2012/13. DDCs account for the largest portion of these unspent resources, followed by VDCs and 
municipalities. 
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Figure 14: Total LB unspent amounts 
 
 
There are several reasons for this trend. One is the low absorption capacity of LBs. Another is that 
transfers from the central government the late and unpredictable fund transfers from central 
government. As explained above, there are consistent delays in transferring funds to LBs. Funds 
usually take three to six months to reach LBs and the last tranche of the allocated amount is often 
received only a few months, or even weeks, before the end of the FY. There even have been instances 
of funds reaching only in the last week of the FY, creating considerable difficulties for LBs to spend 
these before the end of the FY. 
Of all LBs, VDCs are most reliant on grants. On average, more than 90% of VDC expenditure is 
covered by central government transfers, meaning only 10% of total VDC expenditures are covered by 
OSR. For VDCs in the mountain region this figure is with just 4% even lower, while it is more than 
13% in the Terai region. 
 
Source: LBFC Reports 
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ANNEX 5: EXCERPTS OF SURVEY RESULTS IN DHANKUTA AND DHANUSA 
DISTRICTS 
 
 
Background and Scope of Work 
The survey carried out by ‘Solutions’ (a survey firm) collected quantitative and qualitative data about 
the service delivery outcomes in Dhankuta and Dhanusa districts. It was conducted in 5 VDCs and one 
municipality in 2 districts pre-selected by the World Bank. The households were regarded as the basic 
sampling unit. The below table lists the VDCs and municipalities that were covered by the survey, 
along with their total population as well as the total number of households in that area and the sample 
size proposed for each of the areas. The fieldwork entailed a questionnaire based survey to collect data 
and information with respect to service outcomes in the education and roads sectors. The survey was 
undertaken in a single round in March-April 2014. 
 
Table 3: Dhankuta (Hill) – list of selected VDCs/Municipality 
SN VDC Total Population Household 
Population* 
Proposed Sample Size 
(Households) 
1 Bhirgawon 4,581 975 250 
2 Hattikharka 5,542 1,132 250 
3 Pakhrivas 3,221 1,136 250 
4 Rajarani 2,890 6,47 250 
5 Bhedatar 2,789 6,82 250 
6 Dhankuta Municipality 19,920 7,204 350 
 TOTAL 1,600 
 
Table 2: Dhanusa (Terai/Plain) – list of selected VDCs/Municipality 
SN VDC Total Population Household 
Population* 
Proposed Sample Size 
(Households) 
1 Lalbotali 5,106 908 250 
2 Sapahi 9,017 1,512 250 
3 Umaprempur 11,854 2,174 250 
4 Lohana 6,927 1,182 250 
5 Basbitti 2,948 536 250 
6 Janakpur Municipality 97,776 19,183 350 
 TOTAL 1,600 
Source: VDC Profile 2012 
 
Respondent Selection Process 
Each of the VDCs was divided into 4-10 segments, depending on the settlement pattern and spread 
within, with households in each segment. The field team then chose segments using a random number 
table. The index houses for interview within the chosen segment were identified using the ‘spin the 
bottle’ method. The field team then walked in the direction that the bottle pointed to, counting houses 
within 20 meters on either side of their path until they reached the edge of the cluster and randomly 
chose (with help of a random number table) a number ‘x’ between 1 and the total number of houses 
counted to identify the index house for interview. After locating the household, the interviewers then 
selected every 3rd house to their left.  
In each selected household, an adult member with a recent birthday and 18 years and above was 
interviewed. Only one eligible respondent per household was chosen for the questionnaire assuming 
that local service delivery within a household is similar even if there were more than one eligible 
respondent in the same household. 
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Sample Distribution 
The table below illustrates the achieved sample and its distribution for the purpose of the survey. 
 
Table 3: Sample Distribution 
Total Dhankuta Dhanusa 
Total VDC Muni. Total VDC Muni. Total VDC Muni. 
3200 2500 700 1600 1250 350 1600 1250 350 
 
General Profile of the Respondents 
Of the respondents interviewed, a majority of them (42.2%) were between the age of 30-39 years 
followed by around one forth who were between the age of 40-49 years. Although the overall 
proportion of male and female respondents were almost equal, the majority respondents from the 
municipalities were females. However, at the VDC level, the proportion of male respondents was 
observed to be the highest (90%) in Labatoli VDC of Dhanusa district. Among the total respondents 
interviewed more than 95% of them were married and most of them were Hindu (83.5%). It was 
observed that the ethnic/caste composition of the two districts was different. Across the two districts, 
most of the respondents from Dhankuta were adibasi/janajatis whereas the proportion of the same was 
minimal in Dhanusa district. It was observed that the majority of respondents from Dhanusa belonged 
to the Dalit or disadvantaged community. Dhankuta was seen to be more homogenous in terms of 
ethnic/caste groups, with the exception of Bhirgaun VDC. In comparison to Dhankuta, Dhanusa was 
found to be more diverse in terms of ethnic group composition. 
 
Table 4: Age Range 
 Total Dhankuta Dhanusa 
 Total VDC Muni. Total VDC Muni. Total VDC Muni. 
 N= 
3200 
N =  
2500 
N = 
 700 
N =  
1600 
N = 
 1250 
N = 
 350 
N = 
 1600 
N = 
1250 
N = 
 350 
18 to 19 1.2% 1.3% .7% 1.4% 1.6% .9% .9% 1.0% .6% 
20 to 29 17.7% 17.0% 20.4% 17.4% 17.8% 16.0% 18.1% 16.2% 24.9% 
30 to 39 42.2% 40.7% 47.4% 37.8% 34.2% 50.9% 46.5% 47.2% 44.0% 
40 to 49 24.5% 24.7% 23.9% 25.3% 25.5% 24.3% 23.8% 23.9% 23.4% 
50 to 59 9.0% 10.0% 5.3% 11.6% 13.4% 5.1% 6.4% 6.6% 5.4% 
60 to 69 3.9% 4.4% 2.1% 4.4% 5.0% 2.6% 3.4% 3.8% 1.7% 
70 and above 1.5% 1.9% .1% 2.1% 2.6% .3% 1.0% 1.3% 0.0% 
Total 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 
 
Table 5: Gender 
 Total Dhankuta Dhanusa 
 Total VDC Muni. Total VDC Muni. Total VDC Muni. 
 N= 
3200 
N = 
 2500 
N =  
700 
N =  
1600 
N =  
1250 
N =  
350 
N =  
1600 
N = 1250 N =  
350 
Male 50.4% 55.1% 33.7% 43.9% 46.6% 34.6% 56.9% 63.6% 32.9% 
Female 49.6% 44.9% 66.3% 56.1% 53.4% 65.4% 43.1% 36.4% 67.1% 
Total 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 
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Table 6: Marital Status 
 Total Dhankuta Dhanusa 
 Total VDC Muni. Total VDC Muni. Total VDC Muni. 
 N= 
3200 
N =  
2500 
N =  
700 
N =  
1600 
N =  
1250 
N =  
350 
N = 
 1600 
N =  
1250 
N =  
350 
Married 95.6% 95.5% 95.7% 94.4% 93.8% 96.6% 96.8% 97.3% 94.9% 
Unmarried 2.6% 2.7% 2.1% 3.6% 4.0% 2.3% 1.6% 1.4% 2.0% 
Divorced .1% .1% 0.0% .1% .2% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 
Widow 1.8% 1.7% 2.1% 1.9% 2.1% 1.1% 1.7% 1.3% 3.1% 
Total 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 
 
Table 7: Religion 
 Total Dhankuta Dhanusa 
 Total VDC Muni. Total VDC Muni. Total VDC Muni. 
 N= 
3200 
N = 
 2500 
N =  
700 
N =  
1600 
N =  
1250 
N =  
350 
N =  
1600 
N =  
1250 
N =  
350 
Hindu 83.5% 82.7% 86.4% 72.8% 71.6% 76.9% 94.3% 93.8% 96.0% 
Bouddha 5.4% 5.5% 5.1% 10.8% 11.0% 10.3% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 
Islam 2.9% 3.2% 2.1% .2% .2% .3% 5.7% 6.2% 4.0% 
Kirat 5.9% 6.2% 4.7% 11.8% 12.5% 9.4% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 
Christian 1.8% 2.0% 1.4% 3.7% 3.9% 2.9% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 
Don’t follow any religion .3% .3% .1% .5% .6% .3% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 
Don’t know .1% .2% 0.0% .3% .3% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 
Total 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 
 
Table 8: Social Group 
 Total Dhankuta Dhanusa 
 Total VDC Muni. Total VDC Muni. Total VDC Muni. 
 N= 
3200 
N =  
2500 
N =  
700 
N = 
 1600 
N =  
1250 
N = 
 350 
N =  
1600 
N = 
 1250 
N = 
 350 
Dalit 24.7% 25.3% 22.4% 4.8% 3.8% 8.0% 44.6% 46.8% 36.9% 
Adhibasi/Janajati 33.9% 34.5% 31.6% 66.1% 68.2% 58.6% 1.7% .9% 4.6% 
Madhesis 10.3% 11.0% 7.6% .6% .4% 1.4% 19.9% 21.6% 13.7% 
Religious Minorities 2.8% 3.1% 1.7% .1% .1% 0.0% 5.6% 6.2% 3.4% 
Others 28.4% 26.0% 36.7% 28.5% 27.5% 32.0% 28.3% 24.6% 41.4% 
Total 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 
 
Table 9: Average Number of Household Members 
 Total Dhankuta Dhanusa 
MEAN Total VDC Muni. Total VDC 
Muni
. Total VDC 
Muni
. 
Number of Households Members: Male 3.01 3.04 2.91 2.67 2.72 2.47 3.35 3.35 3.36 
Number of Households Members: Female 2.87 2.85 2.92 2.74 2.79 2.54 3.00 2.92 3.30 
Number of Households Members: Total 5.88 5.89 5.84 5.40 5.51 5.01 6.36 6.27 6.66 
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Table 10: Occupation of the Respondents 
 Total Dhankuta Dhanusa 
 Total VDC Muni. Total VDC Muni. Total VDC Muni. 
 N= 
3200 
N =  
2500 
N =  
700 
N =  
1600 
N =  
1250 
N =  
350 
N =  
1600 
N = 
1250 
N =  
350 
Working 11.1% 10.8% 12.3% 9.8% 9.0% 12.6% 12.5% 12.6% 12.0% 
Self-employed 43.4% 44.4% 39.6% 62.5% 64.2% 56.6% 24.3% 24.7% 22.6% 
Unemployed 12.4% 15.2% 2.1% 2.1% 2.3% 1.4% 22.6% 28.2% 2.9% 
Retired .9% .9% .9% .8% .6% 1.1% 1.0% 1.1% .6% 
Student 1.0% .9% 1.4% 1.2% .9% 2.3% .9% 1.0% .6% 
Housewife 31.2% 27.7% 43.7% 23.7% 23.0% 26.0% 38.8% 32.4% 61.4% 
Total 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 
 
Table 11: Main Source of Family Income 
 Total Dhankuta Dhanusa 
 Total VDC Muni. Total VDC Muni. Total VDC Muni. 
 N= 
3200 
N = 
 2500 
N =  
700 
N =  
1600 
N =  
1250 
N = 
 350 
N =  
1600 
N = 
1250 
N = 
 350 
Agriculture 37.2% 42.8% 17.0% 41.3% 47.9% 17.7% 33.0% 37.7% 16.3% 
Livestock 2.4% 3.0% .3% 3.8% 4.7% .3% 1.1% 1.4% .3% 
Job 11.0% 8.8% 18.9% 9.2% 7.1% 16.6% 12.9% 10.6% 21.1% 
Business 16.6% 12.2% 32.1% 16.8% 8.9% 44.9% 16.4% 15.5% 19.4% 
Remittance 24.8% 26.0% 20.3% 23.6% 26.6% 12.9% 25.9% 25.4% 27.7% 
Pension 1.0% .9% 1.3% 1.8% 1.6% 2.3% .2% .2% .3% 
Other non-farming  
activities 7.1% 6.2% 10.1% 3.6% 3.1% 5.4% 10.6% 9.4% 14.9% 
Total 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 
 
Table 42: Total Monthly Household Income 
 Total Dhankuta Dhanusa 
 Total VDC Muni. Total VDC Mun Total VDC Mun 
 N= 
3200 
N = 
 2500 
N = 
 700 
N = 
 1600 
N =  
1250 
N =  
350 
N =  
1600 
N = 
1250 
N = 
 350 
NRs.5,000 or less 16.9% 19.1% 8.9% 12.6% 15.3% 2.9% 21.2% 23.0% 14.9% 
NRs.5,001 - NRs.10,000 26.9% 29.2% 18.7% 29.8% 35.2% 10.6% 24.0% 23.2% 26.9% 
NRs.10,001 - NRs.15,000 23.6% 22.6% 27.0% 20.4% 21.5% 16.6% 26.7% 23.7% 37.4% 
NRs.15,001 - NRs.20,000 17.9% 16.0% 24.6% 18.2% 14.9% 30.0% 17.6% 17.1% 19.1% 
More than NRs.20,001 14.8% 13.1% 20.9% 19.0% 13.1% 40.0% 10.6% 13.0% 1.7% 
Total 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 
 
Table 53: QUESTION: For how many years have you been living in this place? 
 Total Dhankuta Dhanusa 
Mean Total VDC Muni. Total VDC Muni. Total VDC Muni. 
Total Number of Years 26.1 28.3 18.3 23.2 25.8 13.8 29.0 30.8 22.7 
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Table 64: QUESTION: Could you please mention whether you own the house that you are living in? 
 Total Dhankuta Dhanusa 
 Total VDC Muni. Total VDC Muni. Total VDC Muni. 
 N= 
3200 
N =  
2500 
N =  
700 
N =  
1600 
N = 
 1250 
N =  
350 
N =  
1600 
N = 
1250 
N = 
 350 
Yes 93.7% 97.4% 80.6% 87.9% 95.0% 62.3% 99.5% 99.7% 98.9% 
No 6.3% 2.6% 19.4% 12.1% 5.0% 37.7% .5% .3% 1.1% 
Total 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 
 
Table 75: QUESTION: Could you please mention whether you own land (agricultural and non-
agricultural) 
 Total Dhankuta Dhanusa 
 Total VDC Muni. Total VDC Muni. Total VDC Muni. 
 N= 
3200 
N = 
 2500 
N =  
700 
N =  
1600 
N =  
1250 
N =  
350 
N =  
1600 
N =  
1250 
N =  
350 
Yes 91.2% 93.9% 81.4% 94.6% 95.2% 92.3% 87.8% 92.6% 70.6% 
No 8.8% 6.1% 18.6% 5.4% 4.8% 7.7% 12.3% 7.4% 29.4% 
Total 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 
 
Table 86: QUESTION: Could you please mention the number of floors in your house? 
 Total Dhankuta Dhanusa 
 Total VDC Muni. Total VDC Muni. Total VDC Muni. 
 N= 
3200 
N =  
2500 
N =  
700 
N= 
3200 
N = 
 2500 
N = 
 700 
N= 
3200 
N =  
2500 
N =  
700 
1.0 60.9% 60.0% 64.1% 25.8% 23.6% 33.4% 96.1% 96.5% 94.9% 
2.0 27.6% 28.8% 23.3% 51.4% 54.1% 41.7% 3.8% 3.4% 4.9% 
3.0 10.7% 10.9% 10.1% 21.3% 21.7% 20.0% .1% .1% .3% 
4.0 .5% .2% 1.6% 1.1% .5% 3.1% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 
5.0 .2% .1% .7% .4% .2% 1.4% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 
6.0 .0% 0.0% .1% .1% 0.0% .3% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 
Total 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 
 
Table 97: QUESTION: What type of toilet facility are you using in your household? 
 Total Dhankuta Dhanusa 
 Total VDC Muni. Total VDC Muni. Total VDC Muni. 
 N= 
3200 
N =  
2500 
N = 
 700 
N= 
3200 
N = 
 2500 
N = 
 700 
N= 
3200 
N = 
2500 
N =  
700 
Flush toilet (public 
sewerage) 1.4% 1.8% .3% .9% 1.0% .6% 1.9% 2.5% 0.0% 
Flush toilet (septic tank) 38.8% 33.2% 58.7% 44.3% 36.1% 73.7% 33.2% 30.2% 43.7% 
Ordinary toilet 
(conventional pit) 34.6% 39.2% 18.1% 52.1% 59.8% 24.3% 17.1% 18.5% 12.0% 
No toilet 25.3% 25.9% 22.9% 2.7% 3.0% 1.4% 47.8% 48.8% 44.3% 
Total 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 
 
Perceptions of Education Outputs and Outcomes 
One of the objectives of the survey was to assess the condition of local service delivery in different 
VDCs and the municipality of the two districts in terms of the quality of schools and education in 
general. Hence the respondents were first asked if they had any school age children or children 
enrolled from class 1 to 10 in their households. The enrollment rate was observed to be high in both 
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the rural and urban areas with over 95% of the households mentioning that they had children going to 
school. It was observed that 5% of the households had only some or none of their children going to 
school for which the most common reason stated was that the kids did not show interest in going to 
school. The other reasons stated for non-attendance are listed in Table 19.1. At the VDC/municipality 
level, it was seen that the non-enrollment rates were relatively more significant in Basbitti, Lohana and 
Sapahi VDCs of Dhanusa. It was observed that many children in these VDCs from a Muslim 
background attend Madrassas (religious schools) which have not been legally authorized by the 
government and haven’t been considered as schools in this survey. 
 
Table 108: School going children in the household 
 Total Dhankuta Dhanusa 
 Total VDC Muni. Total VDC Muni. Total VDC Muni. 
 N= 
3200 
N =  
2500 
N =  
700 
N =  
1600 
N =  
1250 
N =  
350 
N =  
1600 
N =  
1250 
N = 
 350 
All going 92.0% 92.0% 92.3% 95.1% 94.2% 98.6% 88.9% 89.8% 86.0% 
Some going / some not 
going 3.2% 2.8% 4.9% 1.1% 1.3% .6% 5.3% 4.2% 9.1% 
All not going 1.8% 1.9% 1.6% .8% .9% .6% 2.9% 3.0% 2.6% 
No children going to 
school: class 1 to 10 2.9% 3.4% 1.3% 2.9% 3.7% .3% 2.9% 3.0% 2.3% 
Total 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 
 
Table 18.1: QUESTION: Why don’t all of the children attend School? State reasons 
 Total Dhankuta Dhanusa 
 Total VDC Muni. Total VDC Muni. Total VDC Muni. 
 N = 
162 
N = 
117 
N =  
45 
N = 
 31 
N = 
 27 
N = 
 4 
N = 
131 
N = 
 90 
N = 
 41 
The school is located far .6% 0.0% 2.2% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% .8% 0.0% 2.4% 
The kid didn't show any interest in 
going school 43.8% 40.2% 53.3% 25.8% 25.9% 25.0% 48.1% 44.4% 56.1% 
The education is not job oriented 1.2% 1.7% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 1.5% 2.2% 0.0% 
The child left school for marrying 1.9% .9% 4.4% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 2.3% 1.1% 4.9% 
The child is still small to attend 
school 8.0% 7.7% 8.9% 3.2% 0.0% 25.0% 9.2% 10.0% 7.3% 
The child is planning to go abroad 
for studies 1.2% 1.7% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 1.5% 2.2% 0.0% 
Due to poor health condition of child 5.6% 6.8% 2.2% 16.1% 18.5% 0.0% 3.1% 3.3% 2.4% 
We need the child to carry out other 
works (household, business etc.) 4.9% 4.3% 6.7% 3.2% 3.7% 0.0% 5.3% 4.4% 7.3% 
The child failed in exam so he left 
school 1.9% 2.6% 0.0% 9.7% 11.1% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 
Due to lack of legal documents 
(citizenship, birth certificate) 4.3% 2.6% 8.9% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 5.3% 3.3% 9.8% 
Due to religious reason 2.5% 3.4% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 3.1% 4.4% 0.0% 
Due to lack of appropriate 
environment for studies 1.2% 1.7% 0.0% 3.2% 3.7% 0.0% .8% 1.1% 0.0% 
Due to financial crisis 26.5% 29.1% 20.0% 41.9% 40.7% 50.0% 22.9% 25.6% 17.1% 
Due to lack of disabled friendly 
school 1.9% 2.6% 0.0% 9.7% 11.1% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 
Due to lack of awareness regarding 
the importance of educating children 1.9% 2.6% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 2.3% 3.3% 0.0% 
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Table 18.2: School going children in the household by gender 
 Total Dhankuta Dhanusa 
 Total VDC Muni. Total VDC Muni. Total VDC Muni. 
 Sum Sum Sum Sum Sum Sum Sum Sum Sum 
Male - total 2,978 2,298 680 1,300 1,031 269 1,678 1,267 411 
Male - enrolled in school 97% 97% 96% 98% 98% 99% 96% 97% 94% 
Male - not enrolled in school 3% 3% 4% 2% 2% 1% 4% 3% 6% 
Female - total 2,738 2,093 645 1,262 994 268 1,476 1,099 377 
Female - enrolled in school 96% 96% 95% 99% 99% 99% 94% 94% 93% 
Female - not enrolled in school 4% 4% 5% 1% 1% 1% 6% 6% 7% 
 
Table 19: Means of transportation used to go to school 
 Total Dhankuta Dhanusa 
 Total VDC Muni. Total VDC Muni. Total VDC Muni. 
 N =  
2953 
N = 
 2323 
N =  
630 
N =  
1509 
N =  
1178 
N = 
 331 
N =  
1444 
N = 
1145 
N = 
 299 
On foot 92.9% 92.8% 93.3% 98.5% 98.5% 98.5% 87.1% 87.0% 87.6% 
Bicycle 8.6% 8.7% 7.9% .2% .3% 0.0% 17.3% 17.5% 16.7% 
Motorcycle .4% .3% 1.0% .2% .1% .6% .6% .4% 1.3% 
School Bus/Van 2.4% 2.1% 3.8% .7% .6% .9% 4.3% 3.6% 7.0% 
Public transportation .7% .9% .2% 1.4% 1.8% 0.0% .1% 0.0% .3% 
Others .6% .6% .6% .3% .3% .3% 1.0% 1.0% 1.0% 
Asked to those who are sending children to school (grade 1 - 10)  
 
Table 110: QUESTION: How long does it take for them to reach school? 
 Total Dhankuta Dhanusa 
Average time taken on: Total VDC Muni. Total VDC Muni. Total VDC Muni. 
Foot 20 21 15 23 26 13 16 15 18 
Bicycle 22 23 15 15 15   22 23 15 
Motorcycle 14 21 7 9 20 4 16 21 9 
School bus/ban 23 27 15 24 31 8 23 26 16 
Public transportation 17 17 10 17 17   10   10 
Other means 4 5 1 3 4 1 4 5 1 
 
Table 121: QUESTION: What was the average age when the children in your household started primary 
school? 
 Total Dhankuta Dhanusa 
(Mean) Total VDC Muni. Total VDC Muni. Total VDC Muni. 
Male 5.83 5.63 6.61 5.78 5.75 5.88 5.87 5.53 7.33 
Female 5.75 5.61 6.29 5.74 5.74 5.76 5.77 5.49 6.79 
 
The respondents were also asked to give their opinion on the overall quality of primary education 
provided by public schools in their localities. Around 56% replied that the quality was around average. 
Almost one third of the respondents rated the quality of primary education as good with slight 
variations across the two districts. Regarding their opinion on the quality of secondary education 
provided by the public schools, around half of the respondents across all the VDCs and municipalities 
in the two districts felt that the quality was average and 35.7% felt that the quality was good. A 
relatively higher proportion of respondents from Dhankuta perceived the quality of secondary 
education provided by public schools to be good in comparison to the respondents in Dhanusa. 
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At the VDC/municipality level, it was observed that the respondents of Lohana and Sapahi in Dhanusa 
had the most negative view on the quality of primary public schools. Additionally, the respondents of 
Sapahi VDC had the most negative perception of secondary public schools. The most positive views 
about both primary and secondary public schools were expressed by respondents in Rajarani, where 
almost 3/4 mentioned that the secondary schools were good or very good. Overall, it was seen that the 
respondents in Dhankuta had a more positive opinion about the quality of public schools, with over 
40% regarding the quality to be good or very good in all localities with the exception of Bhirgaun. 
Similarly, the respondents were asked to assess the overall quality of primary and secondary education 
provided by private schools in their localities. Over one third of the VDC respondents in Dhankuta 
mentioned that there were no private schools providing primary education in their locality. Over half 
of the VDC respondents from Dhankuta mentioned that private schools providing secondary education 
were also not available in their locality. However, it has to be noted that those respondents who were 
aware of the quality of primary or secondary education being provided by private schools were mostly 
positive and perceived that the quality of education provided was good or very good. In comparison to 
public schools, a relatively higher proportion of respondents perceived the quality of education (both 
primary and secondary) provided by private schools as good or very good. 
Overall, 15-20% of the respondents were seen to be more satisfied with the quality of private than with 
public schools, both primary and secondary. Apparently, there were no private schools in Bhirgaun 
and Vedetar, while in Rajarani VDC of Dhankuta there is no private secondary school. 
 
Table 13: QUESTION: Could you please mention your opinion about the overall quality of education 
provided by the PUBLIC SCHOOLS in this VDC/Municipality: primary education? 
 Total Dhankuta Dhanusa 
 Total VDC Muni. Total VDC Muni. Total VDC Muni. 
 N =  
3200 
N =  
2500 
N =  
700 
N =  
1600 
N =  
1250 
N = 
 350 
N =  
1600 
N = 
1250 
N =  
350 
Don't Know 1.7% 1.4% 2.9% 1.8% 1.0% 4.3% 1.7% 1.8% 1.4% 
Not Applicable 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 
Not Available 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 
Very bad .5% .4% .7% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% .9% .8% 1.4% 
Bad 8.5% 7.3% 12.7% 3.1% 2.9% 3.7% 13.9% 11.7% 21.7% 
Average 55.9% 57.2% 51.6% 55.8% 57.6% 49.1% 56.1% 56.7% 54.0% 
Good 31.2% 31.1% 31.3% 36.9% 35.8% 41.1% 25.4% 26.5% 21.4% 
Very Good 2.3% 2.6% .9% 2.5% 2.7% 1.7% 2.0% 2.6% 0.0% 
Total 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 
 
Table 23: QUESTION: Could you please mention your opinion about the overall quality of education 
provided by the PUBLIC SCHOOLS in this VDC/Municipality: secondary education? 
 Total Dhankuta Dhanusa 
 Total VDC Muni. Total VDC Muni. Total VDC Muni. 
 N =  
3200 
N = 
 2500 
N =  
700 
N =  
1600 
N =  
1250 
N =  
350 
N =  
1600 
N = 
1250 
N =  
350 
Don't Know 2.4% 1.9% 4.3% 1.7% .8% 4.9% 3.2% 3.0% 3.7% 
Not Applicable 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 
Not Available .7% .8% 0.0% .3% .3% 0.0% 1.1% 1.4% 0.0% 
Very Bad .6% .6% .6% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 1.2% 1.2% 1.1% 
Bad 7.3% 6.8% 8.9% 2.6% 2.2% 3.7% 11.9% 11.4% 14.0% 
Average 49.8% 49.9% 49.3% 49.1% 49.4% 48.0% 50.4% 50.3% 50.6% 
Good 35.7% 35.8% 35.0% 41.3% 41.1% 41.7% 30.1% 30.6% 28.3% 
Very Good 3.7% 4.1% 2.0% 5.1% 6.1% 1.7% 2.2% 2.2% 2.3% 
Total 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 
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Table 144: QUESTION: Could you please mention your opinion about the overall quality of education 
provided by the PRIVATE SCHOOLS in this VDC/Municipality: primary education? 
 Total Dhankuta Dhanusa 
 Total VDC Muni. Total VDC Muni. Total VDC Muni. 
 N =  
3200 
N = 
 2500 
N =  
700 
N = 
 1600 
N = 
 1250 
N =  
350 
N = 
 1600 
N = 
 1250 
N = 
 350 
Don't Know 14.3% 17.3% 3.4% 8.3% 9.0% 6.0% 20.2% 25.6% .9% 
Not Applicable 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 
Not Available 14.8% 18.7% .6% 28.4% 36.1% 1.1% 1.1% 1.4% 0.0% 
Very Bad 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 
Bad .4% .5% .1% .4% .5% 0.0% .5% .6% .3% 
Average 14.6% 15.1% 12.7% 17.1% 17.0% 17.7% 12.1% 13.3% 7.7% 
Good 44.6% 39.6% 62.6% 43.3% 35.8% 70.3% 45.9% 43.4% 54.9% 
Very Good 11.4% 8.8% 20.6% 2.4% 1.8% 4.9% 20.3% 15.8% 36.3% 
Total 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 
 
Table 155: QUESTION: Could you please mention your opinion about the overall quality of education 
provided by the PRIVATE SCHOOLS in this VDC/Municipality: secondary education? 
 Total Dhankuta Dhanusa 
 Total VDC Muni. Total VDC Muni. Total VDC Muni. 
 N =  
3200 
N =  
2500 
N =  
700 
N =  
1600 
N =  
1250 
N = 
 350 
N =  
1600 
N =  
1250 
N =  
350 
Don't Know 17.6% 21.4% 3.7% 8.8% 9.6% 6.0% 26.3% 33.3% 1.4% 
Not Applicable 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 
Not Available 24.5% 31.2% .6% 41.1% 52.3% 1.1% 7.9% 10.2% 0.0% 
Very Bad 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 
Bad .4% .4% .3% .4% .5% .3% .4% .4% .3% 
Average 10.7% 10.4% 11.7% 11.6% 10.4% 16.0% 9.8% 10.5% 7.4% 
Good 35.9% 28.6% 62.3% 36.3% 26.4% 71.7% 35.6% 30.7% 52.9% 
Very Good 10.8% 7.9% 21.4% 1.7% .8% 4.9% 20.0% 15.0% 38.0% 
Total 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 
 
Table 26:16 QUESTION: How would you assess the PUBLIC PRIMARY SCHOOL in your 
VDC/Municipality in terms of the following aspects: Quality of classroom? 
 Total Dhankuta Dhanusa 
 Total VDC Muni. Total VDC Muni. Total VDC Muni. 
 N = 
 3200 
N = 
 2500 
N = 
 700 
N = 
 1600 
N = 
 1250 
N = 
 350 
N =  
1600 
N = 
 1250 
N = 
 350 
Don't Know 3.0% 2.2% 5.6% 3.3% 2.1% 7.4% 2.7% 2.4% 3.7% 
Not Applicable 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 
Not Available 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 
Very Bad .9% 1.0% .4% .1% .1% 0.0% 1.8% 2.0% .9% 
Bad 8.5% 8.8% 7.3% 1.5% 1.0% 3.1% 15.5% 16.6% 11.4% 
Average 45.5% 45.6% 45.0% 42.9% 45.4% 34.3% 48.0% 45.8% 55.7% 
Good 37.9% 37.3% 40.1% 49.1% 47.8% 53.4% 26.8% 26.8% 26.9% 
Very Good 4.2% 5.0% 1.6% 3.2% 3.6% 1.7% 5.3% 6.3% 1.4% 
Total 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 
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Table 27: QUESTION: How would you assess the PUBLIC PRIMARY SCHOOL in your 
VDC/Municipality in terms of the following aspects: Teachers qualification? 
 Total Dhankuta Dhanusa 
 Total VDC Muni. Total VDC Muni. Total VDC Muni. 
 N =  
3200 
N = 
 2500 
N =  
700 
N = 
 1600 
N =  
1250 
N =  
350 
N = 
 1600 
N = 
 1250 
N =  
350 
Don't Know 14.4% 11.3% 25.3% 9.3% 8.0% 14.0% 19.4% 14.6% 36.6% 
Not Applicable 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 
Not Available 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 
Very Bad .2% .2% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% .3% .4% 0.0% 
Bad 2.8% 2.6% 3.4% 1.2% 1.0% 2.0% 4.3% 4.2% 4.9% 
Average 37.8% 40.3% 28.6% 31.1% 32.8% 25.1% 44.4% 47.8% 32.0% 
Good 40.7% 40.7% 40.6% 53.8% 53.5% 54.9% 27.6% 27.9% 26.3% 
Very Good 4.3% 4.9% 2.1% 4.6% 4.7% 4.0% 4.0% 5.0% .3% 
Total 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 
 
Table 28: QUESTION: How would you assess the PUBLIC PRIMARY SCHOOL in your 
VDC/Municipality in terms of the following aspects: Availability of teachers? 
 Total Dhankuta Dhanusa 
 Total VDC Muni. Total VDC Muni. Total VDC Muni. 
 N =  
3200 
N =  
2500 
N = 
 700 
N =  
1600 
N = 
 1250 
N = 
 350 
N = 
 1600 
N =  
1250 
N = 
 350 
Don't Know 9.8% 7.2% 19.1% 10.1% 8.6% 15.7% 9.6% 5.9% 22.6% 
Not Applicable 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 
Not Available 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 
Very Bad .3% .2% 1.0% .1% .1% 0.0% .6% .2% 2.0% 
Bad 4.8% 3.8% 8.1% 2.3% 2.3% 2.0% 7.3% 5.4% 14.3% 
Average 41.5% 44.2% 32.1% 34.1% 37.3% 22.9% 48.9% 51.0% 41.4% 
Good 39.3% 40.0% 36.9% 47.6% 45.7% 54.3% 31.1% 34.4% 19.4% 
Very Good 4.2% 4.6% 2.7% 5.9% 6.1% 5.1% 2.4% 3.0% .3% 
Total 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 
 
Table 29: QUESTION: Could you please mention how you would assess the following physical 
condition/infrastructure of the PUBLIC SECONDARY SCHOOL in your VDC/Municipality: Building? 
 Total Dhankuta Dhanusa 
 Total VDC Muni. Total VDC Muni. Total VDC Muni. 
 N = 
 3200 
N = 
 2500 
N =  
700 
N =  
1600 
N = 
 1250 
N = 
 350 
N = 
 1600 
N =  
1250 
N =  
350 
Don't Know .8% .9% .4% .5% .6% 0.0% 1.1% 1.2% .9% 
Not Applicable .7% .8% 0.0% .3% .3% 0.0% 1.1% 1.4% 0.0% 
Not Available 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 
Very Bad .3% .3% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% .5% .6% 0.0% 
Bad 2.0% 2.1% 1.6% .9% 1.1% 0.0% 3.1% 3.0% 3.1% 
Average 33.5% 35.9% 24.7% 23.1% 25.0% 16.3% 43.9% 46.9% 33.1% 
Good 53.3% 49.6% 66.6% 64.5% 61.5% 75.1% 42.1% 37.6% 58.0% 
Very Good 9.6% 10.4% 6.7% 10.8% 11.4% 8.6% 8.3% 9.3% 4.9% 
Total 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 
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Table 30: QUESTION: Could you please mention how you would assess the following physical 
condition/infrastructure of the PUBLIC SECONDARY SCHOOL in your VDC/Municipality: Toilet 
facility? 
 Total Dhankuta Dhanusa 
 Total VDC Muni. Total VDC Muni. Total VDC Muni. 
 N =  
3200 
N = 
 2500 
N = 
 700 
N =  
1600 
N =  
1250 
N = 
 350 
N = 
 1600 
N = 
 1250 
N = 
 350 
Don't Know 4.0% 3.4% 5.9% 3.4% 3.5% 3.1% 4.5% 3.4% 8.6% 
Not Applicable .7% .8% 0.0% .3% .3% 0.0% 1.1% 1.4% 0.0% 
Not Available 4.5% 5.8% 0.0% .2% .2% 0.0% 8.8% 11.3% 0.0% 
Very Bad 1.2% 1.5% .1% .2% .2% .3% 2.3% 2.9% 0.0% 
Bad 7.9% 9.0% 3.9% 3.6% 3.6% 3.7% 12.1% 14.4% 4.0% 
Average 42.8% 42.1% 45.0% 39.5% 41.2% 33.4% 46.0% 43.0% 56.6% 
Good 36.5% 34.6% 43.4% 49.3% 47.1% 57.1% 23.8% 22.1% 29.7% 
Very Good 2.5% 2.7% 1.7% 3.5% 3.8% 2.3% 1.5% 1.6% 1.1% 
Total 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 
 
Table 31: QUESTION: How would you assess the PUBLIC SECONDARY SCHOOL in your 
VDC/Municipality in terms of the following aspects: Quality of Classroom? 
 Total Dhankuta Dhanusa 
 Total VDC Muni. Total VDC Muni. Total VDC Muni. 
 N = 
 3200 
N =  
2500 
N = 
 700 
N =  
1600 
N =  
1250 
N = 
 350 
N = 
 1600 
N = 
 1250 
N = 
 350 
Don't Know 3.0% 2.5% 5.0% 3.0% 2.3% 5.4% 3.1% 2.6% 4.6% 
Not Applicable .7% .8% 0.0% .3% .3% 0.0% 1.1% 1.4% 0.0% 
Not Available 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 
Very Bad .2% .2% .1% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% .3% .3% .3% 
Bad 4.1% 4.4% 3.1% .7% .6% 1.1% 7.6% 8.2% 5.1% 
Average 39.6% 41.0% 34.6% 31.6% 33.5% 24.9% 47.6% 48.6% 44.3% 
Good 46.2% 44.0% 54.1% 57.3% 55.0% 65.7% 35.1% 33.0% 42.6% 
Very Good 6.2% 7.1% 3.0% 7.1% 8.3% 2.9% 5.3% 5.9% 3.1% 
Total 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 
 
Table 32: QUESTION: How would you assess the PUBLIC SECONDARY SCHOOL in your 
VDC/Municipality in terms of the following aspects: Teachers qualification? 
 Total Dhankuta Dhanusa 
 Total VDC Muni. Total VDC Muni. Total VDC Muni. 
 N = 
 3200 
N =  
2500 
N = 
 700 
N =  
1600 
N =  
1250 
N = 
 350 
N = 
 1600 
N = 
 1250 
N = 
 350 
Don't Know 14.8% 11.2% 27.4% 8.3% 7.4% 11.7% 21.2% 15.0% 43.1% 
Not Applicable .7% .8% 0.0% .3% .3% 0.0% 1.1% 1.4% 0.0% 
Not Available 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 
Very Bad .2% .3% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% .4% .6% 0.0% 
Bad 1.8% 2.1% 1.0% .5% .5% .6% 3.2% 3.7% 1.4% 
Average 23.9% 25.0% 19.7% 22.8% 24.7% 16.0% 24.9% 25.4% 23.4% 
Good 51.2% 52.2% 47.6% 59.2% 57.6% 64.9% 43.1% 46.7% 30.3% 
Very Good 7.5% 8.4% 4.3% 8.9% 9.5% 6.9% 6.1% 7.3% 1.7% 
Total 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 
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Table 33: QUESTION: How would you assess the PUBLIC SECONDARY SCHOOL in your 
VDC/Municipality in terms of the following aspects: Availability of teachers? 
  Total Dhankuta Dhanusa 
 Total VDC Muni. Total VDC Muni. Total VDC Muni. 
 N = 
 3200 
N =  
2500 
N = 
 700 
N =  
1600 
N =  
1250 
N = 
 350 
N = 
 1600 
N = 
 1250 
N = 
 350 
Don't Know 10.8% 8.1% 20.4% 9.3% 8.2% 13.4% 12.3% 8.1% 27.4% 
Not Applicable .7% .8% 0.0% .3% .3% 0.0% 1.1% 1.4% 0.0% 
Not Available 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 
Very Bad .1% .1% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% .2% .2% 0.0% 
Bad 2.9% 2.6% 4.0% 1.3% 1.3% 1.1% 4.6% 3.9% 6.9% 
Average 36.6% 38.5% 29.9% 27.9% 30.9% 17.4% 45.3% 46.1% 42.3% 
Good 42.8% 43.2% 41.0% 51.2% 48.6% 60.3% 34.3% 37.8% 21.7% 
Very Good 6.2% 6.6% 4.7% 10.1% 10.7% 7.7% 2.3% 2.5% 1.7% 
Total 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 
 
Table 34: QUESTION: Could you please mention whether teachers in the PUBLIC PRIMARY SCHOOL 
in your VDC/Municipality are always available for full time during school days? 
  Total Dhankuta Dhanusa 
 Total VDC Muni. Total VDC Muni. Total VDC Muni. 
 N = 
 3200 
N =  
2500 
N = 
 700 
N =  
1600 
N =  
1250 
N = 
 350 
N = 
 1600 
N = 
 1250 
N = 
 350 
Yes 75.2% 78.6% 63.1% 80.1% 82.1% 73.1% 70.3% 75.1% 53.1% 
No 10.9% 10.8% 11.4% 5.1% 5.8% 2.9% 16.8% 15.8% 20.0% 
Don't Know 13.8% 10.6% 25.4% 14.8% 12.2% 24.0% 12.9% 9.0% 26.9% 
Total 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 
 
Table 35: QUESTION: Could you please mention whether teachers in the PUBLIC SECONDARY 
SCHOOL in your VDC/Municipality are always available for full time during school days? 
  Total Dhankuta Dhanusa 
 Total VDC Muni. Total VDC Muni. Total VDC Muni. 
 N = 
 3200 
N =  
2500 
N = 
 700 
N =  
1600 
N =  
1250 
N = 
 350 
N = 
 1600 
N = 
 1250 
N = 
 350 
Yes 75.3% 78.4% 64.0% 81.7% 83.8% 74.0% 68.8% 73.0% 54.0% 
No 8.0% 8.6% 5.9% 3.3% 3.1% 3.7% 12.8% 14.2% 8.0% 
Don't Know 16.7% 13.0% 30.1% 15.1% 13.0% 22.3% 18.4% 12.9% 38.0% 
Total 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 
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Responsibility for Ensuring Quality Education 
It was observed that around half of the respondents regarded the School Management Committee to be 
the most responsible for the quality of both primary and secondary education in their 
VDC/municipality. The District Education Office was somewhat regarded as the second important 
entity after the School Management Committee to be responsible for the quality of education, 
particularly by the respondents of Dhanusa. Even within Dhanusa district, a significant proportion of 
respondents of Labatoli and Umaprempur VDCs regarded the DEO as being the second most 
important entity after the School Management Committee responsible for quality education. 
Most of the respondents felt that the VDC/municipality officials are only little to somewhat concerned 
about the quality of education with variations across the two districts. Over half of the respondents of 
VDCs in Dhanusa stated that these officials were not concerned about the quality of education at all. 
The responses in Dhankuta indicate that the population thinks that the VDC is concerned about the 
quality of education, in particular in Vedetar and Rajarani VDCs. Whereas in Dhanusa the majority of 
respondents in Lohana and Janakpur perceive that the VDC/municipality does not care about the 
quality of education while other VDCs in this district have a more positive view. 
The question whether respondents felt that the DDC officials were concerned about the quality of 
education, around one fourth were not able to answer while over one fourth felt that they were 
somewhat concerned. In Dhankuta, similar to respondents’ views on VDCs, there is a sense that the 
DDC cares about education, whereas in Dhanusa about half the respondents in Lohana and in Janakpur 
perceive that DDC officials do not care about the quality of education. 
 
Table 36: QUESTION: In your opinion which entity do you hold MOST RESPONSIBLE for the 
QUALITY OF PRIMARY EDUCATION in your VDC/Municipality? 
 Total Dhankuta Dhanusa 
 Total VDC Muni. Total VDC Muni. Total VDC Muni. 
 N = 
 3200 
N =  
2500 
N = 
 700 
N =  
1600 
N =  
1250 
N = 
 350 
N = 
 1600 
N = 
 1250 
N = 
 350 
School Management 
Committee 50.3% 51.3% 46.6% 59.3% 58.3% 62.6% 41.3% 44.3% 30.6% 
Social Audit Committee .4% .4% .7% .4% .4% .3% .5% .3% 1.1% 
Village Education 
Committee 2.6% 2.6% 2.6% 2.6% 3.0% 1.1% 2.5% 2.1% 4.0% 
Village Development 
Committee (VDC) 8.6% 10.2% 2.7% 2.8% 3.0% 2.3% 14.4% 17.5% 3.1% 
District Education 
Committee 2.0% 2.0% 1.9% 1.1% 1.0% 1.7% 2.8% 3.0% 2.0% 
District Development 
Committee (DDC) .4% .3% 1.0% .6% .6% .6% .3% 0.0% 1.4% 
District Education Office 
(DEO) 10.3% 10.9% 8.4% 5.5% 4.8% 8.0% 15.2% 17.0% 8.9% 
Department of education 
(DoE) .5% .5% .6% .8% .9% .3% .3% .2% .9% 
Ministry of Education 
(MoE) 2.9% 3.0% 2.4% 4.4% 5.1% 2.0% 1.3% .9% 2.9% 
Other 5.9% 5.7% 6.9% 7.2% 7.3% 6.9% 4.7% 4.1% 6.9% 
Don't Know 16.0% 13.2% 26.3% 15.4% 15.7% 14.3% 16.7% 10.6% 38.3% 
Total 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 
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Table 37: QUESTION: In your opinion which entity do you hold MOST RESPONSIBLE for the 
QUALITY OF SECONDARY EDUCATION in your VDC/Municipality? 
 Total Dhankuta Dhanusa 
 Total VDC Muni. Total VDC Muni. Total VDC Muni. 
 N = 
 3200 
N =  
2500 
N = 
 700 
N =  
1600 
N =  
1250 
N = 
 350 
N = 
 1600 
N = 
 1250 
N = 
 350 
School Management 
Committee 48.4% 50.4% 41.1% 57.1% 57.8% 54.9% 39.7% 43.1% 27.4% 
Social Audit Committee .3% .3% .4% .4% .5% .3% .2% .1% .6% 
Village Education 
Committee 1.8% 2.0% 1.3% 2.1% 2.6% .6% 1.6% 1.4% 2.0% 
Village Development 
Committee (VDC) 7.9% 9.8% .9% 2.3% 2.5% 1.4% 13.5% 17.2% .3% 
District Education 
Committee 2.7% 2.4% 3.9% 1.7% 1.2% 3.4% 3.7% 3.5% 4.3% 
District Development 
Committee (DDC) .8% .6% 1.4% 1.3% 1.2% 1.7% .3% 0.0% 1.1% 
District Education Office 
(DEO) 11.5% 11.0% 13.0% 6.4% 4.7% 12.3% 16.6% 17.4% 13.7% 
Department of education 
(DoE) .8% .6% 1.6% .9% .9% .9% .7% .2% 2.3% 
Ministry of Education 
(MoE) 2.8% 3.0% 2.4% 4.4% 5.0% 2.3% 1.3% .9% 2.6% 
Other 5.9% 5.7% 6.7% 7.3% 7.4% 6.6% 4.6% 3.9% 6.9% 
Don't Know 17.1% 14.2% 27.3% 16.1% 16.2% 15.7% 18.1% 12.2% 38.9% 
Total 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 
 
Table 38: QUESTION: In your opinion, how concerned are the VDC/Municipalities officials with the 
quality of education in your VDC/Municipality? 
   Total Dhankuta Dhanusa 
  Total VDC Muni. Total VDC Muni. Total VDC Muni. 
 N = 
 3200 
N =  
2500 
N = 
 700 
N =  
1600 
N =  
1250 
N = 
 350 
N = 
 1600 
N = 
 1250 
N = 
 350 
Very concerned 4.9% 2.0% 2.8% 2.4% 6.8% 18.0% 2.3% 2.8% 6.0% 
Somewhat concerned 35.3% 21.6% 36.4% 36.8% 71.2% 70.4% 27.7% 11.2% 56.0% 
A little concerned 24.6% 23.2% 26.8% 31.2% 14.4% 5.2% 19.7% 21.2% 25.2% 
Not concerned at all 16.2% 20.8% 4.0% 12.8% 2.8% 0.0% 14.6% 52.4% 8.4% 
Don't Know 19.0% 32.4% 30.0% 16.8% 4.8% 6.4% 35.7% 12.4% 4.4% 
Total 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 
 
Table 39: QUESTION: In your opinion, how concerned are the DDC officials with the quality of 
education in your VDC/Municipality? 
  Total Dhankuta Dhanusa 
  Total VDC Muni. Total VDC Muni. Total VDC Muni. 
 N = 
 3200 
N =  
2500 
N = 
 700 
N =  
1600 
N =  
1250 
N = 
 350 
N = 
 1600 
N = 
 1250 
N = 
 350 
Very concerned 3.6% 4.1% 1.6% 5.4% 6.2% 2.9% 1.7% 2.1% .3% 
Somewhat concerned 27.2% 31.0% 13.6% 37.9% 41.9% 23.7% 16.4% 20.1% 3.4% 
A little concerned 26.8% 30.1% 14.9% 21.3% 22.6% 16.6% 32.3% 37.6% 13.1% 
Not concerned at all 17.0% 13.1% 31.0% 8.8% 7.7% 12.9% 25.3% 18.6% 49.1% 
Don't Know 25.4% 21.6% 39.0% 26.5% 21.6% 44.0% 24.4% 21.7% 34.0% 
Total 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 
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The respondents were also asked if people in their village/community area were able to influence the 
quality of education. Over 42% replied that they were not able to do so. Over 36% of the respondents 
mentioned that they did not know if they would be able to influence the quality of education. 
Similarly, almost half of the respondents were of the view that the village and community members 
are not able to influence the spending on education in their VDC/municipality. However, it was 
observed that the proportion of respondents who believed that they could influence the quality of 
education in their VDC/municipality was higher than those who felt that they could influence spending 
on education. Across the VDCs and municipality, the majority of respondents of Pakhribas, 
Hathikharka, Lohana and Janakpur VDCs/municipality feel that they cannot influence the quality or 
the spending on education. 
 
Table 40: QUESTION: In your opinion, are the members in your village/community area able to influence 
the quality of education in your VDC/Municipality? 
  Total Dhankuta Dhanusa 
 Total VDC Muni. Total VDC Muni. Total VDC Muni. 
 N = 
 3200 
N =  
2500 
N = 
 700 
N =  
1600 
N =  
1250 
N = 
 350 
N = 
 1600 
N = 
 1250 
N = 
 350 
Yes 21.3% 20.8% 23.4% 25.4% 22.8% 34.6% 17.3% 18.7% 12.3% 
No 42.2% 40.6% 48.0% 37.3% 39.5% 29.4% 47.1% 41.6% 66.6% 
Don't Know 36.5% 38.7% 28.6% 37.3% 37.7% 36.0% 35.6% 39.7% 21.1% 
Total 100.0% 
100.0
% 
100.0
% 
100.0
% 
100.0
% 
100.0
% 
100.0
% 
100.0
% 
100.0
% 
 
Table 40.1: QUESTION: How are the members in your village/community able to influence quality? 
 Total Dhankuta Dhanusa 
 Total VDC Muni. Total VDC Muni. Total VDC Muni. 
 N = 
683 
N = 
519 
N = 
164 
N = 
406 
N = 
285 
N = 
121 
N = 
277 
N = 
234 
N =  
43 
By playing direct roles to 
improve the quality of 
education (monitoring teachers 
performance) 
66.3% 64.7% 71.3% 63.1% 59.3% 71.9% 71.1% 71.4% 69.8% 
By forming SMC with active 
members and making it active 6.7% 6.7% 6.7% 5.7% 4.9% 7.4% 8.3% 9.0% 4.7% 
By giving advice to different 
authorities 2.8% 2.9% 2.4% 3.2% 3.5% 2.5% 2.2% 2.1% 2.3% 
By approaching concerned 
authorities for improving 
quality of education and 
necessary educational materials 
8.8% 7.5% 12.8% 11.1% 10.9% 11.6% 5.4% 3.4% 16.3% 
By being concerned with the 
quality of education 13.8% 11.9% 19.5% 20.2% 18.9% 23.1% 4.3% 3.4% 9.3% 
By being concerned with / 
involved in the activities 
related to education 
18.6% 17.9% 20.7% 22.2% 21.1% 24.8% 13.4% 14.1% 9.3% 
By reporting the issues related 
with education to concerned 
authorities 
3.7% 3.7% 3.7% 3.9% 4.6% 2.5% 3.2% 2.6% 7.0% 
By assisting school with 
physical/financial means 4.1% 4.0% 4.3% 6.4% 6.7% 5.8% .7% .9% 0.0% 
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Table 171: QUESTION: In your opinion, are the members in your village/community able to influence 
spending on education in your VDC/Municipality? 
  Total Dhankuta Dhanusa 
 Total VDC Muni. Total VDC Muni. Total VDC Muni. 
 N = 
 3200 
N =  
2500 
N = 
 700 
N =  
1600 
N =  
1250 
N = 
 350 
N = 
 1600 
N = 
 1250 
N = 
 350 
Yes 12.3% 11.9% 13.9% 13.1% 10.3% 22.9% 11.6% 13.5% 4.9% 
No 49.9% 48.5% 54.9% 45.7% 48.5% 35.7% 54.1% 48.5% 74.0% 
Don't Know 37.8% 39.6% 31.3% 41.3% 41.2% 41.4% 34.3% 38.0% 21.1% 
Total 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 
 
Table 41.1: QUESTION: How are the members in your village/community able to influence spending? 
 Total Dhankuta Dhanusa 
 Total VDC Muni. Total VDC Muni. Total VDC Muni. 
 N = 
395 
N = 
298 
N = 
 97 
N = 
209 
N = 
129 
N =  
80 
N = 
186 
N = 
169 
N = 
 17 
By demanding for proper 
utilization and transparency of 
budget 
41.0% 44.3% 30.9% 34.4% 34.1% 35.0% 48.4% 52.1% 11.8% 
By offering resources (land, 
labor, money, other educational 
materials) 
48.9% 43.6% 64.9% 61.7% 60.5% 63.8% 34.4% 30.8% 70.6% 
By approaching to the 
authorities for assistance 
(financial, educational materials) 
to the school 
11.4% 12.4% 8.2% 8.6% 10.1% 6.3% 14.5% 14.2% 17.6% 
By complaining the corruption 
and irregularities to the 
concerned authorities 
.3% .3% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% .5% .6% 0.0% 
By participating in the activities 
like meetings, public hearings 
related to education 
5.6% 3.0% 13.4% 7.7% 3.1% 15.0% 3.2% 3.0% 5.9% 
By paying tuition fee on time .3% .3% 0.0% .5% .8% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 
By requesting to allocate more 
budget/financial assistance 4.8% 3.7% 8.2% 7.2% 6.2% 8.8% 2.2% 1.8% 5.9% 
By requesting school to decrease 
the fee .3% 0.0% 1.0% .5% 0.0% 1.3% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 
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Table 42: QUESTION: Could you please give us your opinion about the benefits of educating your 
children? 
 Total Dhankuta Dhanusa 
 Total VDC Muni. Total VDC Muni. Total VDC Muni. 
 N = 
2953 
N = 
2323 
N = 
630 
N = 
1509 
N = 
1178 
N = 
331 
N = 
1444 
N = 
1145 
N = 
299 
Will go abroad 3.5% 3.9% 2.1% 1.0% 1.1% .6% 6.2% 6.8% 3.7% 
Will do business 1.7% .9% 4.4% 1.1% .5% 3.0% 2.4% 1.4% 6.0% 
Will develop English language 
skills .5% .2% 1.6% .5% .3% .9% .6% .1% 2.3% 
The prospect of getting a job is 
better (Teacher, Doctor, 
Engineer, Gov. Officials etc.) 
27.6% 23.7% 42.1% 18.9% 16.4% 27.8% 36.7% 31.2% 57.9% 
Will be well educated, 
disciplined, successful, 
respected and have bright future 
71.0% 71.1% 70.6% 83.0% 83.7% 80.7% 58.4% 58.1% 59.5% 
Will be smart, clever and 
updated with current happenings 1.5% 1.5% 1.4% 2.7% 2.8% 2.1% .3% .2% .7% 
Will be easier for them to get 
married 1.1% 1.2% .8% .3% .3% 0.0% 1.9% 2.0% 1.7% 
To make good politician in 
village .0% .0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% .1% .1% 0.0% 
They will get better opportunity .2% .1% .6% .4% .2% 1.2% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 
They can serve the society and 
country 1.0% 1.2% .5% 1.7% 2.0% .6% .3% .3% .3% 
Family will have prestige in the 
society .9% .9% .8% 1.2% 1.3% .9% .6% .6% .7% 
They will be economically 
independent, have secured life 
and take care of family 
14.3% 15.1% 11.3% 18.0% 18.0% 17.8% 10.4% 12.1% 4.0% 
Did not mention .5% .6% .5% .5% .4% .6% .6% .7% .3% 
 
Participation and Representation in Associations and Committees 
Table 43: QUESTION: Are you aware of the Parents Teachers Association (PTA) in your children’s 
school? 
  Total Dhankuta Dhanusa 
 Total VDC Muni. Total VDC Muni. Total VDC Muni. 
 N =  
2953 
N = 
 2323 
N =  
630 
N = 
 1509 
N =  
1178 
N =  
331 
N = 
 1444 
N =  
1145 
N =  
299 
Yes 21.7% 21.6% 22.1% 34.3% 36.1% 28.1% 8.5% 6.7% 15.4% 
No 78.3% 78.4% 77.9% 65.7% 63.9% 71.9% 91.5% 93.3% 84.6% 
Total 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 
Asked to those who are sending children to school (grade 1 - 10) 
 
Table 44: QUESTION: Have you ever been asked to participate in the any of the meetings of PTA? 
  Total Dhankuta Dhanusa 
 Total VDC Muni. Total VDC Muni. Total VDC Muni. 
 N = 
 641 
N = 
 502 
N = 
 139 
N = 
 518 
N = 
 425 
N =  
93 
N = 
 123 
N =  
77 
N =  
46 
Yes 79.7% 83.7% 65.5% 90.5% 91.5% 86.0% 34.1% 40.3% 23.9% 
No 20.3% 16.3% 34.5% 9.5% 8.5% 14.0% 65.9% 59.7% 76.1% 
Total 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 
Asked only to those who are aware of PTA (B35 = Yes) 
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Table 45: QUESTION: Are you aware of the process how parents are selected / elected to be in the PTA? 
  Total Dhankuta Dhanusa 
 Total VDC Muni. Total VDC Muni. Total VDC Muni. 
 N =  
641 
N =  
502 
N =  
139 
N =  
518 
N = 
 425 
N =  
93 
N =  
123 
N = 
 77 
N = 
 46 
Yes 81.9% 83.1% 77.7% 82.0% 83.1% 77.4% 81.3% 83.1% 78.3% 
No 18.1% 16.9% 22.3% 18.0% 16.9% 22.6% 18.7% 16.9% 21.7% 
Total 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 
Asked only to those who are aware of PTA (B35 = Yes) 
 
Table 46: QUESTION: Can you explain how they are selected / elected to be in the PTA? 
  Total Dhankuta Dhanusa 
 Total VDC Muni. Total VDC Muni. Total VDC Muni. 
 N =  
525 
N =  
417 
N = 
 108 
N= 
 425 
N = 
 353 
N = 
 72 
N = 
 100 
N =  
64 
N = 
 36 
Through Election 14.9% 13.7% 19.4% 14.1% 12.2% 23.6% 18.0% 21.9% 11.1% 
Consensus among 
parents 78.1% 82.0% 63.0% 78.8% 83.9% 54.2% 75.0% 71.9% 80.6% 
Consensus with 
political parties 1.5% 1.4% 1.9% 1.6% 1.7% 1.4% 1.0% 0.0% 2.8% 
Consensus with the 
headmaster/principal 3.6% 1.9% 10.2% 3.1% 1.1% 12.5% 6.0% 6.3% 5.6% 
Others 1.9% 1.0% 5.6% 2.4% 1.1% 8.3% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 
Total 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 
Asked to those who are aware of the process how parents are selected/elected to be in the PTA (B37 = Yes) 
 
Table 418: QUESTION: Are you aware of the School Management Committee (SMC) in your children’s 
school? 
  Total Dhankuta Dhanusa 
 Total VDC Muni. Total VDC Muni. Total VDC Muni. 
 N =  
2953 
N =  
2323 
N =  
630 
N =  
1509 
N =  
1178 
N =  
331 
N =  
1444 
N = 
1145 
N =  
299 
Yes 47.4% 51.7% 31.9% 47.1% 49.2% 39.6% 47.9% 54.2% 23.4% 
No 52.6% 48.3% 68.1% 52.9% 50.8% 60.4% 52.1% 45.8% 76.6% 
Total 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 
Asked to those who are sending children to school (grade 1 - 10) 
 
Table 48: QUESTION: Have you ever been asked to participate in the any of the meetings of SMC? 
  Total Dhankuta Dhanusa 
 Total VDC Muni. Total VDC Muni. Total VDC Muni. 
 N =  
1401 
N =  
1200 
N =  
201 
N =  
710 
N =  
579 N = 131 
N =  
691 
N =  
621 
N =  
70 
Yes 66.7% 69.8% 48.3% 79.4% 81.9% 68.7% 53.7% 58.6% 10.0% 
No 33.3% 30.2% 51.7% 20.6% 18.1% 31.3% 46.3% 41.4% 90.0% 
Total 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 
Asked to those who are aware of School Management Committee (B39 = Yes) 
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Table 49: QUESTION: Are you aware of the process how parents are selected / elected to be in the SMC? 
  Total Dhankuta Dhanusa 
 Total VDC Muni. Total VDC Muni. Total VDC Muni. 
 N =  
1401 
N =  
1200 
N =  
201 
N =  
710 
N =  
579 N = 131 
N =  
691 
N =  
621 
N =  
70 
Yes 82.8% 85.0% 69.7% 78.0% 80.3% 67.9% 87.7% 89.4% 72.9% 
No 17.2% 15.0% 30.3% 22.0% 19.7% 32.1% 12.3% 10.6% 27.1% 
Total 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 
Asked to those who are aware of School Management Committee (B39 = Yes) 
 
Table 50: QUESTION: Can you explain how they are selected / elected to be in the SMC? 
  Total Dhankuta Dhanusa 
 Total VDC Muni. Total VDC Muni. Total VDC Muni. 
 N =  
1160 
N =  
1020 
N =  
140 
N =  
554 
N =  
465 
N =  
89 
N =  
606 
N =  
555 
N =  
51 
Through Election 40.2% 40.3% 39.3% 28.2% 25.6% 41.6% 51.2% 52.6% 35.3% 
Consensus among parents 52.0% 52.8% 45.7% 65.9% 70.1% 43.8% 39.3% 38.4% 49.0% 
Consensus with political 
parties 2.1% 2.0% 2.9% .7% .6% 1.1% 3.3% 3.1% 5.9% 
Consensus with the 
headmaster/principal 5.0% 4.8% 6.4% 3.6% 3.4% 4.5% 6.3% 5.9% 9.8% 
Others .8% .1% 5.7% 1.6% .2% 9.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 
Total 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 
Asked to those who are aware of the process how parents are selected/elected to be in the PTA (B37 = Yes) 
 
Table 51: QUESTION: Are you represented in the school? 
  Total Dhankuta Dhanusa 
 Total VDC Muni. Total VDC Muni. Total VDC Muni. 
 N =  
2953 
N =  
2323 
N =  
630 
N =  
1509 
N =  
1178 
N =  
331 
N =  
1444 
N =  
1145 
N =  
299 
Yes 11.4% 12.0% 9.2% 17.6% 18.9% 13.0% 4.9% 4.9% 5.0% 
No 88.6% 88.0% 90.8% 82.4% 81.1% 87.0% 95.1% 95.1% 95.0% 
Total 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 
Asked to those who are sending children to school (grade 1 - 10) 
 
Table 52: QUESTION: If yes, how are you represented? 
  Total Dhankuta Dhanusa 
 Total VDC Muni. Total VDC Muni. Total VDC Muni. 
 N =  
337 
N =  
279 
N =  
58 
N = 
266 
N =  
223 
N = 
 43 
N =  
71 
N =  
56 
N  
= 15 
Through Involvement in the School 
Management Committee 78.9% 83.5% 56.9% 81.2% 83.4% 69.8% 70.4% 83.9% 20.0% 
Through Involvement in the Parent 
Teacher Association 35.0% 33.3% 43.1% 38.7% 39.5% 34.9% 21.1% 8.9% 66.7% 
Through Village Education 
Committee 3.0% 3.2% 1.7% 1.5% 1.8% 0.0% 8.5% 8.9% 6.7% 
Through District Education 
Committee .6% .7% 0.0% .8% .9% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 
Through Social Audit Committee 1.5% 1.1% 3.4% 1.9% 1.3% 4.7% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 
Through Others 1.5% 1.1% 3.4% .8% .4% 2.3% 4.2% 3.6% 6.7% 
Total 78.9% 83.5% 56.9% 81.2% 83.4% 69.8% 70.4% 83.9% 20.0% 
Asked to those who are represented in school (B43 = Yes) 
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Table 53: QUESTION: Could you please mention if you/parents can influence the contribution made by 
VDC/Municipality/DDC to the provision of education to your children? 
  Total Dhankuta Dhanusa 
 Total VDC Muni. Total VDC Muni. Total VDC Muni. 
 N =  
2953 
N =  
2323 
N =  
630 
N =  
1509 
N =  
1178 
N =  
331 
N =  
1444 
N =  
1145 
N =  
299 
Yes 34.9% 38.8% 20.6% 37.2% 38.9% 31.1% 32.6% 38.8% 9.0% 
No 65.1% 61.2% 79.4% 62.8% 61.1% 68.9% 67.4% 61.2% 91.0% 
Total 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 
Asked to those who are sending children to school (grade 1 - 10) 
 
Table 54: QUESTION: Who do you think should be approached for making complaints regarding quality 
and service delivery of education in this VDC/Municipality? 
  Total Dhankuta Dhanusa 
 Total VDC Muni. Total VDC Muni. Total VDC Muni. 
 N= 
3200 
N =  
2500 
N = 
 700 
N =  
1600 
N = 
 1250 
N = 
 350 
N = 
 1600 
N = 
1250 
N = 
 350 
School Management 
Committee 37.2% 40.4% 25.7% 56.3% 60.4% 41.7% 18.1% 20.4% 9.7% 
School Headmaster/ 
Principal 83.5% 83.8% 82.6% 83.2% 85.4% 75.4% 83.9% 82.2% 89.7% 
VDC/ Municipality 17.4% 20.8% 5.3% 7.6% 8.8% 3.4% 27.1% 32.7% 7.1% 
DDC 2.1% 2.4% 1.1% 3.1% 3.4% 2.0% 1.1% 1.4% .3% 
District Education Office 9.1% 7.9% 13.4% 11.5% 9.0% 20.6% 6.7% 6.8% 6.3% 
District Administrative 
Office 1.1% .8% 2.1% 1.1% .6% 2.6% 1.1% .9% 1.7% 
Others 1.1% .9% 1.7% 1.6% 1.1% 3.4% .5% .6% 0.0% 
Total 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 
 
Table 55: QUESTION: In comparison to last three years, what is your opinion regarding the quality of 
education provided by the public schools in your VDC/Municipality? 
  Total Dhankuta         Dhanusa 
 Total VDC Muni. Total VDC Muni. Total                                VDC Muni. 
 N= 
3200 
N =  
2500 
N = 
 700 
N =  
1600 
N = 
 1250 
N = 
 350 
N = 
 1600 
N = 
1250 
N = 
 350 
Improved 63.9% 65.8% 57.1% 70.7% 73.0% 62.3% 57.1% 58.5% 52.0% 
Remained the same 25.7% 25.4% 26.7% 19.1% 17.8% 23.4% 32.3% 33.0% 30.0% 
Worse 6.3% 5.3% 10.0% 5.8% 5.4% 7.1% 6.8% 5.1% 12.9% 
Don't know 4.1% 3.6% 6.1% 4.4% 3.7% 7.1% 3.8% 3.4% 5.1% 
Total 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 
 
Table 56: QUESTION: In comparison to last three years, what is your opinion regarding the 
infrastructure of the public schools in your VDC/Municipality? 
  Total Dhankuta Dhanusa 
 Total VDC Muni. Total VDC Muni. Total VDC Muni. 
 N= 
3200 
N =  
2500 
N = 
 700 
N =  
1600 
N = 
 1250 
N = 
 350 
N = 
 1600 
N = 
1250 
N = 
 350 
Improved 71.7% 70.6% 75.3% 83.4% 84.0% 81.4% 59.9% 57.3% 69.1% 
Remained the same 24.7% 26.4% 18.4% 13.1% 13.3% 12.3% 36.3% 39.5% 24.6% 
Worse 1.3% 1.1% 2.1% .6% .5% 1.1% 2.0% 1.7% 3.1% 
Don't know 2.4% 1.9% 4.1% 2.9% 2.2% 5.1% 1.9% 1.5% 3.1% 
Total 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 
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Local Road Infrastructure 
Table 519: QUESTION: How frequently do you/your family members travel: Within the 
VDC/Municipality? 
  Total Dhankuta Dhanusa 
 Total VDC Muni. Total VDC Muni. Total VDC Muni. 
 N= 
3200 
N =  
2500 
N = 
 700 
N =  
1600 
N = 
 1250 
N = 
 350 
N = 
 1600 
N = 1250 N = 
 350 
Everyday 97.8% 97.6% 98.7% 97.4% 96.8% 99.7% 98.2% 98.3% 97.7% 
2-3 times a week .8% .7% 1.1% .4% .5% 0.0% 1.3% 1.0% 2.3% 
Once a week .5% .6% 0.0% .5% .6% 0.0% .4% .6% 0.0% 
1-2 times a month .6% .7% .1% 1.0% 1.2% .3% .1% .2% 0.0% 
1-2 times in three months .3% .4% 0.0% .7% .9% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 
Once a year 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 
Less than once a year 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 
Never 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 
Total 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 
 
Table 20: QUESTION: How frequently do you/your family members travel: Within the district? 
  Total Dhankuta Dhanusa 
 Total VDC Muni. Total VDC Muni. Total VDC Muni. 
 N= 
3200 
N =  
2500 
N = 
 700 
N =  
1600 
N = 
 1250 
N = 
 350 
N = 
 1600 
N = 1250 N = 
 350 
Everyday 14.1% 16.7% 4.9% 8.4% 9.8% 3.4% 19.8% 23.5% 6.3% 
2-3 times a week 5.5% 5.3% 6.3% 4.1% 3.2% 7.4% 6.9% 7.4% 5.1% 
Once a week 11.0% 10.4% 12.9% 11.8% 11.0% 14.9% 10.1% 9.9% 10.9% 
1-2 times a month 40.2% 37.7% 49.0% 36.4% 37.7% 31.7% 44.0% 37.8% 66.3% 
1-2 times in three months 26.8% 27.0% 26.0% 34.9% 33.1% 41.1% 18.8% 21.0% 10.9% 
Once a year .9% 1.1% 0.0% 1.4% 1.8% 0.0% .3% .4% 0.0% 
Less than once a year .4% .4% .4% .8% .9% .3% .1% 0.0% .6% 
Never 1.1% 1.2% .6% 2.2% 2.5% 1.1% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 
Total 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 
 
Table 59: QUESTION: How frequently do you/your family members travel: Outside the district? 
  Total Dhankuta Dhanusa 
 Total VDC Muni. Total VDC Muni. Total VDC Muni. 
 N= 
3200 
N =  
2500 
N = 
 700 
N =  
1600 
N = 
 1250 
N = 
 350 
N = 
 1600 
N = 
1250 
N = 
 350 
Everyday .4% .4% .4% .4% .3% .6% .4% .5% .3% 
2-3 times a week .6% .5% .9% .9% .7% 1.7% .3% .3% 0.0% 
Once a week 1.3% 1.4% .9% 1.9% 2.1% 1.4% .6% .7% .3% 
1-2 times a month 9.3% 8.4% 12.6% 13.2% 11.9% 17.7% 5.4% 4.8% 7.4% 
1-2 times in three months 70.1% 68.4% 76.0% 64.9% 62.5% 73.7% 75.3% 74.4% 78.3% 
Once a year 9.5% 10.7% 5.1% 6.9% 8.4% 1.4% 12.1% 13.0% 8.9% 
Less than once a year 4.3% 4.8% 2.6% 3.5% 4.2% .9% 5.1% 5.4% 4.3% 
Never 4.5% 5.4% 1.6% 8.3% 9.8% 2.6% .8% .9% .6% 
Total 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 
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Table 60: QUESTION: Generally which mode of transportation do you / your family members use to 
travel: Within the VDC/Municipality? 
  Total Dhankuta Dhanusa 
 Total VDC Muni. Total VDC Muni. Total VDC Muni. 
 N= 
3200 
N =  
2500 
N = 
 700 
N =  
1600 
N = 
 1250 
N = 
 350 
N = 
 1600 
N = 
1250 
N = 
 350 
On Foot/ Walking 78.1% 75.9% 86.1% 81.9% 79.5% 90.6% 74.3% 72.2% 81.7% 
Bicycle 11.4% 12.7% 7.0% .3% .3% .3% 22.6% 25.0% 13.7% 
Motorcycle 2.5% 1.7% 5.4% 2.2% .9% 6.9% 2.9% 2.6% 4.0% 
Private vehicle .3% .3% 0.0% .5% .6% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 
Public Vehicle 7.7% 9.4% 1.4% 15.1% 18.6% 2.3% .3% .2% .6% 
Taxi 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 
Others 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 
Not Applicable 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 
Total 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 
 
Table 61: QUESTION: Generally which mode of transportation do you / your family members use to 
travel: Within the district? 
  Total Dhankuta Dhanusa 
 Total VDC Muni. Total VDC Muni. Total VDC Muni. 
 N= 
3200 
N =  
2500 
N = 
 700 
N =  
1600 
N = 
 1250 
N = 
 350 
N = 
 1600 
N = 
1250 
N = 
 350 
On Foot/ Walking 6.6% 7.6% 3.0% 9.4% 10.5% 5.4% 3.8% 4.6% .6% 
Bicycle 4.8% 5.8% 1.1% .3% .3% 0.0% 9.3% 11.3% 2.3% 
Motorcycle 5.6% 4.6% 8.9% 3.6% 1.5% 10.9% 7.6% 7.8% 6.9% 
Private vehicle 1.3% 1.5% .6% 1.0% 1.2% .3% 1.6% 1.8% .9% 
Public Vehicle 80.6% 79.1% 85.7% 83.4% 83.8% 82.0% 77.7% 74.4% 89.4% 
Taxi .1% .1% 0.0% .1% .1% 0.0% .1% .2% 0.0% 
Others .1% .0% .1% .1% .1% .3% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 
Not Applicable 1.1% 1.2% .6% 2.2% 2.5% 1.1% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 
Total 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 
 
Table 62: QUESTION: Generally which mode of transportation do you / your family members use to 
travel: Outside the district? 
  Total Dhankuta Dhanusa 
 Total VDC Muni. Total VDC Muni. Total VDC Muni. 
 N= 
3200 
N =  
2500 
N = 
 700 
N =  
1600 
N = 
 1250 
N = 
 350 
N = 
 1600 
N = 
1250 
N = 
 350 
On Foot/ Walking .0% .0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% .1% .1% 0.0% 
Bicycle .2% .3% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% .4% .6% 0.0% 
Motorcycle 2.4% 2.4% 2.7% 1.6% .9% 4.0% 3.3% 3.8% 1.4% 
Private vehicle 1.8% 2.0% .9% 1.1% 1.0% 1.1% 2.5% 3.0% .6% 
Public Vehicle 90.8% 89.7% 94.4% 88.8% 88.1% 91.4% 92.7% 91.4% 97.4% 
Taxi .2% .2% .1% .2% .2% .3% .2% .2% 0.0% 
Others .1% 0.0% .3% .1% 0.0% .6% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 
Not Applicable 4.5% 5.4% 1.6% 8.3% 9.8% 2.6% .8% .9% .6% 
Total 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 
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Table 63: QUESTION: What is your opinion about the quality of transport and roads in your 
VDC/Municipality: Quality of roads? 
  Total Dhankuta Dhanusa 
 Total VDC Muni. Total VDC Muni. Total VDC Muni. 
 N= 
3200 
N =  
2500 
N = 
 700 
N =  
1600 
N = 
 1250 
N = 
 350 
N = 
 1600 
N = 
1250 
N = 
 350 
Don't Know .4% .5% .1% .3% .2% .3% .6% .7% 0.0% 
Very Bad 11.2% 10.3% 14.6% 4.7% 5.2% 2.9% 17.8% 15.4% 26.3% 
Bad 40.2% 39.2% 43.6% 28.1% 28.3% 27.4% 52.2% 50.1% 59.7% 
Average 36.1% 36.8% 33.9% 50.8% 49.8% 54.3% 21.4% 23.7% 13.4% 
Good 10.4% 11.2% 7.7% 14.4% 14.2% 14.9% 6.4% 8.1% .6% 
Very Good 1.7% 2.1% .1% 1.8% 2.2% .3% 1.6% 2.1% 0.0% 
Total 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 
 
Table 21: QUESTION: What is your opinion about the quality of transport and roads in your 
VDC/Municipality: Quality of transport? 
  Total Dhankuta Dhanusa 
 Total VDC Muni. Total VDC Muni. Total VDC Muni. 
 N= 
3200 
N =  
2500 
N = 
 700 
N =  
1600 
N = 
 1250 
N = 
 350 
N = 
 1600 
N = 
1250 
N = 
 350 
Don't Know .8% .9% .4% .6% .5% .9% 1.0% 1.3% 0.0% 
Very Bad 20.7% 25.9% 2.0% 18.5% 23.1% 2.0% 22.8% 28.6% 2.0% 
Bad 22.7% 22.5% 23.4% 18.2% 18.2% 18.3% 27.2% 26.8% 28.6% 
Average 42.1% 36.2% 63.1% 45.8% 41.0% 62.9% 38.4% 31.4% 63.4% 
Good 12.7% 13.2% 10.9% 15.5% 15.4% 15.7% 9.8% 10.9% 6.0% 
Very Good 1.1% 1.4% .1% 1.4% 1.8% .3% .8% 1.0% 0.0% 
Total 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 
 
Table 65: QUESTION: In your opinion which entity do you hold MOST RESPONSIBLE for the 
QUALITY OF RURAL ROADS in your VDC/Municipality? 
  Total Dhankuta Dhanusa 
 Total VDC Muni. Total VDC Muni. Total VDC Muni. 
 N= 
3200 
N =  
2500 
N = 
 700 
N =  
1600 
N = 
 1250 
N = 
 350 
N = 
 1600 
N = 
1250 
N = 
 350 
Users Committee 20.7% 20.8% 20.3% 33.6% 34.4% 30.9% 7.7% 7.1% 9.7% 
VDC 62.6% 60.5% 70.1% 42.6% 38.9% 55.7% 82.7% 82.2% 84.6% 
DDC 8.8% 9.9% 5.1% 8.9% 9.8% 6.0% 8.8% 10.0% 4.3% 
Department of Local 
Infrastructure and 
Agricultural Roads 
6.1% 6.9% 3.3% 11.8% 13.4% 6.0% .4% .4% .6% 
Ministry of Federal 
Affairs and Local 
Development 
1.8% 1.9% 1.1% 3.1% 3.5% 1.4% .4% .3% .9% 
Total 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 
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Table 66: QUESTION: In your opinion which entity do you hold MOST RESPONSIBLE for the 
QUALITY OF TRANSPORT in your VDC/Municipality? 
  Total Dhankuta Dhanusa 
 Total VDC Muni. Total VDC Muni. Total VDC Muni. 
 N= 
3200 
N =  
2500 
N = 
 700 
N =  
1600 
N = 
 1250 
N = 
 350 
N = 
 1600 
N = 
1250 
N = 
 350 
VDC 65.5% 64.1% 70.4% 50.3% 48.4% 57.1% 80.6% 79.8% 83.7% 
DDC 15.9% 18.0% 8.1% 14.9% 16.7% 8.6% 16.8% 19.4% 7.7% 
Department of Local 
Infrastructure and 
Agricultural Roads 
2.4% 2.3% 2.7% 4.4% 4.3% 4.9% .3% .2% .6% 
Ministry of Federal 
Affairs and Local 
Development 
1.6% 1.6% 1.7% 2.9% 2.9% 2.9% .4% .3% .6% 
Public sector 
transport/Bus Companies 12.6% 12.4% 13.6% 24.1% 24.6% 22.6% 1.1% .2% 4.6% 
Private sector 
transport/Bus Companies 2.0% 1.6% 3.4% 3.3% 3.1% 4.0% .8% .2% 2.9% 
Total 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 
 
Table 67: QUESTION: Who do you think should be approached for making complaints regarding quality 
and service delivery of road and transportation in this VDC/Municipality? 
  Total Dhankuta Dhanusa 
 Total VDC Muni. Total VDC Muni. Total VDC Muni. 
 N= 
3200 
N =  
2500 
N = 
 700 
N =  
1600 
N = 
 1250 
N = 
 350 
N = 
 1600 
N = 
1250 
N = 
 350 
Users Committee 28.6% 29.8% 24.4% 44.9% 48.2% 33.4% 12.3% 11.4% 15.4% 
VDC/ Municipality 77.9% 78.2% 76.9% 69.3% 69.9% 67.1% 86.5% 86.5% 86.6% 
DDC 20.7% 22.6% 13.9% 21.9% 22.9% 18.6% 19.4% 22.2% 9.1% 
District Administrative 
Office 4.8% 4.8% 4.4% 7.9% 8.2% 6.9% 1.6% 1.5% 2.0% 
Others 3.3% 1.7% 8.9% 4.9% 2.9% 12.3% 1.6% .6% 5.4% 
Total 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 
 
Table 68: QUESTION: How much do you pay? 
  Total Dhankuta Dhanusa 
 Total VDC Muni. Total VDC Muni. Total VDC Muni. 
 Mean Mean Mean Mean Mean Mean Mean Mean Mean 
How much do you pay for 
transport every month 667 675 639 871 863 900 464 489 378 
How much does your 
household pay for transport 
every month 
1520 1521 1520 2031 2022 2064 1013 1024 976 
 
Table 69: QUESTION: Could you please mention if members of your community/village are able to 
INFLUENCE THE QUALITY OF ROADS in your VDC/Municipality? 
  Total Dhankuta Dhanusa 
 Total VDC Muni. Total VDC Muni. Total VDC Muni. 
 N= 
3200 
N =  
2500 
N = 
 700 
N =  
1600 
N = 
 1250 
N = 
 350 
N = 
 1600 
N = 
1250 
N = 
 350 
Yes 19.9 % 18.7% 24.1% 22.7% 19.9% 32.6% 17.1% 17.4% 15.7% 
No 47.1% 46.6% 48.9% 45.3% 47.5% 37.4% 48.8% 45.6% 60.3% 
Don't Know 33.1% 34.8% 27.0% 32.0% 32.6% 30.0% 34.1% 37.0% 24.0% 
Total 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 
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Table 69.1: QUESTION: How are the members of your community/village able to influence the quality of 
roads? 
 Total Dhankuta Dhanusa 
 Total VDC Muni. Total VDC Muni. Total VDC Muni. 
 N = 
636 
N = 
467 
N = 
169 
N = 
363 
N = 
249 
N = 
114 
N = 
273 
N = 
218 
N = 
  55 
By raising awareness on road 
related issues 27.2% 25.5% 32.0% 32.0% 30.1% 36.0% 20.9% 20.2% 23.6% 
By the proper management of roads 12.3% 6.9% 27.2% 14.9% 9.6% 26.3% 8.8% 3.7% 29.1% 
By volunteering in road 
construction/repair and maintenance 
of roads 
31.1% 30.6% 32.5% 30.0% 32.1% 25.4% 32.6% 28.9% 47.3% 
By demanding for transparency in 
expenses 14.8% 13.7% 17.8% 14.3% 9.6% 24.6% 15.4% 18.3% 3.6% 
By demanding for the involvement 
of different stakeholders during 
planning stage 
3.9% 4.7% 1.8% 6.9% 8.8% 2.6% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 
By offering resources (labor, land, 
money) 7.4% 8.4% 4.7% 8.5% 10.0% 5.3% 5.9% 6.4% 3.6% 
By empowering local people .8% 1.1% 0.0% 1.4% 2.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 
By requesting for necessary budget 7.5% 6.9% 9.5% 6.9% 8.0% 4.4% 8.4% 5.5% 20.0% 
By seeking recommendations from 
different authorities 3.3% 3.0% 4.1% 5.0% 4.4% 6.1% 1.1% 1.4% 0.0% 
By being helpful and active 
engagement/involvement in 
different tasks 
24.1% 25.3% 20.7% 23.4% 23.7% 22.8% 24.9% 27.1% 16.4% 
By requesting for timely 
maintenance and repair works of 
nearby roads 
1.9% .9% 4.7% 1.4% .8% 2.6% 2.6% .9% 9.1% 
 
Table 70: QUESTION: Could you please mention if members of your community/village are able to 
INFLUENCE SPENDING ON NEW ROADS in your VDC/Municipality? 
  Total Dhankuta Dhanusa 
 Total VDC Muni. Total VDC Muni. Total VDC Muni. 
 N= 
3200 
N =  
2500 
N = 
 700 
N =  
1600 
N = 
 1250 
N = 
 350 
N = 
 1600 
N = 
1250 
N = 
 350 
Yes 14.9% 13.6% 19.7% 18.0% 14.1% 32.0% 11.8% 13.0% 7.4% 
No 50.8% 50.5% 51.7% 49.2% 52.7% 36.6% 52.3% 48.2% 66.9% 
Don't Know 34.3% 36.0% 28.6% 32.8% 33.2% 31.4% 35.9% 38.7% 25.7% 
Total 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 
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Table 70.1: QUESTION: How are the members of your community/village able to influence the spending 
on new roads? 
 Total Dhankuta Dhanusa 
 Total VDC Muni. Total VDC Muni. Total VDC Muni. 
 N = 
477 
N = 
339 
N = 
138 
N = 
288 
N = 
176 
N = 
112 
N = 
189 
N = 
163 
N = 
 26 
By demanding for proper 
utilization and transparency of 
budget 
28.5% 33.3% 16.7% 22.6% 24.4% 19.6% 37.6% 42.9% 3.8% 
By being aware and concerned 
regarding the road infrastructure 1.0% 1.2% .7% 1.0% 1.1% .9% 1.1% 1.2% 0.0% 
By offering resources (land, labor, 
money) 69.6% 65.5% 79.7% 79.2% 78.4% 80.4% 55.0% 51.5% 76.9% 
By seeking recommendations 
from different authorities .4% .6% 0.0% .7% 1.1% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 
By giving out application for 
construction of roads where there 
is none 
3.1% 1.5% 7.2% 2.8% 1.1% 5.4% 3.7% 1.8% 15.4% 
By assuring that the work 
progresses only after the 
consensus between Local 
authorities and villagers 
2.3% .3% 7.2% 3.1% .6% 7.1% 1.1% 0.0% 7.7% 
By paying taxes on time .2% 0.0% .7% .3% 0.0% .9% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 
By making collective request for 
budget/financial assistance 8.4% 8.0% 9.4% 8.3% 8.5% 8.0% 8.5% 7.4% 15.4% 
 
Table 71: QUESTION: In comparison to last three years, what is your opinion regarding the quality of 
roads and transport in your VDC/Municipality? 
  Total Dhankuta Dhanusa 
 Total VDC Muni. Total VDC Muni. Total VDC Muni. 
 N= 
3200 
N =  
2500 
N = 
 700 
N =  
1600 
N = 
 1250 
N = 
 350 
N = 
 1600 
N = 
1250 
N = 
 350 
Improved 37.9% 38.5% 35.9% 57.4% 58.1% 54.9% 18.5% 19.0% 16.9% 
Remained the same 49.7% 50.4% 47.3% 34.6% 35.5% 31.4% 64.8% 65.3% 63.1% 
Worse 11.0% 10.1% 14.3% 6.2% 5.2% 9.7% 15.8% 15.0% 18.9% 
Don't know 1.3% 1.0% 2.6% 1.8% 1.2% 4.0% .9% .8% 1.1% 
Total 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 
 
Table 72: QUESTION: In comparison to last three years, what is your opinion regarding the road 
infrastructure in your VDC/Municipality? 
  Total Dhankuta Dhanusa 
 Total VDC Muni. Total VDC Muni. Total VDC Muni. 
 N= 
3200 
N =  
2500 
N = 
 700 
N =  
1600 
N = 
 1250 
N = 
 350 
N = 
 1600 
N = 
1250 
N = 
 350 
Improved 50.3% 49.4% 53.6% 73.4% 73.1% 74.3% 27.2% 25.6% 32.9% 
Remained the same 42.5% 43.7% 38.1% 22.8% 23.4% 20.9% 62.1% 64.0% 55.4% 
Worse 5.8% 5.8% 5.7% 1.9% 2.2% .9% 9.7% 9.4% 10.6% 
Don't know 1.5% 1.2% 2.6% 1.9% 1.4% 4.0% 1.0% 1.0% 1.1% 
Total 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 
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Other Public Services and General Perceptions of Trustworthiness 
Table 73: QUESTION: Please give your opinion on the importance of the following public services to be 
delivered in your VDC/Municipality: Education 
  Total Dhankuta Dhanusa 
 Total VDC Muni. Total VDC Muni. Total VDC Muni. 
 N= 
3200 
N =  
2500 
N = 
 700 
N =  
1600 
N = 
 1250 
N = 
 350 
N = 
 1600 
N = 
1250 
N = 
 350 
Not at all important 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 
Slightly important .8% .7% 1.3% .9% 1.0% .3% .8% .4% 2.3% 
Moderately important 10.7% 10.3% 12.1% 13.3% 13.8% 11.4% 8.1% 6.7% 12.9% 
Very important 43.7% 42.8% 47.0% 44.0% 44.7% 41.4% 43.4% 40.8% 52.6% 
Extremely important 44.8% 46.2% 39.6% 41.8% 40.4% 46.9% 47.8% 52.1% 32.3% 
Total 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 
 
Table 74: QUESTION: Please give your opinion on the importance of the following public services to be 
delivered in your VDC/Municipality: Health 
  Total Dhankuta Dhanusa 
 Total VDC Muni. Total VDC Muni. Total VDC Muni. 
 N= 
3200 
N =  
2500 
N = 
 700 
N =  
1600 
N = 
 1250 
N = 
 350 
N = 
 1600 
N = 
1250 
N = 
 350 
Not at all important 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 
Slightly important .7% .5% 1.4% .3% .4% 0.0% 1.1% .6% 2.9% 
Moderately important 10.3% 10.0% 11.6% 11.6% 11.8% 10.9% 9.1% 8.2% 12.3% 
Very important 42.3% 43.0% 39.4% 37.3% 39.2% 30.6% 47.2% 46.9% 48.3% 
Extremely important 46.7% 46.4% 47.6% 50.8% 48.6% 58.6% 42.6% 44.2% 36.6% 
Total 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 
 
Table75: QUESTION: Please give your opinion on the importance of the following public services to be 
delivered in your VDC/Municipality: Roads 
  Total Dhankuta Dhanusa 
 Total VDC Muni. Total VDC Muni. Total VDC Muni. 
 N= 
3200 
N =  
2500 
N = 
 700 
N =  
1600 
N = 
 1250 
N = 
 350 
N = 
 1600 
N = 
1250 
N = 
 350 
Not at all important .0% .0% 0.0% .1% .1% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 
Slightly important 1.5% 1.3% 2.3% .4% .5% .3% 2.6% 2.1% 4.3% 
Moderately important 16.7% 15.4% 21.1% 14.1% 12.1% 21.1% 19.3% 18.8% 21.1% 
Very important 40.6% 39.1% 45.9% 40.0% 39.3% 42.6% 41.1% 38.9% 49.1% 
Extremely important 41.2% 44.2% 30.7% 45.4% 48.1% 36.0% 37.0% 40.2% 25.4% 
Total 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 
 
 
60 
 
Table 76: QUESTION: Please give your opinion on the importance of the following public services to be 
delivered in your VDC/Municipality: Water/Sanitation 
  Total Dhankuta Dhanusa 
 Total VDC Muni. Total VDC Muni. Total VDC Muni. 
 N= 
3200 
N =  
2500 
N = 
 700 
N =  
1600 
N = 
 1250 
N = 
 350 
N = 
 1600 
N = 
1250 
N = 
 350 
Not at all important .0% .0% 0.0% .1% .1% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 
Slightly important 1.7% 1.5% 2.3% 1.1% 1.0% 1.1% 2.3% 2.0% 3.4% 
Moderately important 23.4% 25.1% 17.4% 22.1% 25.1% 11.4% 24.8% 25.1% 23.4% 
Very important 43.1% 45.6% 34.1% 37.3% 40.4% 26.3% 48.9% 50.8% 42.0% 
Extremely important 31.8% 27.7% 46.1% 39.4% 33.4% 61.1% 24.1% 22.1% 31.1% 
Total 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 
 
Table 77: QUESTION: Please give your opinion on the importance of the following public services to be 
delivered in your VDC/Municipality: Electrification 
   Total Dhankuta Dhanusa 
 Total VDC Muni. Total VDC Muni. Total VDC Muni. 
 N= 
3200 
N =  
2500 
N = 
 700 
N =  
1600 
N = 
 1250 
N = 
 350 
N = 
 1600 
N = 
1250 
N = 
 350 
Not at all important .1% .1% 0.0% .1% .1% 0.0% .1% .1% 0.0% 
Slightly important 4.8% 4.8% 4.7% 2.3% 2.5% 1.4% 7.3% 7.1% 8.0% 
Moderately important 34.5% 36.6% 27.1% 29.9% 33.2% 18.0% 39.1% 39.9% 36.3% 
Very important 41.9% 42.3% 40.4% 43.0% 43.0% 43.1% 40.8% 41.6% 37.7% 
Extremely important 18.8% 16.3% 27.7% 24.8% 21.3% 37.4% 12.8% 11.3% 18.0% 
Total 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 
 
Table 78: QUESTION: Please give your opinion on the importance of the following public services to be 
delivered in your VDC/Municipality: Communication 
  Total Dhankuta Dhanusa 
 Total VDC Muni. Total VDC Muni. Total VDC Muni. 
 N= 
3200 
N =  
2500 
N = 
 700 
N =  
1600 
N = 
 1250 
N = 
 350 
N = 
 1600 
N = 
1250 
N = 
 350 
Not at all important .3% .2% .3% .1% .1% 0.0% .4% .4% .6% 
Slightly important 7.1% 7.2% 7.0% 6.5% 7.8% 1.7% 7.8% 6.5% 12.3% 
Moderately important 39.7% 41.1% 34.7% 43.4% 47.0% 30.9% 35.9% 35.2% 38.6% 
Very important 40.3% 41.0% 37.7% 34.9% 33.1% 41.4% 45.6% 48.8% 34.0% 
Extremely important 12.7% 10.6% 20.3% 15.1% 12.0% 26.0% 10.3% 9.1% 14.6% 
Total 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 
 
61 
 
Table 79: QUESTION: Please give your opinion on the importance of the following public services to be 
delivered in your VDC/Municipality: Legal registrations and permits 
  Total Dhankuta Dhanusa 
 Total VDC Muni. Total VDC Muni. Total VDC Muni. 
 N= 
3200 
N =  
2500 
N = 
 700 
N =  
1600 
N = 
 1250 
N = 
 350 
N = 
 1600 
N = 
1250 
N = 
 350 
Not at all important .6% .6% .7% .4% .5% .3% .8% .7% 1.1% 
Slightly important 7.3% 7.2% 7.4% 5.1% 5.9% 2.0% 9.5% 8.6% 12.9% 
Moderately important 29.9% 30.0% 29.4% 29.3% 29.6% 28.3% 30.4% 30.4% 30.6% 
Very important 41.8% 42.5% 39.3% 42.3% 44.2% 35.7% 41.3% 40.9% 42.9% 
Extremely important 20.4% 19.6% 23.1% 22.9% 19.8% 33.7% 17.9% 19.4% 12.6% 
Total 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 
 
Table 80: QUESTION: Could you please mention your level of trust/confidence in the following 
institutions: VDC/Municipality 
  Total Dhankuta Dhanusa 
 Total VDC Muni. Total VDC Muni. Total VDC Muni. 
 N= 
3200 
N =  
2500 
N = 
 700 
N =  
1600 
N = 
 1250 
N = 
 350 
N = 
 1600 
N = 
1250 
N = 
 350 
Not trustworthy at all 10.8% 8.7% 18.0% 2.5% 1.9% 4.6% 19.0% 15.5% 31.4% 
Slightly trustworthy 17.7% 15.2% 26.6% 12.8% 10.9% 19.7% 22.5% 19.4% 33.4% 
Moderately trustworthy 43.9% 45.1% 39.7% 51.7% 51.7% 51.7% 36.2% 38.6% 27.7% 
Very trustworthy 22.1% 24.6% 13.3% 27.9% 30.3% 19.1% 16.3% 18.8% 7.4% 
Completely trustworthy 5.6% 6.4% 2.4% 5.1% 5.2% 4.9% 6.0% 7.7% 0.0% 
Total 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 
 
Table 81: QUESTION: Could you please mention your level of trust/confidence in the following 
institutions: DDC 
  Total Dhankuta Dhanusa 
 Total VDC Muni. Total VDC Muni. Total VDC Muni. 
 N= 
3200 
N =  
2500 
N = 
 700 
N =  
1600 
N = 
 1250 
N = 
 350 
N = 
 1600 
N = 
1250 
N = 
 350 
Not trustworthy at all 9.7% 7.5% 17.6% 1.4% 1.4% 1.4% 17.9% 13.5% 9.7% 
Slightly trustworthy 24.5% 23.0% 29.6% 16.5% 16.1% 18.0% 32.4% 30.0% 24.5% 
Moderately trustworthy 45.4% 47.2% 39.0% 58.9% 59.0% 58.9% 31.9% 35.4% 45.4% 
Very trustworthy 18.7% 20.8% 11.0% 20.8% 22.0% 16.3% 16.6% 19.6% 18.7% 
Completely trustworthy 1.8% 1.5% 2.9% 2.4% 1.5% 5.4% 1.2% 1.4% 1.8% 
Total 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 
 
Table 82: QUESTION: Could you please mention your level of trust/confidence in the following 
institutions: District Education Office 
  Total Dhankuta Dhanusa 
 Total VDC Muni. Total VDC Muni. Total VDC Muni. 
 N= 
3200 
N =  
2500 
N = 
 700 
N =  
1600 
N = 
 1250 
N = 
 350 
N = 
 1600 
N = 1250 N = 
 350 
Not trustworthy at all 5.7% 4.2% 11.3% 1.3% 1.3% 1.1% 10.2% 7.0% 21.4% 
Slightly trustworthy 22.0% 21.4% 24.4% 16.6% 17.8% 12.0% 27.5% 24.9% 36.9% 
Moderately trustworthy 47.0% 47.8% 44.0% 54.4% 54.0% 55.7% 39.6% 41.7% 32.3% 
Very trustworthy 21.3% 22.7% 16.1% 24.2% 24.3% 23.7% 18.4% 21.1% 8.6% 
Completely trustworthy 4.0% 3.9% 4.1% 3.6% 2.6% 7.4% 4.3% 5.3% .9% 
Total 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 
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Table 83: QUESTION: Could you please mention your level of trust/confidence in the following 
institutions: District Administration Office 
  Total Dhankuta Dhanusa 
 Total VDC Muni. Total VDC Muni. Total VDC Muni. 
 N= 
3200 
N =  
2500 
N = 
 700 
N =  
1600 
N = 
 1250 
N = 
 350 
N = 
 1600 
N = 
1250 
N = 
 350 
Not trustworthy at all 5.7% 5.0% 8.0% 1.6% 1.3% 2.9% 9.7% 8.7% 13.1% 
Slightly trustworthy 16.2% 14.7% 21.4% 12.6% 12.8% 11.7% 19.8% 16.6% 31.1% 
Moderately trustworthy 49.6% 50.1% 47.9% 53.2% 53.6% 51.7% 46.1% 46.6% 44.0% 
Very trustworthy 22.9% 24.4% 17.6% 28.0% 28.9% 24.9% 17.8% 19.9% 10.3% 
Completely trustworthy 5.6% 5.8% 5.1% 4.6% 3.4% 8.9% 6.6% 8.1% 1.4% 
Total 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 
 
Table 84: QUESTION: Could you please mention your level of trust/confidence in the following 
institutions: District Police Office 
  Total Dhankuta Dhanusa 
 Total VDC Muni. Total VDC Muni. Total VDC Muni. 
 N= 
3200 
N =  
2500 
N = 
 700 
N =  
1600 
N = 
 1250 
N = 
 350 
N = 
 1600 
N = 
1250 
N = 
 350 
Not trustworthy at all 6.0% 5.3% 8.4% 4.2% 3.2% 7.7% 7.8% 7.4% 9.1% 
Slightly trustworthy 21.4% 22.5% 17.3% 21.1% 23.0% 14.6% 21.6% 22.1% 20.0% 
Moderately trustworthy 43.2% 41.8% 48.1% 47.2% 47.1% 47.4% 39.1% 36.4% 48.9% 
Very trustworthy 25.8% 26.9% 21.9% 23.8% 23.6% 24.3% 27.8% 30.2% 19.4% 
Completely trustworthy 3.7% 3.6% 4.3% 3.8% 3.1% 6.0% 3.7% 4.0% 2.6% 
Total 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 
 
Table 85: QUESTION: Could you please mention your level of trust/confidence in the following 
institutions: District Court 
  Total Dhankuta Dhanusa 
 Total VDC Muni. Total VDC Muni. Total VDC Muni. 
 N= 
3200 
N =  
2500 
N = 
 700 
N =  
1600 
N = 
 1250 
N = 
 350 
N = 
 1600 
N = 
1250 
N = 
 350 
Not trustworthy at all 4.2% 3.8% 5.9% 2.1% 2.2% 1.7% 6.4% 5.4% 10.0% 
Slightly trustworthy 16.5% 16.1% 18.0% 15.3% 18.2% 5.1% 17.7% 14.0% 30.9% 
Moderately trustworthy 39.3% 39.1% 40.0% 44.1% 44.6% 42.3% 34.6% 33.7% 37.7% 
Very trustworthy 26.5% 26.8% 25.6% 25.4% 23.3% 33.1% 27.6% 30.3% 18.0% 
Completely trustworthy 13.4% 14.2% 10.6% 13.1% 11.8% 17.7% 13.8% 16.6% 3.4% 
Total 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 
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ANNEX 6: LOCAL BODY REVENUES AND EXPENDITURE – VARIOUS DATA SHEETS 
 
VDC SOURCES OF REVENUE 
 
NRs % of total NRs % of total NRs % of total NRs % of total
Balance B/Fwd 1,102,804        4.79        690,585           3.42        423,265           1.91        2,216,654        3.39        
Own source and shared revenues 226,613           0.98        182,258           0.90        405,741           1.83        814,611           1.25        
GoN block grants (capital) 7,610,066        33.07      5,370,222        26.61      3,611,579        16.33      16,591,867      25.40      
GoN block grants (recurrent) 1,802,600        7.83        2,187,204        10.84      1,500,000        6.78        5,489,804        8.41        
Other grants 881,346           3.83        17,700             0.09        53,405             0.24        952,451           1.46        
GoN social security transfers 10,530,000      45.76      2,136,000        10.58      12,553,600      56.75      25,219,600      38.61      
DDC grants -                    -          -                    -          -                    -          -                    -          
Advances, settlements etc. 531,761           2.31        9,568,090        47.41      3,516,084        15.89      13,615,935      20.85      
Other 326,670           1.42        29,769             0.15        57,415             0.26        413,853           0.63        
Totals 23,011,859     100.00   20,181,828     100.00   22,121,088     100.00   65,314,775     100.00   
NRs % of total NRs % of total NRs % of total NRs % of total
Balance B/Fwd 706,796           3.83        1,361,349        6.65        2,370,216        11.66      4,438,361        7.49        
Own source and shared revenues 237,821           1.29        483,250           2.36        865,268           4.26        1,586,339        2.68        
GoN block grants (capital) 7,994,190        43.34      8,445,675        41.24      7,099,797        34.93      23,539,662      39.73      
GoN block grants (recurrent) 2,019,998        10.95      2,020,000        9.86        2,020,000        9.94        6,059,998        10.23      
Other grants 1,751,923        9.50        1,948,889        9.52        2,066,407        10.17      5,767,219        9.73        
GoN social security transfers 4,622,800        25.06      4,877,000        23.81      4,237,400        20.85      13,737,200      23.19      
DDC grants 619,900           3.36        560,000           2.73        806,202           3.97        1,986,102        3.35        
Other 491,013           2.66        782,639           3.82        861,382           4.24        2,135,034        3.60        
Totals 18,444,441     100.00   20,478,802     100.00   20,326,672     100.00   59,249,915     100.00   
Revenue
DHANUSA: VDC REVENUES
DHANKUTA: VDC REVENUES
2009/10 2010/11 2011/12 All years
All Dhanusa VDCs
Revenue
All Dhankuta VDCs
2009/10 2010/11 2011/12 All years
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Figure 15: Dhanusa VDCs revenue sources 2009/12 
 
 
Figure 16: Dhankuta VDCs revenue sources 2009/12 
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VDC EXPENDITURE IN DHANKUTA AND DHANUSA DISTRICTS 
 
Expenditure Dhankuta VDC 
SECTOR/ACTIVITY 
ALL DHANKUTA VDCs 
2009/10 2010/11 2011/12 All years 
NRs % of total NRs % of total NRs % of total NRs % of total 
                  
Administrative 2,453,470 12.80 3,027,139 16.64 2,760,121 15.84 8,240,730 15.04 
Social security and social protection 5,563,213 29.03 6,081,291 33.42 6,135,200 35.22 17,779,704 32.46 
Capital expenditure (no breakdown) 0 0.00 0 0.00 1,424,000 8.17 1,424,000 2.60 
Target group activities (no breakdown) 1,161,391 6.06 889,604 4.89 1,340,150 7.69 3,391,145 6.19 
Local roads & bridges 4,459,624 23.27 2,503,916 13.76 760,567 4.37 7,724,107 14.10 
Education 1,380,556 7.20 1,558,011 8.56 485,000 2.78 3,423,567 6.25 
Community and administrative buildings 999,059 5.21 856,085 4.71 1,065,480 6.12 2,920,624 5.33 
Water & sanitation 697,124 3.64 786,355 4.32 1,560,000 8.95 3,043,479 5.56 
Agriculture & irrigation 317,000 1.65 1,002,179 5.51 371,100 2.13 1,690,279 3.09 
Electrification 784,231 4.09 120,918 0.66 121,350 0.70 1,026,499 1.87 
Environment 241,876 1.26 0 0.00 246,000 1.41 487,876 0.89 
Other (health, police stations, etc.) 1,104,237 5.76 1,368,830 7.52 1,151,770 6.61 3,624,837 6.62 
                  
Totals 19,161,781 100.00 18,194,328 100.00 17,420,738 100.00 54,776,847 100.00 
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Expenditure Dhanusa VDC 
SECTOR/ACTIVITY 
ALL DHANUSA VDCs 
2009/10 2010/11 2011/12 All years 
NRs % of total NRs % of total NRs % of total NRs % of total 
                  
Administrative 1,997,687 8.59 2,006,301 9.94 1,817,952 12.80 5,821,940 10.10 
Social security and social protection 7,141,522 30.69 2,382,613 11.81 7,560,000 53.23 17,084,135 29.63 
Capital expenditure (no breakdown) 1,442,466 6.20 1,866,669 9.25 443,495 3.12 3,752,630 6.51 
Target group activities (no breakdown) 324,000 1.39 382,336 1.89 614,858 4.33 1,321,194 2.29 
Local roads & bridges 2,586,485 11.12 1,135,900 5.63 950,795 6.69 4,673,180 8.11 
Education 50,000 0.21 0 0.00 0 0.00 50,000 0.09 
Community and administrative buildings 291,495 1.25 0 0.00 47,000 0.33 338,495 0.59 
Water & sanitation 166,614 0.72 88,410 0.44 0 0.00 255,024 0.44 
Agriculture & irrigation 363,050 1.56 332,000 1.65 299,950 2.11 995,000 1.73 
Electrification 215,700 0.93 0 0.00 0 0.00 215,700 0.37 
Environment 25,000 0.11 0 0.00 0 0.00 25,000 0.04 
Other (health, police stations, etc.) 1,113,044 4.78 702,445 3.48 120,169 0.85 1,935,658 3.36 
Advances and balances 7,552,046 32.46 11,285,152 55.92 2,349,017 16.54 21,186,215 36.75 
                  
Totals 23,269,108 100 20,181,826 100 14,203,236 100 57,654,170 100 
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DETAILED VDC EXPENDITURES - SAMPLE OF TWO DHANKUTA VDCs 
 
Bhedetar VDC, Dhankuta  
 Detailed expenditure patterns (NRs)  
Expenditure Heading  FY 2009-10   FY 2010-11   FY 2011-12  
Balance b/ d from last year       
Recurrent /administrative expense 1,112,330 1,376,754 1,572,793 
Salary and allowance 182,824 308,320 308,878 
Other consumption expenses 21,000 107,828   
Office rent 14,400 14,400 20,400 
Office expenses 72,180 68,481 90,100 
Miscellaneous 20,028 22,980 38,020 
Social security Grant 1,550 1,000 5,000 
Social service grant 14,000 4,000 1,200 
Water, electricity, service expense 10,200 12,145 18,280 
Program expenses 0 0 15,000 
Program travel expenses 64,196 60,000 68,000 
Contingency (recurrent) 1,000 0 2,000 
DDC land Revenue 0 0 24,425 
Peace Committee 0 0 20,000 
Social security allowance 558,000 777,600 835,600 
Social mobilization 21,000   125,890 
Training 18,500 0 0 
Participatary contribution 25,000 0 0 
Literacy program 79,902   0 
Family cost 8,550   0 
        
 Activities/Project Sector Wise  1,952,101 1,735,651 909,947 
Road Sector       
Namje Rural Road 282,333     
Kolbote Rural Road 229,168   252,000 
Ekle Tar Rural Road 74,272     
Limbhu Pedstrian Road 24,337     
Jimmy Gaun Rural Rpad 70,344     
Namstey Jharan Pedestrian Road     50,567 
Majhuwa Mukten Rural Road   318,567   
        
School/Education Sector       
Gramin Jan S. School Grant 110,000 110,000 110,000 
Training   113,110   
        
Agriculture Sector       
Agriculture awareness training 41,000     
Animal program 41,000     
Formaculture grant 20,000     
Seeds purchase and distribution   89,000   
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Bhedetar VDC, Dhankuta  
 Detailed expenditure patterns (NRs)  
Expenditure Heading  FY 2009-10   FY 2010-11   FY 2011-12  
Tourism Development       
Tourism promotion program 15,000     
Document production 15,000     
Rajarani Festival   15,000   
        
Drinking Water & Sanitation       
Bhedetar Khanepani 284,438   
Karkichhap drinking water 70,986     
Drinking water repair project   256,830   
Furniture purchases 41,700 35,000   
        
Community Building       
Laligurans  Community Building Construction 171,386     
Women Comminuty Building Constriction Thumki     37,764 
Children Community Building Construction, Thumki     60,000 
Agriculture Community Building Construction, Thumki     68,008 
Namastey Jharana Ticket Counter Construction     12,574 
Indiginous Community Buidling Material     12,237 
Navajyoti  Community Building Construction 108,419     
Kirat Rai Commmunity Building Construction, 
Dharapani 
    116,664 
Iman Chemjung Statue Construction     10,050 
Stair Construction, Bhedetar   197,060   
Women Comminuty Building Constriction 70,492 21,109   
Malbase Community Building Construction 36,800     
Community Building Construction, Mokten 9      31,083 
Community Building Construction Ward no. 6   68,730   
Community Building Construction Ward no. 9   41,841   
        
Health       
Sub Health Post Grant 100,000 100,000   
Health Camp   10,000   
        
Training       
Planning  8,550   149,000 
Environment 66,876     
Child Related 20,000     
Domestic Voilence   25,000   
Candle Making Training   25,000   
Senior Citizen Program   246,904   
Orientation Meeting   13,500   
        
Miscellenous        
VDC Complementary Fund 25,000     
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Bhedetar VDC, Dhankuta  
 Detailed expenditure patterns (NRs)  
Expenditure Heading  FY 2009-10   FY 2010-11   FY 2011-12  
Nepal Red Cross Society Contribution 25,000     
Observation Travel VDC Sec   15,000   
Public Hearing   14,000   
Salary of Technician   20,000   
Total 3,064,431 3,112,405 2,482,740 
 
 
Pakhribas VDC, Dhankuta  
 Detailed exoenditure patterns (NRs)  
Expenditure Heading  FY 2009-10   FY 2010-11   FY 2011-12  
        
Balance b/ d from last year       
Recurrent /administrative expense 481,723 568,868 703,024 
Salary and allowance 269,180 274,820 371,660 
Fee for engineering services     8,250 
Meeting allowance, tea and refreshment       
Meeting allowance       
Meeting allowance/travel cost 46,526 64,999 59,989 
Other consumption expenses  7,200 15,000 15,000 
Water, electricity, service expense 9,071 9,747 23,125 
Office expenses 54,807 65,671 55,000 
Miscellaneous Expenses 14,415 36,825 40,000 
Travel 49,526 64,999 60,000 
Program expenses 29,518 7,819 35,000 
Contingency 1,480 14,430 20,000 
Production service expenses   4,500 5,000 
Refund expenses 0 10,058 10,000 
        
 Activities/Project Sector Wise  3,372,974 2,751,154 3,610,450 
        
Social security allowances (assumption) 1,053,600 1,350,200 1,414,200 
        
Women target group: (10%)       
Women's dairy cooperative building construction 40,000     
Sewing traning 35,000     
Reproductive health & HIV/AIDS  24,704     
Allowence for Women Health Volunteers 21,600 21,600 21,600 
Kitchen gardening training 20,000     
Women's cooperative development      18,400 
Skills development training     30,000 
Sudhariya Ko Chullo program (woodstoves)     40,000 
Dalit/Upanga/Jana-Jati target group: (15%)       
Jana-jati road repair, ward 1     20,000 
Bhaudha gumba murti security, ward 3     20,000 
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Pakhribas VDC, Dhankuta  
 Detailed exoenditure patterns (NRs)  
Expenditure Heading  FY 2009-10   FY 2010-11   FY 2011-12  
Margha Dhara water resource security, ward 4     20,000 
Hajare Sim water  tyanki  construction, ward 6     20,000 
Jordhara water resource security, ward 7     20,000 
Dalit Basti water tyanki construction wards 4 & 6     30,000 
Upangha sasaktikaran program     75,000 
        
Agricalture sector: (15%)       
Tanga kulo construction, ward 4   45,000   
Hatting kulo construction, ward 5   32,000   
Chauki khola irrigation pipe purchase, ward 6   27,000   
Layatol irrigation pipe purchase, ward 7   17,000   
Dadha Khet irrigation pipe purchase, ward 8   13,000   
Seeds purchase program, wards 1, 2 & 9   50,000 30,000 
Agricaltural training    28,700 47,700 
Breeding (nasla sudhar)    20,000 20,000 
Hattibar kulo repairs, ward 1     15,000 
Irrigation pipe, wards 2, 6, 8, & 9     60,000 
Management of agricultural market, ward 3     15,000 
Kipate kulo repairs, ward 4     15,000 
Angbung kulo repair, ward 5     15,000 
Muga Khola Kholitar kulo repair, ward 7     15,000 
R4amche drinking water program, ward 2     20,000 
        
Road Sector:       
Health post road (repair), ward 9 10,400 50,000   
Jalpadevi campus road (new) 300,000     
Panchaknya-Salbota road repairs, wards 1, 5 & 9 120,000 100,000   
Bokre Pathake-Kholitar road repair, ward 6 40,000 75,000   
Mungakhola-Kholitar road repair, ward 7 40,000 45,000   
Sihadevi-Paura road repair, ward 8 40,000 50,000   
Basnettol ECD center road repair, ward 2       
Pakharibas humpas construction 30,000     
        
School/Education Sector       
Purand support Jalpa Devi school)   10,555   
School books purchase (Jalpa Devi school) 200,000 42,000   
School furniture (Jalpa Devi school)    200,000   
School playground construction (Dhunga Dhara school)       
School  operating grant 158,600     
School playground (Dhunga Dhara school)   30,000   
Street drama 5,694     
Inter schools quiz contests 10,000     
Inter schools speech competition 14,000     
Pre-primary teacher's salary (Jalpa Devi) 26,000     
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Pakhribas VDC, Dhankuta  
 Detailed exoenditure patterns (NRs)  
Expenditure Heading  FY 2009-10   FY 2010-11   FY 2011-12  
Schools filter dowsing  purchase   27,000     
Dalit ECDcenter furniture purchase 30,000     
Child  development materials  40,000     
Schools materials (Jalpa Devi school)     27,000 
School furniture (Dhunga Dhara school)     28,000 
Schools furniture  (Aniwariya Nisulka school)     28,000 
Schools furniture (Pancha Kanya school)     27,000 
ECD center (Mukten, ward 2)     10,000 
Scholarships  29,000     
        
Capital and equipment:        
Purchase of machine equipment     14,999 110,000 
New VDC building construction 468,635 98,000 435,000 
Expenses for furniture   204,700   
Land purchase for police station  300,000     
Health post furniture  30,000     
Repairs and maintenance (building and furniture) 30,450   40,000 
Jalpadevi savings & co-operative buildings     40,000 
        
Other program  expenditure:       
Sports program (play ground)    10,000 70,000 
VDC contingency (katti)   63,767   
DDC tax periodic plan     50,000 
DDC contingency (katti)   11,633   
Rural Electrification (wards 2 & 5) cable purchase   40,000 21,350 
Sanibare Bazzer (C.S.P.) partnership 30,000     
SIM-N (environment) project matching fund  100,000   201,000 
Old aged falicitation 32,691   39,700 
Community forest matching fund 50,000   5,000 
Peace community     20,000 
VDC periodic plan     99,000 
Village profile 15,600     
Matching fund   50,000   
Pakharibas police post wall contruction   10,000   
Skills development program (community)   20,000   
VDC check writer purchase   15,000   
Mugakhola water tyanki construction, ward 3     224,000 
Health program     10,000 
VDC contingency (4%)     46,000 
Orientation program   6,000 11,000 
Toilet pipe purchase     70,000 
VDC Shimarika & Hakhet Samrakchand     1,500 
Clothes expencess for VDC staff     15,000 
Total 3,854,697 3,320,022 4,313,474 
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MUNICIPAL REVENUES AND EXPENDITURES 
 
Dhankuta Municipality Expenditure - Overview 
DHANKUTA MUNICIPALITY EXPENDITURE 
       
Summary of Municipality Expenditure 2010/11 by Sector  Summary of Municipality Expenditure 2011/12 by Sector 
 Sector Amount (NRs) % of Total  Sector Amount (NRs) % of Total 
Education 1,288,500 1.85 
 
Education 1,182,500 1.83 
Health 3,054,112 4.39 
 
Health 3,145,787 4.87 
Water&Sanitation 2,702,906 3.88 
 
Water&Sanitation 3,950,000 6.12 
Roads 27,473,779 39.46 
 
Roads 23,337,554 36.16 
Agriculture 316,100 0.45 
 
Agriculture 330,000 0.51 
Community building 352,350 0.51 
 
Community building 725,000 1.12 
Religious 125,000 0.18 
 
Religious 645,000 1.00 
Energy 535,986 0.77 
 
Energy 300,000 0.46 
Livelihoods 442,200 0.64 
 
Livelihoods 635,000 0.98 
Targeted Group 1,128,455 1.62 
 
Targeted Group 1,295,000 2.01 
Security 50,000 0.07 
 
Security 0 0.00 
Environment 615,000 0.88 
 
Environment 1,258,322 1.95 
Waste Management 4,004,237 5.75 
 
Waste Management 1,007,050 1.56 
Social Mobilization 90,000 0.13 
 
Social Mobilization 100,000 0.15 
Administrative 7,843,683 11.27 
 
Administrative 8,599,524 13.32 
Social Security 2,628,900 3.78 
 
Social Security 240,800 0.37 
HR 8,590,033 12.34 
 
HR 9,641,532 14.94 
Advance 4,094,990 5.88 
 
Advance 805,129 1.25 
Other 4,290,639 6.16 
 
Other 7,344,040 11.38 
TOTAL 69,626,870 100.00 
 
TOTAL 64,542,237 100.00 
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Figure 17: Dhankuta Municipality expenditure 2010/11 by sector 
 
 
Figure 18: Dhankuta Municipality expenditure 2011/12 by sector 
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Dhankuta Municipality Revenue 
Municipal Revenues (NRs): Dhankuta Municipality 
S.No. Heading 2009/2010 2010/11 2011/12 
A Internal Sources 10,255,207 7,788,384 9,253,021 
1.1 Local Tax       
1.1.1 Tax Arrears (Land Tax) 2,766 300 11,157 
1.1.2 Tax Arrears (House and Land Tax) 0 0 0 
1.1.3 Rent Tax 44,197 49,257 83,498 
1.1.4 Bitauri (Tenant) Tax 3,000 18,150 15,829 
1.1.5 Business Tax 625,580 703,010 1,000,410 
1.1.6 Vehicle Tax 0 0 0 
1.1.6.1 Vehicle Registration and Annual Vehicle Tax 750 0 2,750 
1.1.6.2 Toll Tax 0 0 0 
1.1.7 Property Based (IPT) Tax 1,721,357 1,724,202 1,930,405 
1.1.8 Entertainment Tax 0 0 0 
1.1.9 Advertisement Tax 0 0 0 
1.2 Service Fees       
1.2.1 Parking Fee 484,500 601,000 700,005 
1.2.2 Tariff and Service Fee 0 0 0 
1.2.3 Electricity Tariff 0 5,515 20,604 
1.2.4 Weekly Market Fee 201,000 101,250 238,100 
1.2.5 Solid Waste Management Fee 418,482 482,467 751,205 
1.2.6 Guest House Service Charge 12,550 5,800 1,150 
1.2.7 Public Toilet Service Fee/Public Property Use Fee 45,000 108,000 94,560 
1.2.8 Public Infrastructure Maintenance Fee 170,000 198,875 204,000 
1.2.9 Property Valuation Fee 100,001 49,470 26,742 
1.2.10 Other Service Fee 259,500 230,875 307,085 
1.3 Fees       
1.3.1 Application and Renewal Fee 34,320 32,695 43,098 
1.3.2 Building Permit Fee 793,460 660,171 838,297 
1.3.3 Recommendations Fee 457,555 707,605 636,235 
1.3.4 Relation Certification Fee 9,825 23,400 15,770 
1.3.5 Other Fees - Sarjimin 93,310 57,000 69,550 
1.4 Sales       
1.4.1 Other Sales (tender forms) 7,620 27,286 6,055 
1.5 Resource mobilization       
1.5.1 Public Private Partnership 2,738,204 0 0 
1.5.3 Public Toilet Operation 45,000 108,000 94,560 
1.5.2 Slaugher House       
1.5.3 Street Light Management   116,288 80,500 
1.5.4 Other Resource Mobilization 140,995 0 237,720 
1.6 Other Income       
1.6.1 Penalty 96,762 70,105 61,730 
1.7 Property Rental       
1.7.1 Rent - Shopping Complex 1,037,918 1,039,150 1,033,912 
1.7.2 Rent - Restaurant and Shops 432,980 449,163 499,137 
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1.7.3 Rent - Vegetable Shop 20,000 70,000 75,000 
1.7.4 Rent - Canteen 60,000 15,002 90,000 
1.7.5 Other Rent 33,390 30,000 40,968 
1.8 Deposit Cease 64,641 15,000 0 
1.9 Advance Refund 26,741 209 0 
1.10 Other Sundry Income 73,803 89,140 42,991 
B. External Sources 59,738,068 70,723,669 64,516,784 
2.1 Grant from GoN       
  Conditional Grant       
2.1.1 Local and Agriculture Roads 2,200,000 2,200,000 1,750,000 
2.1.2 Additional Local Development Fee 0     
2.1.3 Local Development Fee - Capital 5,183,000 5,183,000 2,822,000 
2.1.4 Reserve Fund 11,629,000 12,138,000 10,194,000 
2.1.5 LGCDP Capital 11,109,000 7,019,400   
2.1.6 LGCDP Recurrent 834,824 1,721,374 1,506,000 
2.1.7 UGDP Capital 0 8,483,000 11,081,000 
2.1.8 Local Peace Committee - Recurrent 0 0 50,000 
2.1.9 Additional Capital Expenditure Grant 0 0 0 
2.1.10 Peoples Participation Based Program 0 0 0 
  Unconditional Grant       
2.1.9 GON Municipal Grant - Recurrent 1,450,000 1,433,000 1,433,000 
2.1.10 GON Municipal Grant -Capital 8,122,000 6,582,000 10,789,000 
2.1.11 Local Development Fee - Recurrent 2,148,000 2,148,000 2,148,000 
2.1.12 Conditional Grant DDC - Social Security 5,460,451 0 0 
2.2 Grant from Other Institutions 0     
2.2.1 Town Development Fund 775,691 0 0 
2.2.2 DDC conditional grant - Social Security   3,755,200 1,495,000 
2.2.3 Nepal Road Board 1,346,219 1,605,562 1,541,324 
2.2.4 Solid Waste Management and Resource 
Mobilization Centre 
0 0   
2.2.5 District Education Office, Dhankuta 207,478 130,120 599,502 
2.2.6 PPPUE 6,000 0 0 
2.2.7 SIM - Nepal 1,200,000 200,000 408,226 
2.2.8 Municipal Association of Nepal  127,245 0 0 
2.2.9 LFP Dhankuta 0 0 0 
2.2.10 District Health Office, Dhankuta 2,200,000 3,624,000 638,000 
2.2.11 DUBBC 200,000   888,000 
2.2.12 Other 89,160 427,180 1,615,732 
2.2.13 Nothrumbia University 0 0 0 
2.3 Borrowings 550,000     
2.4 Peoples Participation  4,900,000 7,173,833 6,307,500 
2.5 Land Revenue Office - Revenue Sharing   2,700,000 2,943,000 
8.1 Donation and Gift       
8.1.2 Cost Sharing Project 0 4,200,000 6,307,500 
  Total 69,993,275 78,512,053 73,769,805 
 
76 
 
Dhankuta Municipality Revenue - Summary 
 
Figure 19: Dhankuta Municipality revenue sources (%) 
 
 
 
Revenue source 
2009-10 2010-11 2011-12 All years 
NRs % of total NRs % of total NRs % of total NRs % of total 
Local taxes      2,397,650  3.4         2,494,919  3.2         3,044,048  4.1         7,936,617  3.6 
Fees         3,079,503  4.4         3,264,123  4.2         3,946,400  5.3      10,290,026  4.6 
Other         4,778,055  6.8         2,029,342  2.6         2,262,573  3.1         9,069,970  4.1 
GoN conditional grants      30,955,824  44.2      36,744,774  46.8      27,403,000  37.1      95,103,598  42.8 
GoN unconditional grants      17,180,451  24.5      10,163,000  12.9      14,370,000  19.5      41,713,451  18.8 
Other grants         6,151,793  8.8         9,742,062  12.4         7,185,784  9.7      23,079,639  10.4 
Other income         5,450,000  7.8      14,073,833  17.9      15,558,000  21.1      35,081,833  15.8 
Total      69,993,275  100.0      78,512,053  100.0      73,769,805  100.0    222,275,134  100.0 
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Janakpur Municipality Expenditure Details 2011/12 
Source of 
Funding S.N Project Amount Sector 
    A. Children (10 %)     
  1 Shree Secondary School's building 
construction and maintenance, JNP 14 
178,498.05 Education - General 
  2 Shree Janata Secondary School's 
building construction and maintenance, 
JNP 14 
178,454.90 Education - General 
  3 Shree Janak Ratriya P. Shool's gate 
construction, JNP 8 
71,495.47 Education - Construction 
  4 Prize for Municipalities' topped ranked 
SLC graduate of Madhesi, Muslim, 
Dalit, ethnics 
20,000.00 Education - General 
  5 Prize sponsored for Municipals 
Secondary schools 15 girls and boys 
20,000.00 Education - General 
    B. Women (10%)     
  6 Training of sewing and cutting for 
women 
20,000.00 Livelihoods 
  7 Training of Mithila Art 50,000.00 Livelihoods 
  8 Dalit, ethnic and disabled     
  9 Distribution of toilet construction 
material for 12 Wards 
60,265.00 Water&Sanitation - 
Construction 
  10 Distribution of Mosquito net 100 
persons 
68,500.00 Health - General 
  11 Empowerment program 51,235.00 Targeted Group - Unknown 
  12 Training for disabled women to make 
Stick Chudi  
70,000.00 Livelihoods 
  13 Training to make candle for muslim 
women 
50,000.00 Livelihoods 
  14 Awareness program for Dalit 140,000.00 Targeted Group - Unknown 
  15 Awareness program for ethnics groups 110,000.00 Targeted Group - Unknown 
   C. Others (65%)     
  16 Culvert Slab construction, JNP 1 15,815.60 Bridges - Construction 
  17 Drainage construction, JNP 9 713,951.43 Roads - Construction 
  18 Road and drainage construction, JNP 1 165,076.80 Roads - Construction 
  19 PCC and Drainage construction, JNP 9 208,530.00 Roads - Construction 
  20 Drainage construction, JNP7 332,818.23 Roads - Construction 
  21 Road PCC, JNP 2 130,118.26 Roads - Construction 
  22 Road PCC, JNP 4 504,270.05 Roads - Construction 
    Total 3,159,028.79   
          
Expenditure of 
royalty, Land tax, 
Fee etc 
  
1 Road maintenance and PCC, JNP 9 153,509.44 Roads - Maintenance 
2 Public Community building 
construction, JNP 16 
502,869.05 Community building - 
Construction 
  3 Drainage construction and Road PCC, 
JNP 8 
500,671.00 Roads - Construction 
  4 PCC, JNP 10 273,111.87 Roads - Construction 
  5 Drainage and road construction, JNP 8 502,043.36 Roads - Construction 
  6 Slab making, JNP 1 17,474.79 Roads - Construction 
  7 Culvert construction, JNP 5 24,736.45 Roads - Construction 
  8 Gravelling, JNP 4 24,912.50 Roads - Construction 
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Source of 
Funding S.N Project Amount Sector 
  9 Road construction, JNP 4 32,738.25 Roads - Construction 
  10 Road construction, JNP 16 500,491.30 Roads - Construction 
  11 Railing and Marbling in Ram Tower, 
JNP 4 
78,423.13 Other 
  12 PCC, Drainage and public toilet 
construction, JNP 6 
1,103,989.65 Roads - Construction 
    Total 3,714,970.79   
          
Local Transport 
Infrastructure 
Sector Program 
1 PCC construction, JNP 9,14 1,102,914.39 Roads - Construction 
2 Construction of PCC and Drainage, JNP 
2 
550,196.95 Roads - Construction 
  3 PCC construction, JNP 1 786,102.84 Roads - Construction 
  4 PCC construction, JNP 4 500,170.51 Roads - Construction 
  5 PCC and Drainage construction, JNP9 250,580.70 Roads - Construction 
  6 PCC and Drainage construction, JNP14 691,689.63 Roads - Construction 
  7 Culvert construction, JNP7 224,086.01 Bridges - Construction 
  8 Maintenance Funds 169,300.00 Roads - Maintenance 
    Total 4,275,041.03   
          
Jageda Funds 1 Drainage and PCC construction, JNP 8 2,487,354.02 Roads - Construction 
  2 Drainage and PCC construction, JNP 1 3,736,237.46 Roads - Construction 
  3 Drainage construction, JNP4 3,235,026.06 Roads - Construction 
  4 Drainage and PCC construction, JNP 16 1,996,951.35 Roads - Construction 
  5 PCC and Drainage construction, JNP 9 3,204,831.97 Roads - Construction 
  6 PCC and Drainage construction, JNP 2 
& 11 
  Roads - Construction 
    Total 14,660,400.86   
          
Road board 1 Black topped road maintenance 
Janakpur cigarette factory to Suva 
Chowk 
589,114.87 Roads - Maintenance 
  2 PCC maintenance, JNP 5 90,117.37 Roads - Maintenance 
  3 Gravelling, JNP 4 & 12 235,760.82 Roads - Maintenance 
  4 Black topped road maintenance Janak 
Chowk to Ram Temple and Sona 
Bazar's Jyoti Clothing 
464,164.88 Roads - Maintenance 
  5 Road and Drainage maintenance, JNP 4 93,861.33 Roads - Maintenance 
  6 Bridge Maintenance, Jalad River, JNP 
16 
46,826.37 Bridges - Maintenance 
  7 Road Watchman 22,995.00 Roads - General 
    Total 1,542,840.64   
    GRAND TOTAL 27,352,282.11   
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 Summary of Janakpur Municipality Expenditure 2011/12 by Sub-Sector 
Sector Amount 
Education - General 396,952.95 
Education - Construction 71,495.47 
Education - Maintenance 0.00 
Education - Teachers 0.00 
Health - General 68,500.00 
Health - Construction 0.00 
Water&Sanitation - General 0.00 
Water&Sanitation - Construction 60,265.00 
Water&Sanitation - Maintenance 0.00 
Roads - General 22,995.00 
Roads - Design 0.00 
Roads - Construction 23,576,989.82 
Roads - Maintenance 1,795,828.71 
Bridges - General 0.00 
Bridges - Construction 239,901.61 
Bridges - Maintenance 46,826.37 
Agriculture - General 0.00 
Agriculture - Construction 0.00 
Agriculture - Irrigation 0.00 
Community building - General 0.00 
Community building - Construction 502,869.05 
Community building - Maintenance 0.00 
Religious - General 0.00 
Religious - Construction 0.00 
Religious - Maintenance 0.00 
Energy 0.00 
Energy - Construction 0.00 
Livelihoods 190,000.00 
Economic Development 0.00 
Targeted Group - Unknown 301,235.00 
Security - General 0.00 
Other 78,423.13 
TOTAL 27,352,282.11 
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 Summary of Janakpur Municipality Expenditure 2011/12 by Sector 
Sector Amount % of Total 
Education 468,448.42 1.71 
Health 68,500.00 0.25 
Water&Sanitation 60,265.00 0.22 
Roads 25,395,813.53 92.85 
Bridges 286,727.98 1.05 
Community building 502,869.05 1.84 
Livelihoods 190,000.00 0.69 
Targeted Group 301,235.00 1.10 
Other 78,423.13 0.29 
TOTAL 27,352,282.11 100.00 
 
 
 
Figure 20: Janakpur Municipality expenditure 2011/12 by sector 
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Summary of Janakpur Municipality Expenditure by Sector FYs 2009/10 - 2011/12 
 
Summary of Janakpur Municipality Expenditure 2009-12 by Sector 
Sector Amount (NRs) % of Total 
Education 3,791,052 3.42 
Health 68,500 0.06 
Water&Sanitation 452,528 0.41 
Roads 101,186,082 91.40 
Bridges 945,637 0.85 
Community building 717,809 0.65 
Livelihoods 190,000 0.17 
Targeted Group 1,391,492 1.26 
Religious 332,962 0.30 
Other 1,628,257 1.47 
Total 110,704,319 100 
 
 
Figure 21: Janakpur Municipality expenditure 2009-12 by Sector 
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EXPENDITURE DETAILS - DHANUSA DISTRICT 
 
Dhanusa DDC Expenditure Details 2010/11 
Source of 
Funding S.N Project Amount Sector 
DDC Grants 
Capital 
1 Sahid Ram Brichha Yada Memorial, 
Barmajhiya 
262,844.00 Religious - General 
  2 Udeshowr Nath Mahdev Temple, 
conservation 
45,992.00 Religious - Maintenance 
  3 Sahalesh Gahabar Construction, Babhai 250,000.00 Religious - Construction 
  4 Solar Energy, Gahairya 205,000.00 Energy 
  5 Police beat Construction, Dhanusa 500,000.00 Security - Construction 
  6 Armed Police Hall Roof Maintenance 300,000.00 Security - Maintenance 
  7 Payment of detailed survey design, 
Manaharpur-Dhabauli Road 
267,300.00 Roads - Design 
  8 Payment of detailed survey design, 
Mauwa-balabakhar Road 
267,300.00 Roads - Design 
  9 Payment of detailed survey design, 
Naktachhij-Bateshowr Road 
285,120.00 Roads - Design 
  10 Furniture, Hangaha LSS 300,000.00 Education - General 
  11 Payment of detailed survey design, 
Devepura-Khariyani Road 
267,300.00 Roads - Design 
  12 Payment of detailed survey design, 
Devepura-Khariyani Road 
326,700.00 Roads - Design 
  13 Payment of detailed survey design, 
Many roads 
326,700.00 Roads - Design 
  14 Payment of detailed survey design, 
Many roads 
267,300.00 Roads - Design 
  15 Hulaki Road maintenance 30,240.00 Roads - Maintenance 
  16 Zonal Police Quarter maintenance 250,000.00 Security - Maintenance 
  17 Sports program 20,000.00 Other 
  18 Program Operation, Janakpur Deaf 
Association 
5,000.00 Targeted Group - Unknown 
  19 School Building construction, Balmiki 
Nagar 
250,000.00 Education - Construction 
  20 Bio gas plant, RCSDC 245,000.00 Energy 
  21 Community Building construction, 
Hansapur 
250,000.00 Community building - 
Construction 
  22 Writer association's building 
construction 
200,000.00 Community building - 
Construction 
  23 Furniture, Godar HSS 200,000.00 Education - General 
  24 Community Building construction, 
JNP8 
400,000.00 Community building - 
Construction 
  25 Road maintenance, Saketnagar 300,000.00 Roads - Maintenance 
  26 School building maintenance, SNR 
HSS, Dhabauli 
200,000.00 Education - Maintenance 
  27 Furniture Purchasing, Dibasdeep PS 150,000.00 Education - General 
  28 Building Construction, NPS, JNP8 97,491.00 Other 
  29 Building Construction, Nepal Bar 
Association, JNP 
149,840.00 Other 
  30 School Infrastructure Development, 
RPS, Kachuri 
200,000.00 Education - Construction 
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Source of 
Funding S.N Project Amount Sector 
  31 Dalit community building construction, 
Bagewa 
160,847.00 Community building - 
Construction 
  32 Road maintenance, JNP 4 45,154.00 Roads - Maintenance 
  33 Road maintenance JNP8 400,000.00 Roads - Maintenance 
  34 Community building construction, 
Ragunathpur 
400,000.00 Community building - 
Construction 
  35 Building construction, Nepal 
Journalism association 
300,000.00 Other 
  36 Community building construction, 
Bahedabela-7 
250,000.00 Community building - 
Construction 
  37 Road maintenance, Harini 400,000.00 Roads - Maintenance 
  38 Bridge maintenance, Machehitkaiya 250,000.00 Bridges - Maintenance 
  39 Community Building, Bahedabela 250,000.00 Community building - 
General 
  40 Road Maintenance, Banimiya 300,000.00 Roads - Maintenance 
  41 Sewing and cutting training, Labtoli 200,000.00 Livelihoods 
  42 Furniture Purchasing, Pressclub 
Janakpur 
125,000.00 Other 
  43 Maithili Development Fund, Dhanusa 150,000.00 Targeted Group - Unknown 
  44 Leadership Development program, 
Paudeshow 
200,000.00 Livelihoods 
  45 Soil filling at school, RPS, 
Sugamadhukarahi 
138,132.00 Education - Construction 
  46 School building construction, Asharpi 
Shah Primary School 
200,000.00 Education - Construction 
  47 Temple maintenance, Yagabalaky SS 200,000.00 Religious - Maintenance 
  48 Dharmasala Construction, 
Raghunathpur 
491,664.00 Religious - Construction 
  49 Compound wall, Janasewa, Sacos, 
Phulgama 
250,000.00 Community building - 
General 
  50 Road maintenance, Balha to Dumariaya 500,000.00 Roads - Maintenance 
  51 Bahedavella LSS construction 200,000.00 Education - Construction 
  52 Road maintenance and Hum Pipe, 
Raghunathpur  
199,329.00 Roads - Maintenance 
  53 School Construction RPS, Hansapur 200,000.00 Education - Construction 
  54 Road Maintenance Bisarbhoda 6-8 100,000.00 Roads - Maintenance 
  55 Soil filling in Gyanjyoti PS, JNP 200,000.00 Education - Construction 
  56 Scholarship distribution, Narayanbaba 
Sapahi 
150,000.00 Education - General 
   Total 13,079,253.00   
         
RAIDP Capital 1 Bridge maintenance, Devpura 400,000.00 Bridges - Maintenance 
  2 Agro-market Shed Construction, 
Hodgas 
201,321.00 Economic Development 
  3 RPS construction, Bhagawanpatti 36,189.00 Education - Construction 
  4 Remuneration payment, Satya N. 
Mandal 
16,420.00 Other 
  5 Bridge construction 1,490,000.00 Bridges - Construction 
   Total 2,143,930.00   
         
84 
 
Source of 
Funding S.N Project Amount Sector 
RAIDP Current 1 Survey Payment, Employee 77,901.00 Other 
  2 Payment of Remuneration, Arabinda 14,600.00 Other 
  3 Contingency, Ramsatyal 2,660.00 Other 
  4 Stationery, Sudha Traders 254,839.00 Other 
   Total 350,000.00   
         
Rural 
Electrification 
1 Transfer installation, DDC Dhanusa 89,342.00 Energy 
2 Contingency 102,480.00 Other 
  3 Contingency, office operation, union 
press 
64,500.00 Other 
  4 Rural electrification in different VDCs 1,178,448.75 Energy 
  5 Electrification in Laxmipur RPS 105,000.00 Energy 
  6 Road maintenance JNP9, Saket nagar 300,000.00 Roads - Maintenance 
  7 Road maintenance JNP 9, Biharkunda 300,000.00 Roads - Maintenance 
  8 Road maintenance JNP9,  550,000.00 Roads - Maintenance 
  9 Contingency  63,000.00 Other 
  10 Contingency, Advertisement, Janakpur 
Today 
5,750.00 Other 
  11 Contingency Advertisement, Akanchha 
Daily 
8,000.00 Other 
  12 Daily Allowance 21,750.00 Other 
   Total 2,788,270.75   
         
Rural Drinking 
water 
1 Contingency, Parmeshow Shaha 29,055.00 Other 
2 Hand Pipe, Rosan Enterprise 385,652.05 Water&Sanitation - 
Construction 
  3 Hand Pipe, Rosan Enterprise 140,394.59 Water&Sanitation - 
Construction 
  4 Hand Pipe, Rosan Enterprise 95,509.86 Water&Sanitation - 
Construction 
  5 Well construction, Tulasi 100,000.00 Water&Sanitation - 
Construction 
  6 Hand Pipe, Rosan Enterprise 334,945.52 Water&Sanitation - 
Construction 
  7 Well construction, Laxmi Niwas 100,000.00 Water&Sanitation - 
Construction 
  8 Well construction, Godar 100,000.00 Water&Sanitation - 
Construction 
   Total 1,285,557.02   
         
Local 
Trasportation 
Infrastructure 
Capital  
1 New Road Maintenance, Dhanusdham-
Janakpur 
600,000.00 Roads - Maintenance 
   Total 600,000.00   
         
Local 
Infrastructure, 
Agro-road, 
1 Bakhar Irrigation, Godar Chisapani, 400,000.00 Agriculture - Irrigation 
2 Bagdaha Irrigation, therasat 500,000.00 Agriculture - Irrigation 
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Funding S.N Project Amount Sector 
Small Irrigation 
   Total 900,000.00   
         
People's 
Participation 
1 Road Infrastructure Construction, 
Barpha Pachapharwa 
150,000.00 Roads - Construction 
  2 Madan Road construction, Hathipur-
Parwaha 
500,000.00 Roads - Construction 
  3 Road Infrastructure Construction, 
Labtoli-Baphai 
500,000.00 Roads - Construction 
  4 Road instrastructure Construction, 
Jamunibas-Kurtha 
500,000.00 Roads - Construction 
  5 Road instrastructure Construction, 
Mithileswor-Bagchauda 
500,000.00 Roads - Construction 
   Total 2,150,000.00   
         
Endangered 
ethnic 
community 
program 
1 Public service Commission Preparation 
Classes 
200,000.00 Livelihoods 
   Total 200,000.00   
         
National 
Volunteers 
Service 
program 
recurrent 
1 Salary and allowance 262,990.00 HR 
   Total 262,990.00   
         
Local 
Governance 
Community 
Development 
Program 
(LGCDP) 
1 Salary and allowance, Jayakumar 455,000.00 HR 
2 Meeting Allowance 153,000.00 Other 
3 Training program, Jaya Kumar 488,950.00 Other 
4 Program operation, Ram Bhajan 24,145.00 Other 
5 Transportation cost, Sunil kumar 15,540.00 Other 
  6 Transportation cost, Jaya, om & Bina 36,880.00 Other 
  7 Training program, Madhes Samaj 240,000.00 Targeted Group - Unknown 
  8 Training program, Faith Nepal 240,000.00 Other 
  9 Taining Program, Sunalosamaj 240,000.00 Other 
  10 Training progam, People's program 240,000.00 Other 
  11 Training program, Dalit society 
upliftment committee 
240,000.00 Targeted Group - Unknown 
  12 Taining, Development Nepal 240,000.00 Other 
  13 Training, Debit Nepal 240,000.00 Other 
  14 Training, Hariyali Nepal 185,000.00 Other 
  15 Contingency, Kausal Traders 45,625.00 Other 
  16 Transportation, Binod 23,355.00 Other 
  17 Training, Samaj Uthan Centre 240,000.00 Other 
  18 Training, Community Improvement 
Centre 
240,000.00 Other 
86 
 
Source of 
Funding S.N Project Amount Sector 
  19 Training, Community Improvement 
Centre 
240,000.00 Other 
  20 Taining Dalit Empowerment Solidari 240,000.00 Targeted Group - Unknown 
  21 Taining Janaki Mahila samaj 240,000.00 Targeted Group - Unknown 
  22 Training, Dalit Empowerment 
Solidarity Association 
230,000.00 Targeted Group - Unknown 
  23 Advertisement, Umesh Shah 15,701.00 Other 
  24 Payment to different VDCs 1,729,217.00 Other 
  25 MCPM expenditure, Anita 21,625.00 Other 
  26 MCPM expenditure, Sujita 21,760.50 Other 
  27 MCPM, Ramchandra 21,600.00 Other 
  28 MCPM Basanta 21,685.00 Other 
  29 MCPM Mahendra Raya 21,500.00 Other 
  30 Training conduction, Madhesh Samaj 
Kendra 
230,000.00 Other 
  31 Training conduction, Sahabhagitatmak 
Batabaran conservation kendra 
240,000.00 Other 
  32 Training conduction, Rural 
development project 
240,000.00 Other 
  33 Training conduction, Samaj 240,000.00 Other 
  34 MCPM , umesh 19,996.00 Other 
  35 Training, Samaj Uthan Centre 230,000.00 Other 
  36 MCPM, Umesh shana 15,701.00 Other 
  37 Computer purchase 104,299.00 Equipment 
  38 Training, Faith nepal 230,000.00 Other 
  39 Traing, Development Nepal 230,000.00 Other 
  40 Training, Samudaik sudhar Nepal 230,000.00 Other 
  41 Training, Janaki Mahila 230,000.00 Other 
  42 Taining , Mitra Dhanus 240,000.00 Other 
  43 Training, Debit Nepal 230,000.00 Other 
  44 Training, Rural Nepal 230,000.00 Other 
  45 Training, Sunaulo Samaj Nepal 230,000.00 Other 
  46 Traing, Local development funds 534,160.00 Other 
  47 MCPM, different evaluator 233,236.00 Other 
  48 Training, Dalit Empowerment 
Solidarity Association 
273,000.00 Targeted Group - Unknown 
   Total 10,600,975.50   
         
Retired 
employee 
service 
1 Retirement Facilities for 8 employees - 
Salary and accumulated leave 
1,175,034.00 HR 
2 Medical facility 1,785,780.00 HR 
   Total 2,960,814.00   
         
Central Multi-
year program 
1 Road maintenance, Gajaria, Sapahi 500,000.00 Roads - Maintenance 
2 Road maintenance, Nipal, Sapahi 500,000.00 Roads - Maintenance 
3 Road maintenance, Bhuiyathan, Sapahi 500,000.00 Roads - Maintenance 
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Funding S.N Project Amount Sector 
  4 Road maintenance, Sapahi Chowk to 
President residence 
500,000.00 Roads - Maintenance 
  5 Road maintenance, Banigama, 
Laxminiga 
500,000.00 Roads - Maintenance 
  6 Road maintenance, Begadabar, 
Kishannagar 
600,000.00 Roads - Maintenance 
  7 Road maintenance, Dhanusadham 600,000.00 Roads - Maintenance 
   Total 3,700,000.00   
         
Local transport 
infrastructure 
sectoral 
program 
1 Road maintenance, Janakpur 500,000.00 Roads - Maintenance 
2 Road maintenance, Godar-Chisapani, 
Sindhuli 
700,000.00 Roads - Maintenance 
3 Road maintenance, Lagma Gadagudi 596,989.00 Roads - Maintenance 
  4 Road maintenance, Balah to Dumaria 1,000,000.00 Roads - Maintenance 
  5 Road maintenance, Baidahi station to 
Indian border 
400,000.00 Roads - Maintenance 
  6 Road maintenance, Balganga to Tilahi 398,383.00 Roads - Maintenance 
   Total 3,595,372.00   
         
Local level's 
road, bridge 
and community 
access improve 
project  
1 Bridge construction, Surya R.B. 
Construction, J.V 
3,300,000.00 Bridges - Construction 
2 Bridge construction, Oasis Earth J.V. 1,527,404.56 Bridges - Construction 
   Total 4,827,404.56   
         
Madhes, 
backward 
group and 
Muslim welfare 
program  
1 Drinking water, Sanitation and Toilet 
construction, Batteshwor 
1,500,000.00 Water&Sanitation - 
Construction 
2 Drinking water, Sanitation and Toilet 
construction, Tarapti 
999,950.00 Water&Sanitation - 
Construction 
   Total 2,499,950.00   
         
Backward, 
Dalit program 
capital  
1 Contingency expenditure, Janakir Arts 1,300.00 Other 
2 Sahabhoj Program 40,000.00 Targeted Group - Unknown 
3 Training, Rambabu rabi das 55,000.00 Targeted Group - Unknown 
  4 Agabatti Training, Dhanauji 30,000.00 Livelihoods 
  5 Agabatti Training, Machijhitkaiya 55,000.00 Livelihoods 
  6 Candle Making Training, Pacharwa 55,000.00 Livelihoods 
  7 Candle Making Training, Bateshwor 55,000.00 Livelihoods 
  8 Candle Making Training, Bharatpur 55,000.00 Livelihoods 
  9 Candle Making Training, Santipur 55,000.00 Livelihoods 
   Total 401,300.00   
         
Gumba 
Management 
program  
1 Gumba management and maintenance, 
Tulsi 
88,000.00 Religious - Maintenance 
2 Gumba management and maintenance, 
Begadawar,4 
50,000.00 Religious - Maintenance 
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  3 Gumba management and 
maintenance,Begadwar-9 
49,153.00 Religious - Maintenance 
   Total 187,153.00   
         
DDC grants 
Recurrent 
1 Salary of DDC, DTO, VDC secretary, 
Local Development Funds & 
B.P.Koirala with Poor Programs's 
Employee 
27,668,425.25 HR 
   Total 27,668,425.25   
         
Alternative 
energy 
1 Salary 388,139.00 HR 
2 Motor Cycle Purchase, Bhajuratna 166,900.00 Equipment 
  3 Contingency, Hotel Indrabhog 77,600.00 Other 
  4 Program operation, Ajit kumar 62,816.00 Other 
   Total 695,455.00   
         
Registration fee 1 Shiva Temple construction, DDC 
compound 
100,000.00 Religious - Construction 
  2 Hume Pipe purchase, Nepal pipe 
industries 
21,752.00 Other 
  3 Soil filling 141,685.00 Other 
  4 Inauguration expenditure, KSH, HSS, 
Khajuri 
100,000.00 Other 
  5 Tractor accident at tarapati Sirsiya 450,000.00 Other 
  6 Land Tax office (Return) 854,161.75 Other 
  7 Karkat Pata Purchase, Gauri Sankar 
Iron Industry 
89,199.94 Other 
  8 Arrear Settle, RAIDP 522,382.91 Other 
  9 Publication expenditure, color 
advertisng 
238,656.00 Other 
  10 Hume Pipe purchase, Janaki pipe 
industry 
28,365.26 Other 
  11 Fuel  405,955.62 Other 
  12 Internet, Wordlink 135,600.00 Other 
  13 Borrow Expenditure, DDC funds 1,000,000.00 Advance 
  14 Zink Sheet purchase, Gaurisankar Iron 
Industry 
47,141.34 Other 
  15 Borrow Expenditure, DDC funds 500,000.00 Advance 
  16 Borrow Expenditure, DDC funds 4,000,000.00 Advance 
  17 Borrow Expenditure, DDC funds 1,000,000.00 Advance 
  18 Matching fund, Road board 788,917.00 Roads - General 
  19 Maithili Drama Festival 100,000.00 Other 
  20 Road construction, Begashivapur, 4 &5 300,000.00 Roads - Construction 
  21 Program of Micro Entrepreneurship 
Development Program 
400,000.00 Economic Development 
  22 Borrow Expenditure, DDC funds 200,000.00 Advance 
  23 Borrow Expenditure, DDC funds 1,000,000.00 Advance 
  24 Borrow Expenditure, Khajuri Mauwa 1,200,000.00 Advance 
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Lagma Road 
  25 Road Maintenance, Basbitti 700,000.00 Roads - Maintenance 
  26 Temple construction, Duladulahi Janaki 
Temple 
350,000.00 Religious - Construction 
  27 Road Maintenance, JNP13 200,000.00 Roads - Maintenance 
  28 Temple rennovation, Sankat mochan 
JNP 
250,000.00 Religious - Maintenance 
  29 Shed construction, Gurash, Labtolli 300,000.00 Other 
  30 Road maintenance, JNP13 150,000.00 Roads - Maintenance 
  31 Durga Temple construction, Lagma 
bazar 
125,000.00 Religious - Construction 
  32 Road maintenance, Jhatiyai 300,000.00 Roads - Maintenance 
  33 Community Building Construction, 
Mahuwa 
200,000.00 Community building - 
Construction 
  34 Shahid Rambrichha Yadav Memorial 
construction, Barmajhiya 
37,156.00 Other 
  35 Borrow spent, DDC funds 1,300,000.00 Advance 
  36 Culvert construction, Mauwa 100,000.00 Bridges - Construction 
  37 Fuel  65,898.14 Other 
  38 Culvert construction, Rural parna 
construction 
400,000.00 Bridges - Construction 
  39 Borrow Expenditure, DDC funds 400,000.00 Advance 
  40 Miscelleneous, Buddha Bahadur 8,000.00 Other 
  41 Road construction, Lagma, Gadagudi 200,000.00 Roads - Construction 
  42 Women awareness program, JNP 4 300,000.00 Targeted Group - Unknown 
  43 Women awareness program, Samaj 
Uthan Nepal 
300,000.00 Targeted Group - Unknown 
  44 Soil filling, KSH, HSS, Khajuri 228,691.00 Education - Maintenance 
  45 Community Building Construction, 
Laxmipur, Bagewa 
39,153.00 Community building - 
Construction 
  46 Culvert Construction, Mauwa 159,430.00 Bridges - Construction 
   Total 19,737,144.96   
         
Road board 1 Hulaki Road maintenance 350,000.00 Roads - Maintenance 
  2 Road maintenance, Tikauriya 350,000.00 Roads - Maintenance 
  3 Hulaki Road maintenance 1,365,310.00 Roads - Maintenance 
  4 Road maintenance, Tikauriya 1,523,607.00 Roads - Maintenance 
   Total 3,588,917.00   
         
Cultural 
promotion 
program 
1 Sahid Rambrichha Yadav, Barmajiya 1,000,000.00 Other 
   Total 1,000,000.00   
         
Gender equity 
and social 
inclusive 
1 Training, community improvement 
Centre 
400,000.00 Other 
2 Training, Women and Children Office 300,000.00 Targeted Group - Unknown 
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program  3 Contingency, Syam Computer 100,000.00 Other 
   Total 800,000.00   
         
Indian Embassy 
supported 
program  
1 Road construction, Khajuri-Mahuwa-
Lagma 
1,170,595.00 Roads - Construction 
2 School construction, BPHS, Sapahi 4,945,451.31 Education - Construction 
3 School construction, Tapasi Baba HS, 
Sonigama 
48,360.00 Education - Construction 
   Total 6,164,406.31   
         
Consituency 
development 
program(21 CA 
members)  
1 Contingency(21x15000=315000) 315,000.00 Other 
2 Administration(21x50000=1050000) 1,050,000.00 Other 
3 Road maintenance, Janakpur to 
Yadukuwa 
100,000.00 Roads - Maintenance 
4 Furniture and sports 250,000.00 Other 
  5 Hand Pipe distribution 150,000.00 Water&Sanitation - General 
  6 Mosquito Pesticide, JNP 145,000.00 Other 
  7 Skill development training 200,000.00 Livelihoods 
  8 Rahat distribution (5 people) 90,000.00 Education - Teachers 
  9 Ramsaroj Yadav memorial building 150,000.00 Other 
  10 Mithial Drama Council 50,000.00 Other 
  11 Masanghat, Sworgadwari Hospital 50,000.00 Health - General 
  12 Secondary School Construction, 
Bahedabela 
135,000.00 Education - Construction 
  13 Road maintenance 250,000.00 Roads - Maintenance 
  14 Computer & furniture purchasing 250,000.00 Equipment 
  15 Community Reproductive Centre, 
bangadarwar 
50,000.00 Health - General 
  16 Sahid Memorial Building 150,000.00 Other 
  17 Dalit community building construction, 
Basahiya 
100,000.00 Community building - 
Construction 
  18 Dalit community building construction, 
Hansapati 
40,000.00 Community building - 
Construction 
  19 Mandal community building, Lgma 50,000.00 Community building - 
Construction 
  20 Dalit Shool, Devpura 50,000.00 Education - General 
  21 Hanuman Temple 50,000.00 Religious - General 
  22 Furniture in different organization 435,000.00 Other 
  23 Compound wall construction at Masjit, 
Mouwahi 
135,000.00 Other 
  24 Mahabir temple construction, 
Bangasitpur 
200,000.00 Religious - Construction 
  25 Dalit community building, 
ramadaiyabhawari 
100,000.00 Community building - 
General 
  26 Youth community building, Santipur 98,623.00 Community building - 
General 
  27 Community building, gopalpur 200,000.00 Community building - 
General 
  28 Community building, Mansingpatti 100,000.00 Community building - 
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General 
  29 Community building, Sindurjoda 100,000.00 Community building - 
General 
  30 Memorial building, JNP 50,000.00 Other 
  31 Drain construction, JNP 3 220,000.00 Water&Sanitation - 
Construction 
  32 Drain construction, JNP 4 200,000.00 Water&Sanitation - 
Construction 
  33 Temple and road renovation, JNP12 90,000.00 Roads - Maintenance 
  34 Hand Pipe JNP3 200,000.00 Water&Sanitation - General 
  35 Library compound wall construction, 
JNP 9 
100,000.00 Other 
  36 Road maintenance, JNP12 75,000.00 Roads - Maintenance 
  37 Community construction, Tarapati 9 100,000.00 Community building - 
Construction 
  38 Soil filling, Tapapati 6 &7 600,000.00 Other 
  39 Hand Pipe distribution 235,000.00 Water&Sanitation - General 
  40 Teli community building, sapahi 300,000.00 Community building - 
Construction 
  41 Social welfare centre, Sapahi-5 250,000.00 Community building - 
General 
  42 Tamalopa Office, Janakpur 50,000.00 Other 
  43 Dharmasala maintenance, JNP13 50,000.00 Religious - Maintenance 
  44 Women empowerment 285,000.00 Targeted Group - Unknown 
  45 Mithila Building compound wall, JNP4 335,000.00 Targeted Group - Unknown 
  46 Jayabir youth club, Phulgama 200,000.00 Targeted Group - Unknown 
  47 Dalit community building,Lohana 100,000.00 Community building - 
General 
  48 Well construction, Bangadabar 200,000.00 Water&Sanitation - 
Construction 
  49 Community building construction, 
Thilla2 
100,000.00 Community building - 
Construction 
  50 Furniture for rural women centre, JNP 350,000.00 Other 
  51 Drinking water hand pipe 335,000.00 Water&Sanitation - General 
  52 Road maintenance JNP1 150,000.00 Roads - Maintenance 
  53 Drinking water hand pipe, Lakad 50,000.00 Water&Sanitation - General 
  54 Dhanusa Service committee Hospital 50,000.00 Health - General 
  55 Pond maintenance and renovation, 
Machi Jhitkaiya 
300,000.00 Livelihoods 
  56 Road construction 400M, Machi Lagma 500,000.00 Roads - Construction 
  57 Drinking water c1 135,000.00 Water&Sanitation - General 
  58 Bhairab RPS, Sirsiya 5 100,000.00 Education - General 
  59 Divas Deep RPS, Banigama, Sapahi 5 100,000.00 Education - General 
  60 Bajranga RPS, Benga 100,000.00 Education - General 
  61 Health post, Bhagawanpatti 50,000.00 Health - General 
  62 Road gravel, Mahendra Nagar 100,000.00 Roads - General 
  63 Sports materials, CA5 100,000.00 Other 
  64 Youth Empowerment CA 5 385,000.00 Other 
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  65 Road gravel, Dhanusadham 935,000.00 Roads - General 
  66 Sahid Memorial Building 100,000.00 Other 
  67 Shree Sschool, Kuwarampur 100,000.00 Education - General 
  68 Suryadaya Library, Janakpur 50,000.00 Other 
  69 Buidling construction CA4 50,000.00 Other 
  70 Durga Temple construction, Laxmipur, 
Bagewa 
85,000.00 Religious - Construction 
  71 Women empowerment, Janakpur 350,000.00 Targeted Group - Unknown 
  72 Furniture purchasing, Janakpur 200,000.00 Other 
  73 Furniture purchasing, Janakpur 135,000.00 Other 
  74 Police Post construction, Tulsiyahi 80,000.00 Security - Construction 
  75 Ram Laxman Temple, Dhanauji 100,000.00 Religious - General 
  76 Baideja Higher S. School, Tuliyahi 570,000.00 Education - General 
  77 Maunibaba Building maintenance, JNP 
8 
50,000.00 Other 
  78 Road gravel, Baphai, Nabtoli, Hathipur 935,000.00 Roads - General 
  79 Dalit community building construction, 
Ramdaiya 2 
100,000.00 Community building - 
Construction 
  80 Dalit community building construction 
Ramdaiya 4 
200,000.00 Community building - 
Construction 
  81 Furniture purchasing, for different 
organization 
300,000.00 Other 
  82 Sports materials purchase and 
distribution CFI 
335,000.00 Other 
  83 Kurtha Maharani Temple 150,000.00 Religious - General 
  84 Shah Society Service Community 
Dharmasala, JNP 13 
250,000.00 Other 
  85 Sport material distribution, Mauha JNP 535,000.00 Other 
  86 Sahid Kameshowr memorial 
construction, Hathipur hadbara 
500,000.00 Other 
  87 Mithila Drama Festival 50,000.00 Other 
  88 Secondary School , Maholiya 150,000.00 Education - General 
  89 Bhagabati Temple renovation, Gidda 50,000.00 Religious - Maintenance 
  90 Lower S. School, Rudauli 50,000.00 Education - General 
  91 Salahes Temple 50,000.00 Religious - General 
  92 Krishna Temple & OM Shanti Temple, 
baghachauda 
85,000.00 Religious - General 
  93 Madan Ashrit Primary School, 
Bengadabar 7 
100,000.00 Education - General 
  94 Radhara Krishna Temple's Compound 
wall 
50,000.00 Religious - General 
  95 KabirKuti Roof RCC, Dhalkebar 7 100,000.00 Other 
  96 Bishowkarma Temple construction, 
Bhuchakrapur 
50,000.00 Religious - Construction 
  97 Drinking water well and hand pipe 
distribution 
635,000.00 Water&Sanitation - General 
  98 Income generation training JNP 350,000.00 Livelihoods 
  99 Computer and furniture for Nepal 
Development society 
350,000.00 Equipment 
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Source of 
Funding S.N Project Amount Sector 
  100 Sports materials for CA3 235,000.00 Other 
  101 Sahid Durganada Memorial Trust 35,000.00 Other 
  102 Bramha Kanya R Primary School, 
Parawaha 
385,000.00 Education - General 
  103 Baikundadas Masanghat, JNP 0.00 Religious - General 
  104 Furniture Purchasing JNP4 150,000.00 Other 
  105 Drinking water hand pipe, Parwaha 150,000.00 Water&Sanitation - General 
  106 Dalit Community Building JNP 195,339.00 Community building - 
General 
   Total 20,918,962.00   
   GRAND TOTAL 133,106,280.35   
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 Summary of Dhanusa DDC Expenditure 2010/11 by sub-Sector 
Sector Amount 
Education - General 2,505,000.00 
Education - Construction 6,553,132.31 
Education - Maintenance 428,691.00 
Education - Teachers 90,000.00 
Health - General 200,000.00 
Health - Construction 0.00 
Water&Sanitation - General 1,890,000.00 
Water&Sanitation - Construction 4,376,452.02 
Water&Sanitation - Maintenance 0.00 
Roads - General 2,758,917.00 
Roads - Design 2,007,720.00 
Roads - Construction 4,320,595.00 
Roads - Maintenance 16,924,012.00 
Bridges - General 0.00 
Bridges - Construction 6,976,834.56 
Bridges - Maintenance 650,000.00 
Agriculture - General 0.00 
Agriculture - Construction 0.00 
Agriculture - Irrigation 900,000.00 
Community building - General 1,643,962.00 
Community building - Construction 2,890,000.00 
Community building - Maintenance 0.00 
Religious - General 747,844.00 
Religious - Construction 1,651,664.00 
Religious - Maintenance 783,145.00 
Energy 1,822,790.75 
Energy - Construction 0.00 
Livelihoods 1,755,000.00 
Economic Development 601,321.00 
Targeted Group - Unknown 3,783,000.00 
Security - General 0.00 
Security - Construction 580,000.00 
Security - Maintenance 550,000.00 
Environment 0.00 
Equipment 871,199.00 
HR 31,735,368.25 
Advance 10,600,000.00 
Other 22,509,632.46 
TOTAL 133,106,280.35 
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 Summary of Dhanusa DDC Expenditure 2010/11 by Sector 
Sector Amount % of Total 
Education 9,576,823.31 7.19 
Health 200,000.00 0.15 
Water&Sanitation 6,266,452.02 4.71 
Roads 26,011,244.00 19.54 
Bridges 7,626,834.56 5.73 
Agriculture 900,000.00 0.68 
Community building 4,533,962.00 3.41 
Religious 3,182,653.00 2.39 
Energy 1,822,790.75 1.37 
Livelihoods 1,755,000.00 1.32 
Economic Development 601,321.00 0.45 
Targeted Group 3,783,000.00 2.84 
Security 1,130,000.00 0.85 
Equipment 871,199.00 0.65 
HR 31,735,368.25 23.84 
Advance 10,600,000.00 7.96 
Other 22,509,632.46 16.91 
TOTAL 133,106,280.35 100.00 
 
 
Figure 22: Dhanusa DDC expenditure 2010/11 by sector 
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Summary of Dhanusa DDC Expenditure by Sector FYs 2009/10 - 2011/12 
DDC Dhanusa 2009-12: Expenditure by Sectors 
Sector Amount % of Total 
Education 12,812,364 4.02 
Health 1,029,106 0.32 
Water&Sanitation 14,589,421 4.57 
Roads 54,132,631 16.97 
Bridges 27,814,909 8.72 
Agriculture 4,200,000 1.32 
Community building 10,381,677 3.25 
Religious 5,360,691 1.68 
Energy 8,807,984 2.76 
Livelihoods 5,685,000 1.78 
Economic Development 1,051,321 0.33 
Targeted Group 10,522,600 3.30 
Security 2,230,000 0.70 
Environment 976,868 0.31 
Social Mobilisation 15,484,733 4.85 
Equipment 871,199 0.27 
HR 67,264,320 21.08 
Advance 33,491,692 10.50 
Grants 9,881,146 3.10 
Other 32,445,022 10.17 
TOTAL 319,032,685 100 
 
Figure 23: Dhanusa DDC expenditure 2009-12 by sector 
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ANNEX 7: SCHOOL INCOME AND DISTRICT EDUCATION OFFICE EXPENDITURE 
 
School Income Sources - Dhankuta 
Jurisdiction Income sources 2009/10 % of total 2010/11 % of total 2011/12 % of total Totals % of total 
Bhirgaun VDC Brought forward             163,229              1.4          1,817,262           11.1          3,733,599           24.2          5,714,090           13.1  
  GoN grants       12,232,988         102.1        12,919,138           79.2        11,322,778           73.5        36,474,904           83.4  
  LB contribution             316,500              2.6              160,000              1.0              150,000              1.0              626,500              1.4  
  District Education Fund                        -                  -                           -                  -                           -                  -                           -                  -    
  Other           (733,527)           (6.1)         1,423,326              8.7              204,372              1.3              894,171              2.0  
  TOTAL       11,979,190         100.0        16,319,726         100.0        15,410,749         100.0        43,709,665         100.0  
                    
Hattikharka VDC Brought forward         1,097,526           12.3          3,722,787           38.9          3,591,829           46.5          8,412,142           32.1  
  GoN grants         6,222,690           69.7          5,041,271           52.7          3,561,298           46.1        14,825,259           56.6  
  LB contribution             209,138              2.3              189,255              2.0                94,535              1.2              492,928              1.9  
  District Education Fund                        -                  -                           -                  -                           -                  -                           -                  -    
  Other         1,397,703           15.7              604,917              6.3              478,841              6.2          2,481,461              9.5  
  TOTAL         8,927,057         100.0          9,558,230         100.0          7,726,503         100.0        26,211,790         100.0  
                    
Rajarani VDC Brought forward         1,577,572           13.0          3,548,797           20.6          3,075,066           22.2          8,201,435           19.0  
  GoN grants         8,683,302           71.3          8,381,486           48.7          6,442,837           46.4        23,507,625           54.4  
  LB contribution               95,000              0.8                90,000              0.5              151,425              1.1              336,425              0.8  
  District Education Fund                        -                  -                           -                  -                           -                  -                           -                  -    
  Other         1,818,473           14.9          5,181,784           30.1          4,204,310           30.3        11,204,567           25.9  
  TOTAL       12,174,347         100.0        17,202,067         100.0        13,873,638         100.0        43,250,052         100.0  
                    
Pakhribas VDC Brought forward         1,076,574              7.8          2,027,920           10.4          1,919,945              9.9          5,024,439              9.5  
  GoN grants         7,435,404           53.7        10,410,186           53.4          9,458,414           49.0        27,304,004           51.9  
  LB contribution             144,800              1.0              155,188              0.8                42,250              0.2              342,238              0.7  
  District Education Fund                        -                  -                           -                  -                           -                  -                           -                  -    
  Other         5,198,600           37.5          6,888,934           35.4          7,888,816           40.9        19,976,350           37.9  
  TOTAL       13,855,378         100.0        19,482,228         100.0        19,309,425         100.0        52,647,031         100.0  
                    
Bhedetar VDC Brought forward         2,078,449           18.8          2,419,570           19.4          1,984,398           18.2          6,482,418           18.8  
  GoN grants         7,334,343           66.5          9,203,073           73.9          7,897,936           72.3        24,435,352           71.0  
  LB contribution             135,000              1.2              130,000              1.0              335,900              3.1              600,900              1.7  
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Jurisdiction Income sources 2009/10 % of total 2010/11 % of total 2011/12 % of total Totals % of total 
  District Education Fund                        -                  -                           -                  -                494,549              4.5              494,549              1.4  
  Other         1,478,543           13.4              700,229              5.6              215,123              2.0          2,393,894              7.0  
  TOTAL       11,026,335         100.0        12,452,872         100.0        10,927,906         100.0        34,407,112         100.0  
                    
Dhankuta 
Municipality  
Brought forward         2,705,957           10.7          5,456,378           19.0          2,930,685           11.2        11,093,020           13.8  
GoN grants       18,865,878           74.3        20,688,354           72.1        22,271,338           85.0        61,825,570           77.0  
  LB contribution             496,886              2.0              285,100              1.0              191,400              0.7              973,386              1.2  
  District Education Fund                        -                  -                           -                  -                           -                  -                           -                  -    
  Other         3,329,246           13.1          2,250,034              7.8              795,341              3.0          6,374,621              7.9  
  TOTAL       25,397,967         100.0        28,679,866         100.0        26,188,764         100.0        80,266,597         100.0  
                    
All schools Brought forward         8,699,307           10.4        18,992,714           18.3        17,235,522           18.4        44,927,544           16.0  
  GoN grants       60,774,605           72.9        66,643,508           64.3        60,954,601           65.2      188,372,714           67.2  
  LB contribution         1,397,324              1.7          1,009,543              1.0              965,510              1.0          3,372,377              1.2  
  District Education Fund                        -                  -                           -                  -                494,549              0.5              494,549              0.2  
  Other       12,489,038           15.0        17,049,224           16.4        13,786,803           14.8        43,325,064           15.4  
  TOTAL       83,360,274         100.0      103,694,989         100.0        93,436,985         100.0      280,492,248         100.0  
 
 
VDC contributions only 
       Income sources 2009/10 % of total 2010/11 
% of 
total 2011/12 
% of 
total Totals 
% of 
total 
Brought forward         5,993,350       10.34        13,536,336       18.04        14,304,837       21.27        33,834,524        16.90  
GoN grants       41,908,727        72.30        45,955,154       61.26        38,683,263       57.52      126,547,144       63.20  
VDC contribution           900,438         1.55            724,443         0.97            774,110         1.15          2,398,991          1.20  
District Education Fund                      -                  -                         -                  -              494,549         0.74            494,549         0.25  
Other         9,159,792       15.80        14,799,190       19.73        12,991,462       19.32        36,950,443       18.45  
TOTAL       57,962,307      100.00        75,015,123     100.00        67,248,221     100.00      200,225,651     100.00  
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School Income Sources – Dhanusa 
Jurisdiction Income sources 2009/10 % of total 2010/11 
% of 
total 2011/12 
% of 
total Totals 
% of 
total 
Lohana VDC Brought forward         1,039,594           14.3                56,084            0.8            126,817            1.6          1,222,495            5.4  
  GoN grants         5,532,403           76.2          6,728,413           92.6          7,754,728           95.8        20,015,543           88.5  
  LB contribution               32,500            0.4            200,000            2.8                         -                  -              232,500            1.0  
  District Education Fund                        -                  -                           -                  -                           -                  -                           -                  -    
  Other            660,397             9.1             278,631             3.8             214,120             2.6          1,153,148             5.1  
  TOTAL         7,264,894         100.0          7,263,128         100.0          8,095,664         100.0        22,623,685         100.0  
                    
Labtoli VDC Brought forward            244,041             9.5          1,460,429           61.6          1,135,270           47.5          2,839,740           38.7  
  GoN grants         2,258,487           87.6             911,140           38.4          1,255,782           52.5          4,425,409           60.3  
  LB contribution                        -                  -                           -                  -                           -                  -                           -                  -    
  District Education Fund                        -                  -                           -                  -                           -                  -                           -                  -    
  Other               75,000             2.9                         -                  -                           -                  -                  75,000             1.0  
  TOTAL         2,577,528         100.0          2,371,569         100.0          2,391,052         100.0          7,340,149         100.0  
                    
Basbitti VDC Brought forward            397,706           13.3             880,554           23.6             727,391           20.5          2,005,651           19.5  
  GoN grants         2,464,596           82.5          2,403,805           64.4          2,654,433           74.8          7,522,834           73.3  
  LB contribution                        -                  -                           -                  -                           -                  -                           -                  -    
  District Education Fund                        -                  -                           -                  -                           -                  -                           -                  -    
  Other            125,123             4.2             448,384           12.0             167,570             4.7             741,077             7.2  
  TOTAL         2,987,424         100.0          3,732,743         100.0          3,549,394         100.0        10,269,562         100.0  
                    
Umaprempur VDC Brought forward         1,337,281           10.2             833,912             5.8             212,916             3.7          2,384,109             7.2  
  GoN grants       11,256,357           85.9        12,716,976           88.9          5,303,457           93.3        29,276,790           88.5  
  LB contribution            100,000             0.8                         -                  -                           -                  -               100,000             0.3  
  District Education Fund                        -                  -                           -                  -               100,000             1.8             100,000             0.3  
  Other            408,709             3.1             749,031             5.2                69,024             1.2          1,226,765             3.7  
  TOTAL       13,102,347         100.0        14,299,919         100.0          5,685,397         100.0        33,087,664         100.0  
                    
Sapahi VDC Brought forward         1,263,318           12.5          1,109,637           11.8          1,268,512           13.7          3,641,467           12.6  
  GoN grants         8,096,827           80.0          7,517,272           80.2          7,873,389           84.7        23,487,489           81.6  
  LB contribution               50,000             0.5                         -                  -                           -                  -                  50,000             0.2  
  District Education Fund            100,000             1.0             100,000             1.1                         -                  -               200,000             0.7  
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Jurisdiction Income sources 2009/10 % of total 2010/11 
% of 
total 2011/12 
% of 
total Totals 
% of 
total 
  Other            607,358             6.0             650,945             6.9             150,523             1.6          1,408,826             4.9  
  TOTAL       10,117,504         100.0          9,377,854         100.0          9,292,424         100.0        28,787,782         100.0  
                    
Janakpur Municipality Brought forward         4,185,999           12.8          6,545,658           17.5          4,722,857           12.6        15,454,514           14.4  
GoN grants       25,484,951           78.0        27,083,683           72.5        31,314,188           83.7        83,882,822           78.1  
  LB contribution                        -                  -                           -                  -                           -                  -                           -                  -    
  District Education Fund                        -                  -                           -                  -                           -                  -                           -                  -    
  Other         3,012,107             9.2          3,738,709           10.0          1,371,432             3.7          8,122,248             7.6  
  TOTAL       32,683,057         100.0        37,368,049         100.0        37,408,478         100.0      107,459,584         100.0  
      
 
  
 
  
 
    
All schools Brought forward         8,467,939           12.3        10,886,273           14.6          8,193,764           12.3        27,547,976           13.1  
  GoN grants       55,093,621           80.2        57,361,289           77.1        56,155,977           84.5      168,610,887           80.5  
  LB contribution            182,500             0.3             200,000             0.3                         -                  -               382,500             0.2  
  District Education Fund            100,000             0.1             100,000             0.1             100,000             0.2             300,000             0.1  
  Other         4,888,695             7.1          5,865,700             7.9          1,972,669             3.0        12,727,064             6.1  
  TOTAL       68,732,754         100.0        74,413,262         100.0        66,422,410         100.0      209,568,426         100.0  
 
 
VDC contributions only 
       Income sources 2009/10 % of total 2010/11 
% of 
total 2011/12 
% of 
total Totals 
% of 
total 
Brought forward         4,281,939       11.88        4,340,616      11.72          3,470,906       11.96        12,093,461      11.84  
GoN grants       29,608,670       82.13        30,277,606      81.73        24,841,789       85.62        84,728,065      82.98  
VDC contribution           182,500         0.51          200,000         0.54               -              -          382,500        0.37  
District Education Fund           100,000         0.28          100,000        0.27           100,000        0.34      300,000         0.29  
Other         1,876,588         5.21          2,126,991        5.74           601,237       2.07      4,604,816         4.51  
TOTAL       36,049,697     100.00        37,045,213    100.00        29,013,932     100.00      102,108,842    100.00  
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District Education Office Expenditure - Dhankuta FY 2009-10 
Budget code Line item Budget allocation 
 Released 
budget   Expenditure  
65-3-121 DEO recurrent expenditures - salary of all 
DEO staff (including of school 
supervisors) and office 
maintenance/admin-istrative costs  
       5,699,878        5,644,738        5,644,738  
90-3-910 Allowances to teachers for accumulated 
leaves 
                      -                         -                         -    
90-3-930 Medical treatment related costs for 
teachers 
                      -                         -                         -    
90-3-932 Dress allowance                       -                         -                         -    
65-3-130 Office of the Controller of Examinations 
recurrent costs - conduction of SLC 
examinations in the district 
           785,535            785,535           785,535  
65-3-140 Primary teachers salary (including 
permanent and temporary teachers in 
approved positions and Rahat teachers)  
   167,898,734    167,664,989   167,664,989  
65-3-150 Lower secondary and secondary teachers 
salary (including permanent and temporary 
teachers in approved positions and Rahat 
teachers, and also the salaries of resource 
persons)  
     90,938,018      90,938,018      90,938,018  
65-3-169 Teachers Records Office - Teachers post 
retirement benefits 
       4,736,359        4,726,359        4,726,359  
65-3-170 Special education - all recurrent costs 
(except salaries) of operation of special 
schools for inclusive education 
                      -                         -                         -    
65-3-411 Second Higher Education Project - all 
recurrent development activities other than 
salaries 
       2,325,926        2,325,926        2,325,926  
65-3-440 Higher secondary education recurrent costs 
for teacher salary grants 
       5,558,514        5,558,514        5,558,514  
65-3-600 Non-formal education recurrent costs - for 
development activities; does not cover 
salaries 
       6,851,200        5,411,745        5,411,745  
65-3-804 Education for All program      14,657,780        1,439,696      14,396,960  
65-3-815 SSRP district recurrent - major chunk of 
the budget that covers all grants to schools 
(i.e., construction, textbooks, scholarships, 
school management, RC management, 
PCF salary and non-salary,  
     53,594,108      52,282,068      52,282,068  
65-4-815 SSRP district capital - covers capital costs 
such as construction and furnishing of 
DEO buildings 
     31,095,000      31,095,000      31,095,000  
65-3-830 Secondary education support program 
(financed by ADB and Danida) and 
implemented in selected districts between 
2001-2010. 
       5,829,200        5,790,200        5,790,200  
65-4-428  Teachers Records Office - Teachers post 
retirement benefits  
                      -                         -                         -    
65-3-416  Early childhood education and 
development program - development costs; 
from UNICEF fund  
                      -                         -                         -    
65-3-428  SSRP centre budget that is reallocated to 
districts - covers development activities 
such as training and workshops at the 
district level; does not cover any salaries  
                      -                         -                         -    
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Budget code Line item Budget allocation 
 Released 
budget   Expenditure  
65-3-426 Community school capacity building        1,138,470        1,056,619        1,056,619  
  Total    391,108,722    374,719,407   387,676,671  
 
 
 
 
DEO Expenditure - Dhankuta FY 2010/11 
Budget code Line item Budget allocation 
 Released 
budget   Expenditure  
 65-3-121   DEO recurrent expenditures - salary of all 
DEO staff (including of school 
supervisors) and office 
maintenance/administrative costs   
       6,051,000         5,906,565         5,906,565  
90-3-910 Allowances to teachers for accumulated 
leaves 
                      -                          -                         -    
90-3-930 Medical treatment related costs for 
teachers 
                      -                          -                         -    
90-3-932  Dress allowance             169,000            169,000             169,000  
65-3-130  Office of the Controller of Examinations 
recurrent costs - conduction of SLC 
examinations in the district  
           888,000            888,000             888,000  
65-3-140  Primary teachers salary (including 
permanent and temporary teachers in 
approved positions and Rahat teachers)   
   174,603,975    172,995,640     172,995,640  
65-3-150  Lower secondary and secondary teachers 
salary (including permanent and 
temporary teachers in approved positions 
and Rahat teachers, and also the salaries of 
resource persons)   
     98,271,680       96,322,287       96,322,287  
65-3-169  Teachers Records Office - Teachers post 
retirement benefits  
     11,326,922       11,326,922       11,326,922  
65-3-170 Special education - all recurrent costs 
(except salaries) of operation of special 
schools for inclusive education 
                      -                          -                         -    
65-3-411  Second Higher Education Project - all 
recurrent development activities other than 
salaries  
       3,448,000         3,448,000         3,448,000  
65-3-440  Higher secondary education recurrent 
costs for teacher salary grants  
     11,987,580       11,987,580       11,987,580  
65-3-600  Non-formal education recurrent costs - 
for development activities; does not cover 
salaries  
       5,868,764         5,190,695         5,190,695  
65-3-804 Education for All program       
65-3-815  SSRP district recurrent - major chunk of 
the budget that covers all grants to schools 
(i.e., construction, textbooks, scholarships, 
school management, RC management, 
PCF salary and non-salary,   
     97,291,980       90,621,561       90,621,561  
65-4-815  SSRP district capital - covers capital costs 
such as construction and furnishing of 
DEO buildings  
     57,370,000       57,370,000       57,370,000  
65-3-830 Secondary education support program 
(financed by ADB and Danida) and 
implemented in selected districts between 
2001-2010. 
                      -                          -                         -    
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Budget code Line item Budget allocation 
 Released 
budget   Expenditure  
65-4-428  Teachers Records Office - Teachers post 
retirement benefits  
           500,000            500,000             500,000  
65-3-416  Early childhood education and 
development program - development 
costs; from UNICEF fund  
       1,668,233         1,393,237         1,393,237  
65-3-428  SSRP centre budget that is reallocated to 
districts - covers development activities 
such as training and workshops at the 
district level; does not cover any salaries  
       5,354,869         4,914,875         4,914,875  
65-3-426 Community school capacity building                       -                          -                         -    
   Total     474,800,003    463,034,361     463,034,361  
 
 
 
DEO Expenditure - Dhankuta FY 2011-12 
Budget code Line item Budget allocation 
 Released 
budget   Expenditure  
3500143 DEO recurrent expenditures - salary of all 
DEO staff (including of school 
supervisors) and office 
maintenance/administrative costs  
      7,402,160         7,087,144          7,087,144  
  
Allowances to teachers for accumulated 
leaves 
                     -                        -                           -    
  
Medical treatment related costs for 
teachers 
                     -                        -                           -    
   Dress allowance                       -                        -                           -    
3500153 Office of the Controller of Examinations 
recurrent costs - conduction of SLC 
examinations in the district 
      2,665,564         2,665,564          2,665,564  
3500163 Primary teachers salary (including 
permanent and temporary teachers in 
approved positions and Rahat teachers)  
 212,877,490    210,128,999     210,128,999  
3500173 Lower secondary and secondary teachers 
salary (including permanent and 
temporary teachers in approved positions 
and Rahat teachers, and also the salaries of 
resource persons)  
 112,219,089    112,208,256     112,208,256  
  
 Teachers Records Office - Teachers post 
retirement benefits  
                     -                          -                           -    
3500223 Teachers Record office recurrent costs - 
leave and other benefits of teachers in 
approved positions; gratuity for teachers 
    12,396,034      12,396,034        12,396,034  
3501083 Higher secondary education recurrent 
costs for teacher salary grants 
    14,021,280      14,021,280        14,021,280  
  
 Higher secondary education recurrent 
costs for teacher salary grants  
                     -                          -                           -    
3501123 Non-formal education recurrent costs - for 
development activities; does not cover 
salaries 
      4,644,920         4,577,740          4,577,740  
  Education for All program       
3508033 SSRP district recurrent - major chunk of 
the budget that covers all grants to schools 
(i.e., construction, textbooks, scholarships, 
 161,360,411    150,206,180     150,206,180  
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Budget code Line item Budget allocation 
 Released 
budget   Expenditure  
school management, RC management, 
PCF salary and non-salary,  
3508034 SSRP district capital - covers capital costs 
such as construction and furnishing of 
DEO buildings 
         160,000            160,000             160,000  
  
Secondary education support program 
(financed by ADB and Danida) and 
implemented in selected districts between 
2001-2010. 
                     -                        -                           -    
  
 Teachers Records Office - Teachers post 
retirement benefits  
                     -                        -                           -    
3501183 Early childhood education and 
development - development costs; from 
UNICEF fund 
         673,166            642,690             642,690  
3501213 SSRP centre budget that is reallocated to 
districts - covers development activities 
such as training and workshops at the 
district level; does not cover any salaries 
            40,000              40,000                40,000  
  Community school capacity building                      -                        -                           -    
  Total  528,460,114    514,133,885     514,133,885  
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ANNEX 8: BASIC EDUCATION SECTOR DATA 
 
DHANKUTA AND DHANUSA DISTRICT – EXPENDITURE AND TEACHERS RATIOS 
 
Expenditure per student 
Year 
Dhankuta Dhanusa 
Total DEO 
expenditure 
(NRs) 
No of 
students 
Per student 
expenditure 
(NRs) 
Total DEO 
expenditure 
(NRs) 
No of 
students 
Per student 
expenditure 
(NRs) 
2009-10 387,676,670.81 52,957.00 7,320.59 673,074,697.02 146,182.00 4,604.36 
2010-11 463,034,361.41 51,954.00 8,912.39 749,554,896.99 153,871.00 4,871.32 
2011-12 514,133,885.10 47,777.00 10,761.12 464,911,494.12 153,821.00 3,022.42 
       Note: No. of students = students enrolled in public primary, lower secondary, secondary and higher secondary 
schools 
 
 
 
 
ENROLMENT RATES – DHANKUTA AND DHANUSA DISTRICTS (OVERVIEW) 
 
PUBLIC SCHOOLS 
ENROLMENT SUMMARY 
Year Education sub-sector Dhankuta Dhanusa 
2009/10 
Primary 29,537 109,931 
Lower secondary 13,898 23,692 
Secondary and higher secondary 9,522 12,559 
Total students 52,957 146,182 
2010/11 
Primary 27,892 114,954 
Lower secondary 13,694 26,077 
Secondary and higher secondary 10,368 12,840 
Total students 51,954 153,871 
2011/12 
Primary 23,721 107,867 
Lower secondary 13,673 30,133 
Secondary and higher secondary 10,383 15,821 
Total students 47,777 153,821 
2012/13 
Primary 20,769 116,893 
Lower secondary 12,798 35,758 
Secondary and higher secondary 9,980 17,949 
Total students 43,547 170,600 
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ENROLMENT IN PUBLIC AND PRIVATE SCHOOLS 
SUMMARY 
Primary School Enrolment 
 2008-09 2009-10 2010-11 2011-12 2012-13 2013-14 
National 
Public 4,288,517 4,256,010 4,363,443 4,111,679 3,885,449 3,724,043 
Private 493,796 644,653 588,513 671,206 691,244 677,737 
Total 4,782,313 4,900,663 4,951,956 4,782,885 4,576,693 4,401,780 
Dhankuta 
Public 30,321 29,537 27,892 23,721 20,769   
Private 1,747 2,032 2,528 2,785 3,525   
Total 32,068 31,569 30,420 26,506 24,294   
Dhanusha 
Public 112,454 109,931 114,954 107,867 116,893   
Private 352 8,592 328 10,288 6,963   
Total 112,806 118,523 115,282 118,155 123,856   
Lower Secondary School Enrolment 
  2008-09 2009-10 2010-11 2011-12 2012-13 2013-14 
National 
Public 1,263,313 1,366,348 1,469,133 1,546,647 1,537,167 1,544,658 
Private 203,549 238,074 230,794 266,033 286,025 283,693 
Total 1,466,862 1,604,422 1,699,927 1,812,680 1,823,192 1,828,351 
Dhankuta 
Public 13,020 13,898 13,694 13,673 12,798   
Private 591 576 632 817 996   
Total 13,611 14,474 14,326 14,490 13,794   
Dhanusha 
Public 21,668 23,692 26,077 30,133 35,758   
Private 100 532 0 0 0   
Total 21,768 24,224 26,077 30,133 35,758   
Secondary School Enrolment 
  2008-09 2009-10 2010-11 2011-12 2012-13 2013-14 
National 
Public 602,792 656,424 679,854 708,154 722,145 727,014 
Private 112,585 133,924 132,056 140,415 155,902 169,905 
Total 715,377 790,348 811,910 848,569 878,047 896,919 
Dhankuta 
Public 6,164 6,409 6,856 6,596 6,348   
Private 287 302 370 345 425   
Total 6,451 6,711 7,226 6,941 6,773   
Dhanusha 
Public 10,473 11,889 10,507 12,411 14,769   
Private 0 200 490 0 572   
Total 10,473 12,089 10,997 12,411 15,341   
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ENROLMENT RATES – DHANKUTA AND DHANUSA VDCs & MUNICIPALITIES 
Dhankuta VDCs & municipaluty  Dhankuta VDCs only 
Public & private schools  Public & private schools 
Year Primary LS  Year Primary LS 
2009-10 6,881 3,849 
 
2009-10 3,474 1,721 
2010-11 6,744 3,735 
 
2010-11 3,297 1,638 
2011-12 6,136 3,677 
 
2011-12 2,976 1,640 
2012-13 6,372 3,795 
 
2012-13 2,721 1,540 
2013-14 6,134 3,568 
 
2013-14 2,503 1,471 
 
Figure 24: Dhankuta enrolment in VDCs and municipality (all schools) 
 
 
Figure 25: Dhankuta enrolment in VDCs (all schools) 
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Dhanusa VDCs & municipality  Dhanusa VDCs only 
Public & private schools  Public & private schools 
Year Primary LS  Year Primary LS 
2009-10 12,524 3,387 
 
2009-10 6,007 1,147 
2010-11 12,603 3,048 
 
2010-11 6,837 1,297 
2011-12 13,777 5,106 
 
2011-12 6,571 2,053 
2012-13 12,187 3,873 
 
2012-13 6,189 1,632 
2013-14 10,419 3,760 
 
2013-14 4,006 1,091 
 
 
Figure 26: Dhanusa enrolment in VDCs and municipality (all schools) 
 
 
 
 
Figure 27: Dhanusa enrolment in VDCs (all schools) 
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EDUCATION: REPETITION AND DROP-OUT RATES – DHANUSA AND DHANKUTA 
 
DHANKUTA 
REPETITION RATES: public & private schools 
Primary 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 
Grade 1-5 Girls 13.6 11.4 9.8 9.4 9.9 
Grade 1-5 Boys 14.8 12.4 11.1 11.2 11.3 
Grade 1-5 All 14.2 11.9 10.5 10.3 10.6 
Lower Secondary 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 
Grade 6-8 Girls 7.9 8.5 6.7 6.4 5.6 
Grade 6-8 Boys 8.3 9.9 7.8 7.7 7.9 
Grade 6-8 All 8.1 9.2 7.2 7.0 6.7 
 
DHANUSA 
REPETITION RATES: public & private schools 
Primary 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 
Grade 1-5 Girls 8.0 9.3 9.8 9.9 7.6 
Grade 1-5 Boys 9.5 9.8 10.5 9.9 7.7 
Grade 1-5 All 8.8 9.6 10.2 9.9 7.6 
Lower Secondary 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 
Grade 6-8 Girls 5.9 1.7 2.5 3.5 3.0 
Grade 6-8 Boys 6.1 1.8 2.4 3.4 3.0 
Grade 6-8 All 6.0 1.7 2.4 3.4 3.0 
 
DHANKUTA 
DROP-OUT RATES: public & private schools 
Primary 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 
Grade 1-5 Girls 3.8 6.0 5.4 5.5 9.0 
Grade 1-5 Boys 3.4 6.6 6.5 4.3 11.3 
Grade 1-5 All 3.6 6.3 5.9 4.9 10.1 
Lower Secondary 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 
Grade 6-8 Girls 5.5 4.8 5.6 5.5 5.6 
Grade 6-8 Boys 6.5 9.5 9.0 5.4 7.7 
Grade 6-8 All 6.0 7.1 7.2 5.5 6.6 
 
DHANUSA 
DROP-OUT RATES: public & private schools 
Primary 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 
Grade 1-5 Girls 14.6 4.0 3.6 4.1 5.7 
Grade 1-5 Boys 18.1 6.4 6.0 5.2 7.0 
Grade 1-5 All 16.4 5.2 4.8 4.6 6.3 
Lower Secondary 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 
Grade 6-8 Girls 12.6 9.7 10.1 6.6 3.9 
Grade 6-8 Boys 8.9 8.7 7.2 5.8 8.0 
Grade 6-8 All 10.4 9.2 8.5 6.2 6.0 
111 
 
ANNEX 9: LOCAL ROADS 
 
Normative Institutional Framework 
 
1.1. General regulatory and policy framework for the local roads sector 
 
Local body functional responsibilities in the local roads sector are specified in the following legal and 
regulatory texts: 
• The Local Self-Governance Act (LSGA, 1999) – articles 28 (for VDCs), 96 (for Municipalities) 
and 128 (for DDCs) specify LB functional assignments, which include local roads and transport 
infrastructure. Article 243 specifies that the concerned line ministries are expected to assist LBs in 
the planning and implementation of their development programs.  
• LSGR (2000) and LBFAR (2007) provide more detailed operational and financial management 
rules, applicable to all LB activities (including those related to the local roads sector). 
• The Local Infrastructure Development Policy (LIDP, 2004), which assigns LB responsibilities in 
seven local infrastructure sub-sectors: 
- Local transport: district and  rural/agriculture roads, municipal roads, helipads, suspension bridges, 
bridges and culverts along district and rural/agricultural roads, foot and mule tracks, ropeways, 
cable cars, etc.; 
- Irrigation and river control; 
- Micro-hydro and alternative energy; 
- Water supply & sanitation; 
- Housing and urban development; 
- Solid waste management; 
- Social infrastructure (community buildings, health, education, etc.). 
 
The LIDP further classifies local infrastructure as: 
- Village level infrastructure: infrastructure programs that are included in village periodic and 
annual plans, as approved by village councils; 
- Municipal level infrastructure: infrastructure programs which that are included in municipal 
periodic  and annual plans, as approved by municipal councils; 
- District level infrastructure: infrastructure programs which are not included in VDC or municipal 
programs and thus fall under the district periodic and annual plans, approved by district councils. 
 
The LIDP also assigns local infrastructure sector sub-functions (e.g. policy and planning, setting 
technical norms and standards, design and costing, procurement, etc.) to central and local 
governments. 
 
• The National Transport Policy (2002) classifies the local transport system as consisting of district 
roads, village roads, agriculture roads, municipal roads and major foot trails. These local roads and 
trails are devolved to LBs for implementation within their respective jurisdictions. 
 
1.2. Institutional stakeholders in the local roads sector 
 
Table 7 below provides a list of the principal institutional stakeholders in the local roads sector at 
central government, district and village/municipal levels, as well as a summary of their main roles and 
responsibilities within the sector. 
 
1.3. Planning in the local roads sector 
 
Planning in the local roads sector follows largely the general planning process which is described in 
annex 2, at least as far as LB resources from own source, shared revenue and unconditional block 
grants are concerned. The authority of LBs in the road sector is constrained, though, by a variety of 
different programmes and conditions attached to earmarked roads sector funding, some of them 
providing funding in a rather ad hoc fashion which does not leave much room for planning to take 
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place. Therefore, the ways in which local roads sector activities are planned and implemented by LBs 
appear to vary according to the source of funding in practice. 
 
In some cases work on local roads is carried out separately by the Department of Roads. District 
Technical Offices (DTOs in DDCs are expected to provide all LBs with technical support. In practice, 
they tend to direct their limited capacity to district level roads and to GoN and donor-funded sector 
programs. The construction and maintenance of local roads are dominated by user committees (UCs) 
except for DoR roads, which are usually given to private contractors. 
 
See table 1 on the next page for a list of the principal institutional stakeholders in the local roads sector 
and a summary of their main roles and responsibilities within the sector, including those for planning. 
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Table 1: Local roads sector – principal stakeholders, roles and responsibilities 
CENTRAL GOVERNMENT LEVEL DISTRICT LEVEL VILLAGE/MUNICIPAL LEVEL 
Institutional 
stakeholder Main roles and responsibilities 
Institutional 
stakeholder Main roles and responsibilities 
Institutional 
stakeholder Main roles and responsibilities 
National 
Planning 
Commission 
(NPC): 
- Provide budget ceilings and guide-
lines for  local planning by 
November 15 (LSGA: Art. 203) 
- Provide directives for formulation 
of local periodic and annual plans 
(LSGA Art. 297 and LIDP) 
- Approve local conditional & 
unconditional grants and program 
budgets 
- Provide guidelines for M&E and 
harmonization for bringing 
uniformity in the local plan 
structures (LIDP) 
District 
Council (DC) 
- Approve district level DTMPs, 
district periodic plans, and annual 
plans and budgets, including 
sectoral programs 
- General functions of district council 
 
Village/-
Municipal 
Council 
(VC/MC) 
- Approve plans, programs and 
budgets submitted by 
VDC/Municipality 
- General functions of village and 
municipal councils 
Ministry of 
Finance 
(MoF) 
- Allocation and mobilization of 
local and foreign resources 
- Approval of local infrastructure 
plans, programs, projects and 
budgets 
- Issue authorization letters for 
budget release to respective 
ministries 
- Authorize unconditional grants 
directly to LBs as recommended by 
MoFALD 
- Review national priority programs 
on bi-monthly basis 
- Fund release and tracking through 
FCGO/DTCOs  
District 
Development 
Committee 
(DDC) 
- Implement plans, programs as 
approved by DC, and follow 
instructions of DC 
- Prepare DTMP and submit for 
approval to DCs 
- Planning, implementation, 
monitoring, evaluation and 
maintenance of district roads 
(LSGA: Art. 189) 
- Develop district periodic plan 
(LSGA Art.195) 
- Establish district plan formulation 
committees and integrated plan 
formulation committee (LSGA Art. 
197), 
- Prepare resource maps, conduct 
feasibility studies, prioritize and 
select projects (LSGA Arts. 199-
202) 
- Coordinate among different GoN 
agencies and I/NGOs at district 
Village/-
Municipal  
Development 
Committees 
(VDC and 
MDC) 
- Prepare roads related projects  
- Implement, monitor and maintain 
programs within VDC/municipality 
(LSGA Arts. 28 and 96F) 
- Prepare periodic plans, resource 
maps, feasibility studies 
- Prioritize and select projects 
- Coordinate among different GoN 
agencies and I/NGOs 
- Implement, manage ,supervise, 
monitor and review projects under 
their jurisdictions (LSGA Arts. 43-
54 and 111-124) 
- Conduct internal and final audits of 
VDCs/municipalities 
- Conduct public/social audits 
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CENTRAL GOVERNMENT LEVEL DISTRICT LEVEL VILLAGE/MUNICIPAL LEVEL 
Institutional 
stakeholder Main roles and responsibilities 
Institutional 
stakeholder Main roles and responsibilities 
Institutional 
stakeholder Main roles and responsibilities 
level (LSGA Art. 204)  
- Form users groups and identify 
NGOs for implementation of 
projects (LSGA Arts. 208-209) 
- Supervise, monitor, review and 
evaluate projects (LSGA Arts .210-
211)  
- Establish sector specific sections to 
carry out development functions 
(LSGA Art. 257) 
- Coordinate VDCs, municipalities 
and line agencies, share and 
allocate resources among LBs and 
line agencies as conditional, 
unconditional and revenue sharing 
grants to VDCs 
- Select final auditors for VDCs and 
conduct internal auditing of VDC 
accounts  
- Conduct public/social audits  
Ministry of 
Federal 
Affairs and 
Local 
Development 
(MoFALD) 
- Focal ministry for LBs and local 
infrastructure  
- Support to policy formulation, 
implementation, monitoring and 
standard setting, and information 
management,  
- Support technology development 
and research 
- Coordinate with different 
ministries, agencies, development 
partners and institutions I/NGOs, 
private sector and LBs (LIDP: 
6.2.6)  
- Provide directives and guidelines to 
LBs 
- Depute or facilitate deputation of 
Local 
Development 
Officer 
(LDO) 
- Secretary of DC and DDC 
- Coordinate development activities 
at  district level 
- Due to the absence of local 
elections since 2002, the DDCs 
themselves are currently headed by 
the LDO 
- Report to MoFALD 
- Responsible for financial and 
administrative management, and 
operates DDF, the ‘local’ treasury 
to which all LRN funds are 
allocated and from which funds are 
released to the operational accounts 
of different sector wise offices, line 
agencies and the DDC secretariat 
VDC 
secretary/ 
Municipal 
Executive 
Officer (EO) 
- Each VDC and municipality has a 
central government representative, 
appointed to work as the secretary of 
his/her respective Council/ 
Committee 
- responsible for implementation, 
monitoring and financial and 
physical management and reporting 
to concerned local agencies 
- Operate VDC/municipal treasuries 
- Administrative coordination of 
VDC/municipal level activities 
- Responsible for internal and final 
audits 
- Report to respective agencies and  to 
DDCs 
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CENTRAL GOVERNMENT LEVEL DISTRICT LEVEL VILLAGE/MUNICIPAL LEVEL 
Institutional 
stakeholder Main roles and responsibilities 
Institutional 
stakeholder Main roles and responsibilities 
Institutional 
stakeholder Main roles and responsibilities 
officials if requested by LBs who 
will be accountable to concerned 
LBs (LSGA: Art. 256) 
- Facilitate coordination of VDC 
level activities 
- Recommend budget releases to 
VDCs by DTCO 
Ministry of 
Physical 
Works and 
Transport 
Management 
- Develop planning, management 
and maintenance of strategic roads 
network, feeder roads and bridges 
- Implement work on local 
roads/bridges/culverts included in 
national budget heading no. 249 
Integrated 
plan 
Formulation 
Committee 
(IPFC) 
- Recommend synergized plan and 
programs that are submitted by 
different subject specific plan 
formulation committees to DDC 
Integrated 
Plan 
Formulation 
Committee 
(IPFC) 
- Recommend plans and programs 
that are submitted by different ward 
citizen forums (WCFs) to respective 
VDCs/municipalities (RMOMG 
sections 15-16) 
Ministry 
Urban 
Development 
- Provide support for Municipal 
infrastructure including physical 
planning of Municipalities and 
Town Development Committees 
Subject 
specific plan 
formulation 
committees 
- Scrutinize construction-related 
programs and projects that are 
received from Ilaka level service 
centers, line departments and other 
agencies and forward to IPFC 
(LSGA Art. 197) 
Ward 
Committee 
- Maintain roads and bridges (LSGA 
Arts. 25, 93) 
Ministry of 
Science, 
Technology 
and 
Environment 
- Issue guide lines/directives for 
IEE/EIA and approve EIA for road 
projects 
Ilaka level, 
service 
centers 
- Examine and prioritize programs 
and projects that are submitted by 
VDCs/municipalities and make 
recommendations to different 
subject specific plan formulation 
committees at DDC level 
Ward 
Citizen 
Forums 
(WCFs) 
- Prepare compile, integrate and 
prioritize different projects/ 
programs received from different 
communities/groups from settlement 
and neighborhood levels (RMOMG 
section 20) 
Financial 
Comptroller 
General 
Office 
(FCGO) 
- Release budget according to 
authorization letter of MoF, and 
other ministries 
- Treasury management, tracking and 
FMIS 
District 
Technical 
Office (DTO) 
- Provide technical support to LBs 
for planning, implementation, 
supervision, monitoring, evaluation 
and reporting 
- Prepare district specific norms and 
specifications and establish quality 
control labs or ensure quality 
control 
- Support local mechanisms for 
ensuring technical quality, develop 
guidelines and manuals for DDCs 
and other LBs 
- Prepare cost estimates, bid 
documents, design, drawings, 
Community 
groups and 
users 
- Identify and submit projects to 
WCFs 
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CENTRAL GOVERNMENT LEVEL DISTRICT LEVEL VILLAGE/MUNICIPAL LEVEL 
Institutional 
stakeholder Main roles and responsibilities 
Institutional 
stakeholder Main roles and responsibilities 
Institutional 
stakeholder Main roles and responsibilities 
agreement documents, 
measurement books, and other 
construction related documents and 
submit for approval to respective 
agencies for management and final 
payment activities 
- Conduct technical supervision of 
local level infrastructure projects 
and prepare cost variations 
- Prepare progress reports and 
forward to respective agencies, 
including DDCs and DoLIDAR 
Department 
of Local 
Infrastructure 
Development 
and 
Agricultural 
Roads 
(DoLIDAR) 
- Provide technical support to LBs to 
fulfill the objectives of the LIDP 
and national strategies. 
- Provide technical supervision of 
programs and projects implemented 
by LBs, GoN and different DPs 
- Provide technical support for 
maintaining quality and developing 
professionalism and competency of 
LBs 
- Establish linkages with other 
technical departments for quality 
outputs 
- Provide technical support for 
preparation of  DTMPs 
- Planning, budgeting, 
implementation, monitoring and 
reporting along with technical 
guidance and follow-up 
- Provide technical support to 
MoFALD to formulate local 
infrastructure policies/strategies 
and operational guidelines for LBs 
- Support LBs for capacity 
 District 
Treasury 
Comptroller 
Office 
(DTCO) 
- Release approved budget at local 
level 
- Handle single treasury account 
- Fund tracking, FM, operate FMIS  
- Submit periodic financial reports to 
central FCGO 
- Conduct internal audits of 
government accounts  
- Coordinate account related officials 
at local level 
Construction 
committees, 
User Groups 
- Facilitate participation by users of 
services 
- Promote inclusive, representative 
and gender friendly construction 
committees for project 
implementation 
- Establish monitoring committee 
during construction 
- Conduct public audits 
- Conduct local procurement of goods 
and services 
- Collect service charges 
- Report to concerned LBs (LSGA 
Arts. 49,119 and 209) 
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CENTRAL GOVERNMENT LEVEL DISTRICT LEVEL VILLAGE/MUNICIPAL LEVEL 
Institutional 
stakeholder Main roles and responsibilities 
Institutional 
stakeholder Main roles and responsibilities 
Institutional 
stakeholder Main roles and responsibilities 
development, human resource 
development and training for DTOs 
- Develop manuals, guidelines, 
technical norms, standard 
specifications related to local 
infrastructure services (LIDP 
responsibility matrix) 
- Coordinate with different 
departments, LBs and other 
stakeholders concerning local 
infrastructure  
Department 
Of Roads 
- Implement activities related to the 
strategic roads network through its 
5 regional and 25 division offices 
- Carry out road construction 
activities that are under jurisdiction 
of LBs under budget heading 249 
I/NGOs - Social mobilization, group 
strengthening and capacity 
development 
- Support for basic services along 
road side corridors (LSGA Arts. 47, 
51, 115, 120, 204, and 209) 
- Carry out local level activities by 
partnering with LBs 
  
Steering or 
Coordination 
Committee 
- Review project progress reports 
and take necessary action to deal 
with project specific 
implementation issues 
Private 
sector 
(contractors, 
consulting 
firms) 
- Provide services for the 
implementation of road 
construction 
- Provide consulting services for 
designing, supervision and 
technical quality control 
- Conduct IEE/EIA, monitoring and 
reporting 
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